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IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
Plaintiff: 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC ("Wasatch Oil & Gas") 
Defendants: 
Edward A. Reott ("Ed Reott"), an individual and owner of Goal, LLC and Regoal, 
Inc. 
Mission Energy, LLC ("Mission") 
Key Energy Services, Inc., dba Key Energy Services Inc. Four Corners Division 
("Key Energy") 
J West Oilfield Services, Inc. ("J West") 
Counterclaim, Third Party and Crossclaim Plaintiffs: 
Goal, LLC ("Goal"), a Utah limited liability company and Ed Reott5s successor in 
interest to mineral interests acquired from Mission 
Regoal, Inc. ("Regoal"), a Pennsylvania corporation and Ed Reott's successor in 
interest to the Lavinia Well 
Third Party, Counterclaim, and Crossclaim Defendants: 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC 
Wasatch Gas Gathering, LLC ("Wasatch Gas Gathering") 
Wasatch Oil & Gas Production Corporation ("WOGPC") 
Bill Barrett Corporation ("BBC") 
Mission Energy, LLC 
For ease of reference, Ed Reott, Goal, and Regoal are referred to collectively and 
interchangeably as "Reott." 
For ease of reference, Wasatch Oil & Gas, Wasatch Gas Gathering, and WOGPC are 
referred to collectively and interchangeably as "Wasatch." 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the trial court's August 19, 2009 final judgment ("Final 
Judgment") and all other orders entered in the underlying matter. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated ["UCA"] § 78A-4-103(2)(j) and the Utah 
Supreme Court's Order dated Sept. 17, 2009, transferring this appeal to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues set forth below derive from the trial court's Final Judgment. 
Issue I: Did the trial court violate this Court's mandate by considering on remand 
whether Justin Sutton, a manager of Mission, had "actual authority" to assign its Section 
32 Leases to Wasatch? (Issue Preserved: R. 847; 8009; 8291:15-23, 34, 87-88, 166.) 
Standard of Review: "[B]ecause the mandate is a legal determination, reviewing 
whether a trial court complied with the mandate presents a question of law, which we 
review for correctness." Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, \ 8, 218 P.3d 583. 
Issue II: Did the trial court incorrectly conclude that Mission either orally authorized 
or ratified Sutton's transfer of Mission's mineral leases to Wasatch? (Issue Preserved: 
R. 847-851; 5647-5665; 8293.) 
Standard of Review: Ratification and oral authorization involve questions of fact, 
which are reviewed for clear error, and questions of law based on these findings, which 
are reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994). 
Issue III: If the assignment to Wasatch was valid, did the trial court incorrectly 
conclude that the June 2000 transfer was not a fraudulent transfer under UCA § 25-6-6 
(1989)? (Issue Preserved: R. 809-818, 831-833.) 
4848-5386-0357/RE009-001 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review: Under UCA § 25-6-6, whether Mission was "insolvent" and 
whether Mission received "reasonably equivalent value" for the Section 32 Leases 
"present mixed questions of fact and law." See Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT App. 78, Tf 11, 
132 P.3d 63. Appellate courts "review factual questions under the clearly erroneous 
standard and legal questions under the correctness standard. . . . Questions of statutory 
interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness and no deference is 
given to the trial court's determination." Id. (citations omitted). 
Issue IV: Did the trial court err in awarding Reott no damages on his trespass to 
chattels and breach of common carrier obligation claims? {Issue Preserved: R. 7938-
7949.) 
Standard of Review: "Whether the trial court applied the correct rule for measuring 
damages is a question of law that we review for correctness." Mahana v. Onyx 
Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, f 25, 96 P.3d 893. The trial court's reversal of its 
summary judgment decision on Reott5 s trespass to chattels claim is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. See Chilton v. Young, 2009 UT App 265, f 4, 220 P.3d 171. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
A copy of the following determinative statutes is attached in the Addendum: 
(1) UCA §25-5-1 (1953) 
(2) UCA § 25-6-2 (1992) 
(3) UCA §25-6-3 (1988) 
(4) UCA §25-6-4 (1988) 
(5) UCA § 25-6-6 (1989) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal by Reott of the trial court's Final Judgment. 
II. Statement of Facts 
Mission Energy, LLC ("Mission") was engaged in oil and gas exploration. (R. 8098.) 
Mission, a Colorado limited liability company, conducted its business during all relevant 
periods pursuant to an Amended and Restated Mission Operating Agreement (the 
"MOA," attached hereto as Addendum A). (R. 5400, 5420.) The MOA provided that 
"[a]ny...assignment . . . intended to bind the LLC or convey . . . title to its real . . . 
property shall be valid and binding for all purposes if executed by any two of the 
Managers." (R. 8099-8100.) The MOA identified as "initial managers" of Mission four 
individuals: Justin Sutton, Charles Willard, William Muller, and Fred Jager. (R. 8099.) 
Jager did not sign the MOA and there was no evidence at trial that he ever knew he was a 
manager of Mission. (Id.) In May 1998, Willard and Muller terminated their relationship 
with Mission, and Mission did not appoint any managers to replace them. (Id.) From 
May 1998 to October 21, 2000, when he resigned, Sutton acted as sole manager of 
Mission. (R. 8101-8102.) 
In 1997, Mission obtained approval from the Utah School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration ("SITLA") to drill a gas well (the "Lavinia Well") in Section 32, 
Township 12 South, Range 16 East, SLB&M ("Section 32"). (R. 8100.) From its 
inception and as of May 1, 2000 through June 21, 2000, Mission was not able to pay its 
debts as they became due. (R. 8101.) Reott twice loaned funds to Mission (R. 8100), but 
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Mission defaulted on repayment of the loans. On December 20, 1999, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Colorado awarded Reott a judgment in the amount of $204,000 
against Mission (the "Colorado Judgment"). (R. 8103.) 
In Mission's final months of existence, Sutton disposed of Mission's mineral leases, 
its only real assets. On May 1, 2000, pursuant to a letter agreement (the "May Letter 
Agreement"), Mission transferred eight mineral leases located on the Tavaputs Plateau 
(the "May Leases") to Wasatch for an even $5.00 per net acre. (Id.) Following the 
transfer of the May Leases, Sutton and Todd Cusick of Wasatch discussed a second sale 
of leases to Wasatch in June 2000 involving another ten mineral leases on the Tavaputs 
Plateau comprising 7,021.23 net acres (the "June Leases"), including two SITLA leases 
in Section 32 (the "Section 32 Leases"). (R. 7996; 8103; Trial Exhibits 114, 115.) The 
Section 32 Leases—ML-43798 (80 acres) and ML-43541 (560 acres)—covered all 640 
acres of Section 32. (Id.) (Addendum B is a map of the location of the May Leases and 
June Leases, including the Section 32 Leases.) In June 2000, Mission's interests in 
Section 32 were already encumbered by liens filed by Mission's contractors J-West and 
Key Energy and others. (Id.) 
Sutton and Cusick ultimately agreed that Mission would transfer 600 acres of its 
Section 32 Leases, carving out for Mission only the Lavinia Well and the surrounding 40 
acres to a depth of 3,398 feet below the surface of the earth. (Id.) Sutton proposed that 
Wasatch reimburse Mission for past rental payments, obtain reinstatement of any expired 
leases, maintain the leases as lessee and unit operator, and give Mission a specified 
percentage of any drilling deal Wasatch or Mission might negotiate in the future with 
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respect to the leases purchased. (R. 8108.) The letter agreement between Sutton and 
Cusick dated June 21, 2000 (the "June Letter Agreement," attached as Addendum C) set 
forth the terms on which Sutton agreed to assign the June Leases, including the Section 
32 Leases, to Wasatch. (R. 8103.) On June 23, 2000, Sutton alone executed three 
mineral lease assignments (the "MLAs") to transfer Mission's Section 32 Leases and 
returned them to Wasatch.1 (R. 8110-8111.) Neither the June Letter Agreement nor the 
MLAs were recorded in the county recorder's office. (R. 8116) 
Pursuant to the June Letter Agreement, Wasatch reimbursed Mission $3,629.40 for 
Mission's prior lease rental payments on the June Leases purchased by Wasatch. (Id.) 
Wasatch also paid to SITLA approximately $4,000 for lease rental payments between 
June 21, 2000 and August 9, 2001. (Id.) Following the June 2000 transaction, in 
addition to the right to participate in any drilling deal, Mission retained only the 
following assets: (a) the Lavinia Well and 40 acres to a depth of 3,398 feet, (b) cash in 
the bank of $27,236.27, (c) a $19,943.15 bond held by the state of Utah, and (d) Gusher 
leases. (R. 8113.) Neither the value, if any, nor validity of the Gusher leases was 
addressed at trial. (Id.) The trial court found that Reott and Sutton valued the Lavinia 
Well at an amount in excess of the total of all outstanding Mission liabilities. (Id.) 
Nevertheless, Mission's financial statements and balance sheets showed that Mission's 
total liabilities exceeded its "total assets," which included "Oil and Gas Properties," by 
$434,778 by the end of 1999 and $581,282 by the end of 2000. (R. 8293:660-663.) 
1
 The MLAs assigned all 80 acres of ML-43798, 520 acres of ML-43541 from the surface 
to the center of the earth, and 40 acres of ML-43541 below the Lavinia Well from 3,398 
feet below the surface to the center of the earth. 
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Reott filed and docketed the Colorado Judgment in the trial court and acquired the 
judgments obtained against Mission and its property by J-West and Key Energy. (R. 
8115, 8116.) On August 9, 2001, the Carbon County sheriff sold Mission's Section 32 
Leases to satisfy Reott's judgments against Mission. (R. 8117.) Reott purchased 
Mission's Section 32 Leases by his own credit bid of $1.00 at the sheriffs sale. (R. 
8118.) Wasatch, the purported successor to Mission, did not attend or bid at the sale. 
Wasatch later filed notices to exercise a right of redemption with respect to the Section 
32 Leases, which notices Reott rejected. (Id.) On February 9, 2002, Reott received a 
sheriffs deed for the Section 32 Leases. (Id.) 
The Lavinia Well was "shut in" and not producing at the time of the sheriffs sale, but 
due to Reott's efforts it became operational within about a week. (R. 8205.) Reott 
immediately telephoned Cusick to request access to Wasatch's gas gathering pipeline to 
transport and sell natural gas produced from the Lavinia Well. (R. 8204.) Cusick and 
Wasatch did not respond to this and other contacts made by Reott. (R. 8204-8205.) 
On April 1, 2002, Wasatch sold the Section 32 Leases and gas gathering pipeline, 
along with other properties, to BBC. (Id.) Again, in August 2002, Reott requested from 
BBC access to the gas gathering pipeline. (Id.) Finally, in 2004 BBC provided to Reott 
two proposed agreements which the trial court held were commercially unreasonable. (R. 
8209.) The parties finally reached an agreement, and Reott signed a gas gathering 
agreement on July 7, 2005. (Id.) Reott began producing and transporting gas under this 
2
 BBC's claim of title to the Section 32 Leases is solely as a successor to Wasatch and 
therefore rises and falls on Wasatch's claim to be Mission's successor in interest. 
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agreement later that same year. (Id.) Due to Wasatch's and BBC's refusal to allow Reott 
to transport gas through the gas gathering pipeline, the Lavinia Well remained shut-in and 
did not produce gas from August 2001 to August 2005. (R. 8204-8209.) In late 2003, 
BBC forcibly removed the lateral pipeline connecting the Lavinia Well to BBC's gas 
gathering pipeline, causing the meter house to be pulled off its foundation, bending the 
oil production line, damaging the connection to the oil tank, and causing an oil spill of 
approximately 100 barrels of oil. (R. 4816.) 
III. Course of Proceedings & Disposition Below 
On December 24, 2001, Wasatch filed suit against Reott, Mission, Key Energy, and J 
West to quiet title, inter alia, to the Section 32 Leases. (R. 1-147.) In response, Reott 
asserted several counterclaims and third-party claims against Wasatch and BBC, 
including the following claims at issue in this appeal: (1) quiet title of the Section 32 
Leases; (2) fraudulent transfer of the June Leases, including the Section 32 Leases; (3) 
breach of common carrier obligations and lost production in refusing to transport gas 
produced by Reott from the Lavinia Well through the gas gathering pipeline; and (4) 
BBC's trespass to chattels for damages to the Lavinia Well pipeline and equipment and 
oil spill.4 (R. 2118-2165.) 
Reott seeks title to the Section 32 Leases, but seeks to set aside the transfer of the June 
Leases to satisfy his outstanding judgment against Mission. See infra Part III, n.26. 
Reott also asserted counterclaims and third-party claims for access to transport gas 
through the gas gathering pipeline; intentional interference with prospective economic 
relations; and trespass and conversion of minerals BBC later produced from Section 32. 
Wasatch and BBC each asserted crossclaims and counterclaims against Reott for fraud; 
interference with economic relations/ economic advantage; and bad faith litigation. (R. 
1911-1934, 1940-1969.) None of these claims are at issue in this appeal. 
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Quiet Title and Fraudulent Transfer Claims, On cross-motions for partial summary 
judgment regarding the quiet title/fraudulent transfer claims, the trial court quieted title to 
the Section 32 Leases in Reott. (R. 5382-5390.) The trial court found that (1) the MLAs 
did not convey legal title to Wasatch because the MLAs failed to identify Sutton as a 
person authorized to execute the assignments on behalf of Mission; (2) Wasatch did not 
obtain equitable title to the Section 32 Leases because the June 2000 transfer was 
fraudulent; and (3) the June Letter Agreement did not convey equitable title to Wasatch 
because no consideration was ever paid. (R. 4810-4815.) The trial court entered its 
order (attached hereto as Addendum D) and certified it as final under Rule 54(b) for 
purposes of appeal. (R. 5385-5386.) This order was the subject of the first appeal. 
Trespass to Chattels Claim. Reott also moved for partial summary judgment on his 
trespass to chattels claim. (R. 2711-2712, 2723-2724.) The trial court granted Reott's 
motion, holding BBC liable for the damages it caused to the Lavinia Well pipeline and 
equipment and resulting oil spill. (R. 5386.) The trial court reserved for trial 
determination of the amount of Reott's damages. (R. 5386.) 
Breach of Common Carrier Obligation Claim. Reott also moved for partial summary 
judgment on his claims for Wasatch's and BBC's breaches of their common carrier 
obligations. (R. 2769-2772.) The trial court held that Wasatch and BBC were common 
carriers, breached their common carrier obligations to Reott, and were liable to Reott for 
lost production from the Lavinia Well during the time it was denied access to their gas 
gathering pipeline. (R. 4819-4823.) The trial court reserved for trial determination of 
Reott's damages for lost production. (R. 4283.) 
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Prior Appeal of Quiet Title and Fraudulent Transfer Claims. After the trial court's 
rulings on the motions for summary judgment, Wasatch and BBC appealed the trial 
court's final order quieting title to the Section 32 Leases in Reott. (R. 5428-5434.) This 
Court reversed the trial court's order quieting title to the Section 32 Leases in Reott, 
holding that the ML As' failure to identify Sutton's capacity for Mission was not 
dispositive of Wasatch's legal title to the Section 32 Leases. See Wasatch Oil & Gas, 
LLC. v. Reott, 2007 UT App. 223, t 27, 163 P.3d 713 (Addendum E). While this Court 
held that Sutton did not have written authorization to assign the Section 32 Leases to 
Wasatch, as required by the statute of frauds, this Court ruled that it was not clear 
whether Sutton could meet either the oral authorization or ratification exceptions to the 
statute of frauds. Id. fflf 28-29. It therefore "reverse[d] the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment as to the issue of legal title and remand[ed] to the trial court to determine 
whether Mission gave Sutton oral authorization to execute the Assignments or whether 
Mission subsequently ratified the Assignments; and, if so, the effect thereof." Id. 
With respect to equitable title, this Court held that the trial court engaged in improper 
fact finding on summary judgment on Reott's fraudulent transfer claim under UCA § 25-
6-5 by weighing the inferences to be drawn from the undisputed facts and badges of 
fraud. See id. If 31. This Court therefore "reverse[d] the trial court's determination of 
fraudulent intent and remand[ed] for 'the fact-finder [to] consider' whether the 
undisputed facts support an inference of fraudulent intent." Id. f 36. 
Remand and Trial. On remand, Reott moved for partial summary judgment on oral 
authorization and ratification. (R. 5644-5646.) The trial court held that Mission did not 
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ratify Sutton's June 2000 assignment of the Section 32 Leases (R. 8289:68-69), but 
denied Reott's motion with respect to oral authorization (R. 6024-6026; 8289:64-68). 
A five-day bench trial was held from October 27-31, 2008, on the quiet title/ 
fraudulent transfer claims, and to determine the amount of Reott's damages for 
Wasatch's and BBC's breach of their common carrier obligations and BBC's trespass to 
chattels. The court bifurcated the trial and heard (and decided) the quiet title/fraudulent 
transfer claims before hearing and deciding the damages issues. The trial court ruled 
during trial that BBC held title to the Section 32 Leases because Wasatch had acquired 
legal and/or and equitable title to, and hence a right to redeem, the Section 32 Leases. 
The trial court also held that the June 2000 transaction was not a fraudulent transfer. (R. 
8119-8121.) The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re: 
Quiet Title and Fraudulent Transfer Claims (Addendum F) on February 27, 2009, and 
ordered Reott to release all lis pendens of record filed against the June Leases (R. 8097-
8123).5 
On the issue of Reott's damages for breach of common carrier obligations, the trial 
court concluded that Reott suffered no damages as a result of the three-year period that 
the Lavinia Well was denied transportation of natural gas to market via the gas gathering 
pipeline owned first by Wasatch and then by BBC. (R. 8210-8212.) Despite its earlier 
determination of BBC's liability, the trial court also held that Reott suffered no damages 
on his trespass to chattels claim because the evidence did not show that BBC caused the 
5
 The trial court concluded that appellants, unlike other litigants, are not entitled to the 
protections afforded by a lis pendens. This is contrary to Utah law. See, e.g., Gardner v. 
Perry City, 2000 UT App. 1, f24. 
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damages to the Lavinia Well pipeline and equipment or the oil spill. (R. 8212-8213.) 
The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re: Damages on 
August 19, 2009 (attached as Addendum G). (R. 8201-8215.) 
The trial court entered Final Judgment on August 19, 2009 (R. 8216-8219), and Reott 
filed the Notice of Appeal on September 10, 2009 (R. 8243-8246.) Reott now appeals 
the trial court's orders quieting title to the Section 32 Leases in BBC and denying all of 
Reott9s claims for damages. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Reott challenges the trial court's conclusions quieting title to the Section 32 Leases in 
BBC and denying all of Reott5s damages. In arriving at these conclusions, the trial court 
exceeded the scope of this Court's remand and reframed the issues to Wasatch's and 
BBC's advantage; reversed and vacated prior summary judgment decisions without a 
reasonable basis to do so; entered internally inconsistent findings of fact; and erred in its 
application of the law. 
The determinative issue on title to the Section 32 Leases is whether Wasatch had a 
right to redeem the Section 32 Leases sold to Reott at the sheriffs sale. Such a right 
could only arise if Wasatch validly acquired legal or equitable title to the Section 32 
Leases from Mission. As the plaintiff in its action to quiet title to the Section 32 Leases, 
Wasatch had the burden to prove that it was Mission's successor in interest to the Section 
32 Leases. If Wasatch prevailed on this claim, Reott then had the burden to prove that 
Mission's conveyance of the Section 32 Leases to Wasatch was a fraudulent transfer. 
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This Court has already held that Sutton did not have the requisite written authority 
under the statute of frauds to validly convey Mission's title in the Section 32 Leases to 
Wasatch, but remanded to the trial court to consider only (1) oral authorization and (2) 
ratification. See Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott, 2007 UT App. 223, f 30, 163 P.3d 
713. Despite this clear mandate from this Court, the trial court reframed the oral 
authority issue to Wasatch's and BBC's advantage and ruled that Sutton had "actual 
authority" from Mission to alone transfer the Section 32 Leases. 
Considering the proper issues on remand, there was no oral authorization or 
ratification by Mission under the facts as found by the trial court, as a matter of law, 
because (1) there is no longer a recognized oral authorization exception under Colorado 
or Utah law, (2) there was no document in writing that satisfied all requirements for a 
binding ratification by Mission, and (3) Jager was not a manager and could not orally 
authorize or ratify Sutton's conveyances on behalf of Mission. Because Mission did not 
orally authorize or ratify Sutton's conveyances, the June Letter Agreement and the MLAs 
fail to satisfy the statute of frauds. 
Furthermore, the trial court incorrectly concluded that Mission's transfer of the June 
Leases to Wasatch in June 2000 was not a fraudulent transfer. Pursuant to UCA § 25-6-
6, Reott had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mission did not receive 
"reasonably equivalent value" for the June Leases it transferred to Wasatch, and (2) 
Mission was insolvent when it transferred the leases in June 2000. First, while Wasatch 
gave Mission an unfulfilled promise of a drilling deal that never materialized, the only 
value received by Mission for the June Leases was a $3,629.40 reimbursement from 
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Wasatch. Because this amount comprised a mere $0.52 per net acre for the June 
Leases—less than 11% of the $5.00 per net acre value that the trial court specifically 
found "constituted reasonably equivalent value" for the very same June Leases—Mission 
did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the June Leases it transferred to Wasatch. 
Second, Mission was presumed insolvent under the Utah Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act [UFTA] by its inability to pay its debts as they came due, and Wasatch did 
not meet its burden to rebut the insolvency presumption by proving that Mission was 
indeed solvent. By early 2000 Mission's liabilities exceeded the value of its assets by at 
least $434,778, but Wasatch failed to establish the fair value of Mission's remaining 
assets other than $47,179.42 in cash and bond. The sole evidence at trial was that the fair 
value of the Lavinia Well and its 40-acres to a depth 3,398 feet in June 2000 was no more 
than $20,000, and there was no evidence whatsoever of the value, if any, of Mission's 
Gusher leases. The trial court therefore incorrectly concluded that Wasatch rebutted the 
insolvency presumption. Because Mission transferred the June Leases for less than 
reasonably equivalent value, and was insolvent at the time, the transfer is fraudulent and 
defeats Wasatch's claims to legal and equitable title. 
The trial court also erred in denying all of Reott's damages for damage to the Lavinia 
well pipeline, equipment and oil spill based on causation. Although the trial court had 
decided the issue of causation three years prior on summary judgment, it overturned that 
decision during trial without notice or a reasonable basis to do so, all to Reott's prejudice. 
Such was an abuse of discretion. The trial court also incorrectly concluded that Reott 
suffered no damages as a result of any breach by Wasatch or BBC of their common 
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carrier obligations because the trial court failed to apply the correct measure of damages. 
The proper measure of damages for the disruption to Reott's production from the Lavinia 
Well is lost profits, which Reott proved. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Incorrectly Concluded That Sutton Had "Actual Authority." 
In the prior appeal, this Court concluded that Sutton did not have express authority 
acting alone to convey the Section 32 Leases and remanded "to the trial court to 
determine [1] whether Mission gave Sutton oral authorization to execute the [MLAs] or 
[2] whether Mission subsequently ratified the [MLAs]; and, [3] if so, the effect thereof." 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott, 2007 UT App. 223, f 30, 163 P.3d 713. This Court 
appropriately ordered the trial court to conduct "further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion." Id. f 37 (emphasis added). 
In spite of this clear mandate, Wasatch argued on remand that the mandate should be 
ignored because this Court had a "limited record" before it in the prior appeal, and that 
the "limited record" required the trial court to go beyond the mandate and look at "actual 
authority" instead of, or in addition to, "oral authority."6 (R. 7514-7517; 8289:42-43; 
8291:25-27; 8292:464-469.) The trial court was persuaded and reframed the issue on 
remand as one of "actual authority." (R. 8291:37-38; 8292:470-472.) Apparently, the 
trial court's basis for exceeding the mandate was its conclusion that the lack of a second 
manager who could grant oral authority or ratify Sutton's actions excused the MOA's 
6
 The trial court's application of "actual authority" was confusing and inconsistent, 
applying "actual authority" instead of "oral authority," (R. 8192:470-472), but later 
finding "oral ztuthorization" in addition to actual authority (R. 8116). 
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prohibition of a single manager disposing of Mission property. The trial court denied 
Reott's pre-trial motion in limine to exclude evidence of actual authority, stating: "[I]t's 
not clear to me that, if there's no one else who's operating this besides Sutton, how do 
you determine if there was oral authorization? . . . I don't think the Court of Appeals 
mandate was strictly that, if there was no one who gave him authorization, if he was just 
operating on his own, what if no one could give him authorization." (R. 8191:37-38.) 
Similarly, the trial court denied Reott's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of 
Wasatch's case-in-chief, concluding that the trial court must consider "actual authority": 
"Really, this issue comes down to actual authority versus oral authority[.] . . . Just 
because there was no one to give oral authority, does that mean he couldn't have any 
authority?" (R. 8192:470-472.) The appropriate answer is "yes." As is implicit, if not 
explicit, in this Court's prior opinion and mandate, Sutton did not have had "actual" 
authority to act alone due to the MOA's requirement that two managers must act to 
dispose of Mission's property. In other words, the MO A did not give the requisite 
written authority for a single manager, such as Sutton, to dispose of Mission's property as 
required by the statute of frauds. Despite this Court's mandate to consider "oral 
authorization," the trial court reasoned: "I don't think that's what the Court of Appeals 
intended" (id.) and concluded that "Sutton had actual authority to execute the lease 
assignment documents." (R. 8118, f 5.) 
The trial court violated Utah's mandate rule by considering and applying an 
unrecognized, undefined "actual authority" exception to the statute of frauds. 
Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion that Wasatch obtained legal title from Mission 
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because Sutton had actual authority to transfer the Section 32 Leases must be reversed as 
violating both this Court's mandate and the statute of frauds. u[B]ecause the mandate is a 
legal determination, reviewing whether a trial court complied with the mandate presents a 
question of law, which we review for correctness." Utah Dept. of Tramp, v. Ivers, 2009 
UT56, t8 ,218P.3d583. 
A, Sutton did not have written authorization from Mission to alone convey the 
Section 32 Leases, 
"The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern the exercise of redemption rights." 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, 2007 UT App. 223, \ 20. In 2001, when Wasatch attempted to 
exercise its purported redemption rights, the governing provision was former Rule 6 9 0 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided that "[rjeal property sold subject to 
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be redeemed by the [judgment debtor] or 
[its] successors in interest^" Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j)(l) (repealed 2004) (emphasis added). 
Reott purchased Mission's Section 32 Leases at the sheriffs sale. "Thus, as a purchaser, 
'[Reott] owned the [Section 32 Leases], subject only to the exercise of the right of 
redemption5 by Mission, or its alleged successor in interest, Wasatch." Wasatch Oil & 
Gas, 2007 UT App. 223, % 22 (italics added). 
Wasatch was Mission's successor in interest only if a valid conveyance occurred, 
requiring compliance with the statute of frauds, id. U 29, which provides: 
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered[,] or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering[,] or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized 
by writing,, 
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UCA § 25-5-1 (1953) (emphasis added); see also UCA § 25-5-3 (1953). "The 
requirement that an agent signing on behalf of another party is authorized in writing to do 
so '[n]aturally . . . appli[es] to agents of corporations.'" Wasatch Oil & Gas, 2007 UT 
App. 223, \ 28 (quoting Mathis v. Madsen, 261 P.2d 952, 956 (1953). This Court held 
that the MOA provides the requirements for written authorization and the conditions 
attendant to such authorization: "the MOA 'requires two Mission managers to execute 
instruments conveying Mission's title to real property, such as the [MLAs].'" Id. 
Because only Sutton executed the MLAs, this Court held that "Sutton, acting alone, did 
not have the requisite written authority to assign the Section 32 Leasehold Interests." Id. 
In other words, Sutton did not have actual authority to alone assign the Section 32 Leases 
to Wasatch, and the trial court was not at liberty to rule otherwise. 
B. The trial court violated this Court's mandate and Utah's mandate rule. 
This Court remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether two exceptions to 
the statute of frauds' written authorization requirement applied: 
We therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to the issue of 
legal title and remand to the trial court to determine [1] whether Mission gave 
Sutton oral authorization to execute the [MLAs] or [2] whether Mission 
subsequently ratified the [MLAs]; and, [3] if so, the effect thereof. 
Id. \ 30. The mandate from this Court was clear. 
On remand, however, the trial court ignored this mandate and, over the objection of 
Reott (R. 8291:15-23, 34, 87-88, 166), reframed the issue by concluding that "[t]he Utah 
Court of Appeals . . . directed this Court to hold a trial with respect to . . . (a) lack of 
actual authority on the part of Sutton to act for Mission in transferring the Section 32 
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[Leases.]" (R. 8118 (emphasis added).) Although the trial court did not cite to any 
authority or articulate any standard by which Sutton could arrogate to himself "actual 
authority" to assign the Section 32 Leases when the MO A denied him such authority, it 
nevertheless concluded that Sutton had "actual authority" to assign the Section 32 Leases 
and that Wasatch therefore "held legal title and was a successor in interest." (Id.) 
Such departure from this Court's mandate on remand violates Utah's mandate rule. 
Utah courts have "long recognized that branch of the law of the case doctrine known as 
the mandate rule." Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, | 12, 218 P.3d 583 
fivers IF) (citation omitted). "The mandate rule dictates that pronouncements of an 
appellate court on legal issues in a case become the law of the case and must be followed 
in subsequent proceedings of that case." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "The 
mandate of an appellate court binds the district court and the parties and affords the 
district court no discretion whether to comply with that mandate." Id. f 8 (citation 
omitted). "The mandate must be followed even though the lower court subsequently 
addressing the issue may believe that the issue could have been better decided in another 
fashion." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995). "The 
mandate is also binding on the appellate court should the case return on appeal after 
remand." IHCHealth Servs., Inc.f v. D &KMgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, If 28, 196 P.3d 588 
(citation omitted). Thus, "[t]he application of the mandate rule lacks the flexibility found 
in other branches of the law of the case doctrine." Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038. 
Ivers, an eminent domain case, highlights the firmness of the mandate rule in cases 
procedurally similar to the present case. On the first appeal (Ivers I) the Utah Supreme 
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Court had held that "severance damages are awardable [to Arby's] for the loss of view . . 
. if the 'condemned property is essential to the completion of the project as a whole."' 
Ivers II, 2009 UT 56, \ 14 (quoting Ivers v. Utah Dep 't of Tramp., 2007 UT 19, \ 21, 154 
P.3d 802 fivers /")). The Supreme Court noted that it had remanded to the trial court to 
determine "whether Arby's condemned land was essential to the project," and if it was, 
"to award appropriate damages." Id. "This was the scope of remand." Id. Because the 
parties had stipulated after remand that the condemned land was essential to the project, 
"all that remained was for the district court to award Arby's the appropriate severance 
damages." Id. \ 15. On remand, however, UDOT filed a motion in limine to exclude all 
evidence of Arby's right of view because Arby's predecessors in interest had allegedly 
conveyed the right of view in 1961 and 1992. Id. At the urging of UDOT, the trial court 
reframed the issues as presented in UDOT's motion, ignored the limited scope of remand, 
granted the motion and concluded that no claim for a taking existed. Id. 
Arby's appealed, asserting that the trial court violated the Supreme Court's mandate 
to "award appropriate damages." Id. The Supreme Court noted that "the district court 
was drawn in by UDOT's attempt to reframe the foreclosed issue of Arby's right of 
view." Id. \ 15. The prior mandate and UDOT's subsequent admission that the 
condemned land was essential to the project "prohibited] UDOT from reframing the 
issue to its advantage after remand." Id. \ 20. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that 
"because the trial court violated our mandate by exceeding the scope of remand, we 
reverse and vacate its order granting UDOT's motion in limine[.]" Id. Since the trial 
court had made no findings regarding Arby's severance damages, the Supreme Court 
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remanded for the second time and once again "directed] the trial court on remand to 
award appropriate severance damages to Arby's." Id. 
As in Ivers II, the trial court in the present case was drawn in by Wasatch's efforts to 
reframe, to its advantage, the authorization issue as "actual authority." As in Ivers II, this 
Court's mandate prohibited the trial court from reframing the issue as "actual authority." 
See supra Part I, at 15-16. "[B]ecause the trial court violated this Court's mandate by 
exceeding the scope of remand," this Court should "reverse and vacate" the trial court's 
conclusion that Wasatch met its burden to prove actual authority and thereby obtained 
legal title and became a successor in interest to Mission. Ivers II, 2009 UT 56, Tf 20. 
II. The Trial Court Incorrectly Concluded That Mission Either Orally Authorized 
Or Ratified Sutton's June 2000 Transfer Of The Section 32 Leases. 
Considering the only two proper issues on remand, oral authorization and ratification, 
the trial court incorrectly concluded that Sutton's actions were orally authorized or 
ratified by Mission. (R. 8116; 8118, If 7.)7 
A. Oral authorization has no legal effect on Sutton's June 2000 transfer. 
(1) Colorado law does not recognize oral authorization. 
There could be no oral authorization by Mission sufficient to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. Although the Utah statute of frauds applies to the June 2000 transaction between 
Sutton and Wasatch, Utah law defers to Colorado law, the state of Mission's 
incorporation, regarding Sutton's authorization by Mission. The Utah Limited Liability 
7
 The trial court's determination that Sutton had actual authority to dispose of Mission's 
property as the only manager is irreconcilable with its rulings that Sutton obtained both 
oral authorization and ratification from a non-existent second manager. 
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Company Act in effect in June 2000 expressly provided that it "does not govern the 
organization and internal affairs of a foreign limited liability company." UCA § 48-2b-
143(1) (1998). Rather, the "organization and internal affairs" of Mission, including the 
authority of its members and managers, are governed by the laws of Colorado under 
which Mission was organized. See Atherton v. F.D.I.C, 519 U.S. 213, 223-24 (1997) 
("States normally look to the State of a business' incorporation for the law that provides 
the relevant corporate governance[.]"). Under Colorado law, any "oral authorization" 
given by Mission to Sutton is ineffective because Colorado does not recognize "oral 
o 
authorization" as an exception to the statute of frauds' written authorization requirement. 
Rather, Colorado requires written authorization, unless the agent's unauthorized acts are 
later ratified. See Simpson v. Nelson, 208 P. 455, 456 (Colo. 1922). 
In Simpson, the Colorado court refused to enforce a husband's agreement to sell 
property he owned jointly with his wife, in spite of the oral authorization she gave her 
husband to enter into the agreement on her behalf: "The fact that she was present and 
heard the oral contract which was afterwards consummated by the writing would amount 
to no more than oral authority from her to him, which would be void." Id. (emphasis 
added). Other Colorado decisions have consistently required written authorization and 
given no legal effect to any other authorization, oral or otherwise. See, e.g., Nunnally v. 
Hilderman, 373 P.2d 940, 941 (Colo. 1962) (holding that "agent has no authority over the 
o 
The Colorado statute of frauds is substantively identical to Utah's: "No estate or 
interest in lands . . . shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, unless . . 
. by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering, or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing:9 C.R.S. §38-10-106 (emphasis added). 
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title, unless he is specifically authorized in writing to bind the title or to enter into a 
contract binding the owner to convey the title).9 Accordingly, any oral authorization 
given by Mission to Sutton to alone execute the June Letter Agreement or MLAs "would 
be void" and ineffective under Colorado law. 
(2) The oral authorization exception is no longer recognized in Utah. 
Even applying Utah law to Mission's internal affairs, whatever oral authorization 
Sutton may have had from Mission was ineffective. Mathis v. Madsen, 261 P.2d 952, 
956 (Utah 1953), was both the first and the last time that any appellate court in Utah has 
allowed oral authorization to overcome the statute of frauds' written authorization 
requirement.10 In Mathis, the trustee for a cooperative had signed an instrument to 
convey the cooperative's interest in real property to the plaintiffs, but the trustee's 
"authority was not in writing." Id. at 955. The court, however, allowed oral 
authorization to overcome the statute of frauds only '"when the person [1] who acts under 
an oral authorization [2] is either a general agent or executive officer of the corporation.'" 
Id. at 956. What constituted "oral authorization" was never addressed, but the court 
found that the trustee had authorization to sign the instrument because "the instrument 
was authorized by the Board of Directors . . . , although . . . not granted in writing or by 
9
 See also Newman v. Tibbitts, 149 P. 266, 268 (Colo. Ct. App. 1915) (contract and deed 
executed by agent were void because agent was not authorized in writing); Springer v. 
City Bank & Trust Co., 149 P. 253, 254 (Colo. 1915) (the authority of an agent "must be 
conferred in writing"); Johnson v. Lennox, 133 P. 744, 746 (Colo. 1913) (same); Castner 
v. Richardson,, 33 P. 163, 164 (Colo. 1893) (holding that in spite of plaintiff real estate 
broker's conversations with the defendant property owner, "plaintiff was not authorized 
by writing to execute such [real estate sales] contract"). 
10
 This Court relied on Mathis in its discussion of oral authority in the first appeal. 
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formal action[.]" Id. at 955-56. At the least, oral authorization was given by the 
company's governing board. 
On the other hand, subsequent Utah cases have refused to recognize the oral 
authorization exception. For instance, in Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 
1986), the defendants offered to purchase property owned by a husband and wife as joint 
tenants. The husband authorized his agent by telegram to sign the acceptance. The wife 
did not give written authorization to the agent, but rather "expressly authorized her 
husband" to accept for her. When the sale failed, the husband and wife brought suit to 
enforce the purchase agreement. Citing to the statute of frauds' written authorization 
requirement, the Utah Supreme Court held that "an agent may sign for his or her principal 
. . . so long as the authority is given in writing'' Id. at 423 (emphasis added). The wife 
had only given oral authorization, but the court held that "[husband] was a joint tenant 
with [wife] and could not have accepted on her behalf or as her agent without written 
authority first obtained. There is no husband-wife exception to the statute of frauds." Id. 
Other Utah cases agree. See Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 161 (Utah 1983) ("Utah 
law is clear that only a written power of attorney will authorize one to bind another to a 
contract for the sale of real property."); Frandsen v. Gerstner, 487 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 
1971) ("The power to execute a contract of sale is an additional authority that must be 
expressly granted in writing"). These Utah cases subsequent to Mathis comport with the 
well-established general rule across nearly all jurisdictions that a contract within the 
statute of frauds "executed by an agent acting under parol authority is void and of no 
effect." See 72 Am.Jur.2d Statute of Frauds § 301 (citing cases). 
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(3) Jager was not a manager of Mission and could not give oral authority. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Utah oral authority exception is still viable and 
applies in this case, the facts as found by the trial court do not support the conclusion that 
Jager orally authorized Sutton to execute the MLAs. Jager, not Mission, authorized 
Sutton to execute the MLAs, and the only evidence of this was Jager5s January 17, 2001 
letter to Reott (the "Jager Letter" (Trial Exhibit 29), attached as Addendum H), of which 
the trial court made the following findings: 
- "In the letter, Jager did not contradict Sutton's authority." (Id. (emphasis added).) 
- "The January 17, 2001 letter establishes that, to the extent he functioned as a 
manager of Mission or had ownership as a member of Mission, Jager . . gave oral 
authorization to Sutton of the May 1, 2000 and June 21, 2000 transactions at the 
time they took place . . . " (R. 8116 (emphasis added).) 
- "At no time did Jager or anyone else associated with Mission contradict Sutton's 
authority to enter into the May 1, 2000 and June 21, 2000, transactions with 
Wasatch on behalf of Mission." (Id.) 
- "While Jager was not involved in the management of Mission from May 1998 to 
October 2000, his correspondence and Sutton's testimony establish that Jager had 
knowledge of and was in agreement with the actions taken by Sutton with respect 
to the sale of leases to Wasatch." (R. 8119 (emphasis added).) 
These findings are unavailing and ineffectual under the oral authorization exception 
inasmuch as the trial court made no finding that Mission, rather than Jager, ever 
approved the transaction or gave the necessary oral authorization. In any event, the Jager 
Letter itself, written seven months after the June transaction, provides no evidence 
whatsoever that Jager orally authorized Sutton to execute the MLAs or June Letter 
Agreement. "[The] trial court's interpretation of written documents . . . presents a 
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question of law" reviewed for correctness. Harris v. IES Associates, Inc., 2003 UT App. 
112,f 27, 69P.3d297. 
But even more fatal are the trial court's findings that Jager was not a manager of 
Mission, never acted for or on behalf of Mission, and was not in a position to authorize 
Sutton's actions on behalf of Mission. The trial court specifically found: 
- "Jager did not sign the Operating Agreement and there was no evidence at trial 
that, although he purported to act for Mission as 'chairman' once in 1997 and 
once in 2001, he knew he was a manager of Mission." (R. 8101-8102.) 
- "In May 1998, Sutton became the manager of Mission and from that date through 
October 21, 2000, when he resigned, Sutton acted as sole manager of Mission." 
(R. 8102.) 
- "At the time of both the May 2000 and the June 2000 transactions, Sutton was the 
sole manager of Mission." (R. 8111.) 
- "By letter dated August 31, 2000 . . . , Jager advised Reott that he was 'on the 
sidelines' with respect to the affairs of Mission and presented himself merely as a 
creditor who, like Reott, was seeking to recover what he had advanced to 
Mission." (R. 8114.) "Jager did not sign the August 31, 2000, letter in any 
representative capacity, nor does the document reflect that it was sent on behalf of 
Mission." (R. 8115.) 
- "Wasatch had never dealt with Jager and there is no evidence that Wasatch knew 
of Jager or that, during the relevant time period, Jager purported to act on behalf of 
Mission." (R. 8117.) 
- "After the departure of Muller and Willard in May 1998, Sutton acted as sole 
manager of Mission until October 2000." (R. 8119.) 
- "Jager was not involved in the management of Mission from May 1998 to October 
2000[.]" {Id) 
Consequently, Jager was not a manager of Mission and could not orally authorize the 
June 2000 transaction on behalf of Mission. 
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B, Mission did not ratify Sutton's June 2000 transfer. 
The trial court also incorrectly concluded that Mission ratified Sutton's assignment of 
the Section 32 Leases. The trial court had "previously entered Partial Summary 
Judgment in favor of Reott on the issue of Mission's ratification of Sutton's authority" on 
remand (R. 6024-6025; 8118, f 7), thus foreclosing the issue of ratification before trial, 
which all parties recognized (R. 8191:26, 34; 8192:467). At the conclusion of trial, and 
without notice to the parties that ratification was even in issue, the trial court sua sponte 
"vacate[d] that Partial Summary Judgment based on the contents of Jager's letter dated 
January 17, 2001 (Exhibit 29)." (R. 8118, f 7.) 
As with oral authorization, ratification by Mission of Sutton's unauthorized actions is 
an internal affair of Mission governed by Colorado law. Under Colorado law, ratification 
of an unauthorized act occurs only upon "adoption and confirmation by [the principal] 
with knowledge of all material facts, of an act or contract performed or entered into in his 
behalf by another who at the time assumed without authority to act as his agent." 
Nunnally 373 P.2d at 942.u Ratification of a contract also requires the same formality as 
that required to enter into the contract. See Laybourn v. Wrape, 211 P. 367, 369 (Colo. 
1922) (company's ratification of contract must be by the power which could make it). 
11
 See also Mountain States WaterbedDistributors, Inc. v. O.N.C. Freight Systems Corp., 
614 P.2d 906, 907 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980) ("[Knowledge of all material facts is 
indispensable in order to bind the principal by ratification."). 
12
 See also Newman v. Tibbitts, 149 P. 266, 268 (Colo. Ct. App. 1915) (holding that 
"[ratification in writing was necessary" because statute of frauds required authorization 
in writing); People's Mining & Milling Co. v. Central Consol. Mines Corp., 80 P. 479 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1905) (oral ratification of authorization insufficient because under statute 
of frauds ratification must be in writing). 
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Even if Utah law applies, ratification by a principal of an agent's unauthorized act 
likewise "requires the principal to have knowledge of all material facts and an intent to 
ratify." Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982). Additionally, "the same 
kind of authorization that is required to clothe an agent initially with authority to contract 
must be given by the principal to constitute a ratification of an unauthorized act." Id. at 
79. For example, in situations such as those within the statute of frauds "[wjhere the law 
requires the authority to be given in writing, the ratification must also generally be in 
writing." Id. See also Frandsen v. Gerstner, 487 P.2d 697, 701 (Utah 1971) (same). 
By these principles, ratification by Mission must be with knowledge of all material 
facts, and with intent to ratify. Also, where "the MOA . . . requires two Mission 
managers to execute instruments conveying Mission's title to real property," Wasatch Oil 
& Gas, 2007 UT App. 223, ^ f 29, ratification must be in writing executed by two Mission 
managers. The trial court's findings of fact do not support the conclusion that Mission 
ratified Sutton's unauthorized assignment of Mission's Section 32 Leases. 
(1) The Jager Letter was not signed by two Mission managers. 
First, the Jager Letter, the only document purporting to ratify the June 2000 transfer, 
was not executed by two Mission managers as required by the MOA. The trial court 
found that the Jager Letter established that "Jager . . . , after receiving full knowledge of 
the transactions, ratified them at a later date." (R. 8116; 8118, ^ j 7.) Only Jager, who was 
not a manager, signed the letter. (R. 8116.) This ratification was not by the same 
formality necessary to sign the MLAs originally, as required by both the MOA. The 
Jager Letter is ineffective to ratify Sutton's execution of the MLAs. 
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(2) Jager did not have authority to bind Mission by his ratification. 
Second, Jager had no authority and was in no position of authority to act on behalf of 
Mission. It is axiomatic that ratification of an agent's unauthorized acts must be made by 
the principal. The trial court found that the Jager Letter established that Jager "confirmed 
his knowledge of the May 1, 2000 and June 21, 2000 transactions between Wasatch and 
Mission and his support of the transactions and the reasoning behind them" and "did not 
contradict Sutton's authority." (R. 8115). But Jager was not a manager with authority to 
bind Mission by his ratification. Rather, the trial court found that Jager had no 
involvement with the management of Mission. See supra Part II.A.3. Jager simply had 
no authority to ratify Sutton's unauthorized transfer of the Section 32 Leases to Wasatch. 
(3) Jager did not have full knowledge of all material facts. 
Third, the trial court erred in concluding that the contents of the Jager Letter satisfy 
the "knowledge of all material facts" requirement for ratification. The Jager Letter itself 
shows Jager's incomplete and inaccurate understanding of the June transaction: "Mission 
Energy conveyed their ownership to Wasatch Energy in return for future consideration as 
a carried interest for any wells drilled within the unit by Wasatch Energy. There were no 
drill sites conveyed, only acreage, with the commitment for future compensation." (See 
Jager Letter.) Jager did not testify at trial. His understanding of the material facts of the 
June 2000 transaction, which the Jager Letter purports to ratify, may only be gleaned 
from the Jager Letter itself. There are a number of material terms of the June Letter 
Agreement that the Jager Letter either misstates or omits: 
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- The June Letter Agreement was actually entered into with Wasatch Oil & Gas 
Corporation, not "Wasatch Energy" as the Jager Letter states. (See Jager Letter.) 
- Mission retained the "wellbore rights and attributable spacing unit relating to the 
Lavinia 1-32 well," and agreed to "fully indemnify Wasatch for any obligation 
relating to the Lavinia #1-32 well" and maintain "responsibility for financial 
obligations of the Lavinia #1-32 well, including lease bonding." (Id. ffl[ 1, 5.) 
- The extent of Mission's carried interest in any wells drilled by Wasatch would be 
"proportionally similar to whatever Wasatch is able to retain in a trade with a third 
party," e.g. "25% of 25%, or 6.25%." (Id. K 2.) 
- "The terms of any trade obtained by Wasatch will be offered to Mission," which 
terms Mission may accept or reject, and if rejected "Mission will have been 
deemed to relinquish any and all interest in the Leases." (Id. ^[3.) 
- "Mission will assign [Jack's Canyon Unit] operations to Wasatch." (Id. ^  6.) 
- "Wasatch makes no guarantee that" it will "meet the [Jack's Canyon Unit] 
obligations as defined by the BLM." (Id. % 4.) 
- "Mission will work in good faith [to] transfer to Wasatch any pending APD's on 
the Leases." (Id. t 7.) 
- "Any cost incurred by Wasatch to get the Leases in good standing . . . will be 
reimbursed to Wasatch by Mission within 10 days notice, except for Burris/Horse 
Bench leases." (Id.^%.) 
- Wasatch would "reimburse Mission for paying the rentals" on the leases, totaling 
$3,629.40, (id. ^ 10), but Mission would receive no other payment from Wasatch. 
In fact, the Jager Letter shows that Jager's understanding of the transaction was expressly 
contrary to the June Letter Agreement's provision that "/7//Mission elects to participate 
in a trade then assignments will be made after an operating is executed and after a well is 
completed on a particular lease." (Id. \ 3 (emphasis added).) Jager's statement that 
Mission had already conveyed its acreage "in return for future compensation" on a future 
well indicates that he had no knowledge of the conditions precedent to any future 
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consideration found in paragraph 3 of the June Letter Agreement. The Jager Letter does 
not establish Jager's knowledge of all material terms of the June Letter Agreement. 
C. Sutton's lack of authority under the statute of frauds defeats Wasatch's legal 
and equitable title. 
Because Sutton alone executed the MLAs without requisite authority in violation of 
the statute of frauds, they are void. See Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC, 2007 UT App. 223, 
Yli 29-30 (holding that the MLAs were not valid unless the trial court concludes on 
remand that Mission gave Sutton oral authorization or ratified his actions). For the same 
reasons, the June Letter Agreement, signed only by Sutton, is also void. See UCA §25-5-
3 ("Every contract.. . for the sale[] of. . . any interest in lands[] shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the . . . sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing."). 
Sutton's unauthorized and unratified execution of the MLAs defeats Wasatch's legal title 
in the Section 32 Leases, and his unauthorized and unratified execution of the June Letter 
Agreement defeats Wasatch's equitable title in the June Leases. Wasatch's alleged 
equitable interest by virtue of its rental payments to SITLA is void inasmuch as the 
statute of frauds broadly provides that "no estate or interest" whatsoever may be 
"created" or even "surrendered" absent a writing signed by the party "creating" or 
"surrendering" the interest, or by its agent authorized in writing. See UCA §25-5-1. 
13
 The trial court held that Wasatch obtained legal title to the Section 32 Leases by the 
MLAs (R. 8118, T{5), and equitable title to all of the June Leases by the June Letter 
Agreement and/or Wasatch's $4,000 payment to SITLA to preserve the leases (R. 8119). 
Wasatch's $4,000 lease rental payment was actually a debt owed by Mission to Wasatch, 
(see June Letter Agreement f^ 10), which debt also defeats Wasatch's equitable interest. 
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III. The Trial Court Incorrectly Concluded That Mission's June 2000 Transfer Was 
Not A Fraudulent Transfer Under UCA § 25-6-6. 
The trial court also incorrectly concluded that "Reott has failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that Mission's sale of mineral leases to Wasatch in . . . June 2000 
was a fraudulent transfer pursuant to the provisions of UCA §25-6-6."14 
"The law has long held that transfers of property designed to place a debtor's assets 
beyond the reach of the debtor's creditors are void as to the creditors." Butler v. 
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987). "Because UFTA is remedial in nature, it 
should be liberally construed," National Loan Investors, L.P. v. Givens, 952 P.2d 1067, 
1069 (Utah 1998), which Utah courts do "so as to reach all artifices and evasions 
designed to rob the Act of its full force and effect in preventing debtors from paying the 
just claims of their creditors," Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987). 
Thus, a fraudulent transfer conveys no legal or equitable interest to the transferee, but is 
"void as to the creditors." See Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT App 78, ^ 13, 132 P.3d 63 
(citation and quotations omitted)). 
Mission's fraudulent transfer defeats Wasatch's legal title to the Section 32 Leases 
because a "transfer" includes "direct" disposals of an asset. UCA § 25-6-2(12). "[I]t is 
clear the transfer of legal title to real property is a 'transfer' within the [Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer] Act's broad provisions." Kaufmann v. M & S Unlimited, L.L.C., 
121 P.3d 181, 184 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). Mission's fraudulent transfer also defeats 
Wasatch's equitable title, whether arising by the June Letter Agreement or by Wasatch's 
Reott does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that "Reott has failed to prove 
actual intent to defraud" under UCA §25-6-5(l)(a). (R. 8119-8120.) 
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lease rental payments to SITLA. A "transfer" under UFTA includes "every mode, direct 
or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting 
with an asset or an interest in an asset . . . ." UCA § 25-6-2(12) (emphasis added). 
Liberally construed, UFTA prevents Mission from transferring any equitable interest in 
the June Leases to Wasatch, even involuntarily by Wasatch's rental payments to SITLA. 
The relevant avenue under UFTA to assert a claim for fraudulent transfer is "if the 
creditor's claims arose before the transfer, pursuant to Utah Code section 25-6-6." Tolle 
v. Fenley, 2006 UT App. 78, \ 20, 132 P.3d 63. Section 25-6-6 provides: 
(1) A transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose 
before the transfer was made . . . if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer . . . without receiving a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for the transfer . . . ; and 
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a result of the 
transfer. 
UCA § 25-6-6(a), (b) (1998).15 "Under section 25-6-6, the debtor's actual intent is 
irrelevant and the focus is on [1] whether the debtor received 'reasonably equivalent 
value' for the transferred properties and [2] whether the debtor is 'insolvent at the time or 
became insolvent as a result of the transfer.'" Id. (quoting UCA § 25-6-6). 
A. Mission did not receive reasonably equivalent value. 
Whether Mission received "reasonably equivalent value" is a two-part inquiry. First, 
the trial court must determine whether the consideration received by Mission constituted 
"value" within the meaning of UFTA, which defines "value" as follows: 
Reott is a judgment creditor whose claim against Mission arose no later than December 
20, 1999, the date he obtained the Colorado Judgment. See Tolle, 2006 UT App. 78, |14. 
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Value is given for a transfer . . . if, in exchange for the transfer . . . , property is 
transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied. However, value does not 
include an unperformed promise made other than in the ordinary course of the 
promisor's business to furnish support to the debtor or another person. 
UCA §25-6-4(1) (emphasis added). "Property" is defined by UFTA as "anything that 
may be the subject of ownership." Id. §25-6-2(10). Whether consideration constitutes 
"value" under the meaning of UFTA is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See 
Territorial Savings & Loan Assoc, v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Second, the trial court must determine whether the "value" received by Mission was 
"reasonably equivalent" to the value of the property exchanged. While neither UFTA nor 
Utah common law defines what is "reasonably equivalent," guidance may be taken from 
UFTA's predecessor, the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act (UFCA). Under the 
substantively similar constructive fraud provision of UFCA, a conveyance was fraudulent 
if the debtor "[1] was insolvent or rendered insolvent by the conveyance, and . . . [2] the 
conveyance was made without fair consideration." See Territorial Savings & Loan 
Assoc, 781 P.2d at 458 (citing UCA § 25-1-4 (repealed 1988)). "Fair consideration" 
required "a fair equivalent exchange," which meant "such a price as a capable and 
diligent businessman could presently obtain for the property after conferring with those 
accustomed to buy such property. . . ." Id. at 459 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Whether the value received is "reasonably equivalent" is "ordinarily" a question of fact, 
but "there may be, on occasion, instances where it is clear that" reasonably equivalent 
value was or was not exchanged. See id. at 461. In those case, the determination of 
"reasonably equivalent value" is a question of law. Id. 
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(1) The only "value" Mission received was the $3,629.40 reimbursement. 
Under the facts found by the trial court, Mission did not receive "value" from 
Wasatch in exchange for the June Leases other than the $3,629.40 reimbursement. (R. 
8112.) The trial court found that pursuant to the June Letter Agreement, Wasatch 
promised to "give Mission a specified percentage of any drilling deal Wasatch or Mission 
might negotiate in the future with respect to the leases purchased." (R. 8108 (emphasis 
added).) Such promise was never performed or fulfilled (R. 8291:217), and as "an 
unperformed promise" does not constitute "value" within the meaning of UFTA.16 
Additionally, Wasatch's "reinstatement of any expired leases" that it obtained from 
Mission, for Wasatch's own benefit, and Wasatch's obligation to "maintain the leases as 
lessee and unit operator," were not "subject of ownership" and thus were not "property" 
or "value" for purposes of UFTA. See UCA §25-6-2(10). Additionally, only SITLA 
received Wasatch's $4,000 lease reinstatement payment, not Mission. 
(2) The $3,629.40 received by Mission was not reasonably equivalent value. 
The "value" actually received by Mission also was not reasonably equivalent to the 
value of the June Leases transferred. For the May 2000 transaction, the trial court found 
that Wasatch's initial offer to Mission of $24,610.83 for the May Leases "represented the 
amount that a willing buyer was prepared to pay a willing seller for the leases" and was 
"more indicative of reasonably equivalent value at the time of the sale than the values 
16
 See also, e.g., Manchec v. Manchec, 951 So.2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that "the promise of 25% of the future royalties of the invention was an 
'unperformed promise' within the meaning of [the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act]" because "there had been no sales of the invention, no projected sales[, and] 
distribution of the invention required FAA approval, which was, at best, uncertain"). 
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offered by Dr. Stinson."17 (R. 8104, 8105, 8106.) Accordingly, the trial court gave 
"greater weight to the calculations of Wasatch . . . as a measure of reasonably equivalent 
value." (R. 8106.) Shortly thereafter, Mission and Wasatch began negotiating the June 
2000 transfer. Wasatch valued the June Leases in the same manner it did the May 
Leases. (R. 8108.) The trial court found that Wasatch ultimately proposed to purchase 
the June Leases "for the same $5.00 per net acre price paid for the leases purchased on 
May 1, 2000" (R. 8108) and found that "this amount constituted reasonably equivalent 
value and rejects the testimony of Dr. Stinson to the contrary[.]" (Id, (emphasis added).) 
Thus, the trial court expressly found that $5.00 per net acre constituted reasonably 
equivalent value for the June Leases. 
But $5.00 per net acre was not the amount that Mission actually received for the 
transfer. The trial court found that "[p]ursuant to the June 2000 Letter Agreement, 
Wasatch reimbursed Mission $3,629.40 for rentals paid by Mission on leases purchased 
by Wasatch." (R. 8112.) Although "both Mission and Wasatch actively sought other 
parties to develop and drill on the lease property as contemplated in the June 2000 Letter 
Agreement" (R. 8113), Wasatch never did obtain a drilling deal, and all that Mission 
received was the $3,629.40 reimbursement. (R. 8291:217). 
Given that the ten June Leases totaled 7,021.23 net acres (R. 7996; Trial Exhibits 114, 
115), Mission received only fifty-two cents (520) per net acre in exchange for the June 
Leases it transferred to Wasatch—less than 11% of the $5.00 per net acre value that the 
trial court specifically found "constituted reasonably equivalent value" for the very same 
At trial Dr. Stinson gave a much higher value of the May and June Leases. 
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June Leases. (R. 8108.) Accordingly, the trial court's finding that "the consideration set 
forth in the June 2000 Letter Agreement and the amounts subsequently paid by Wasatch 
to preserve the leases and the Jack Canyon Unit constituted reasonably equivalent value 
for the sale of the leases" (R. 8109) is error. 
B. Mission was insolvent in June 2000. 
Mission was also insolvent at the time it transferred the June Leases to Wasatch in 
June 2000. The UFTA defines insolvency by what is known as the "balance sheet test": 
"[a] debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's 
assets at a fair valuation." UCA § 25-6-3(1); see also Tolle, 2006 UT App. 78, f 24 ("In 
order to prove insolvency, a balancing of assets and liabilities must be accomplished and 
only a showing that the debtor's entire nonexempt property and assets are insufficient to 
i n 
pay his debts rises to the level of insolvency." (quotation marks omitted)). "Under the 
UFTA, the level of insolvency necessary to meet the statute's requirement is not 
insolvency in the bankruptcy sense but merely a showing that the party's assets are not 
sufficient to meet liabilities as they become due." Tolle, 2006 UT App., f 24 (quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis in original).19 For example, in Tolle this Court held that the 
debtor was insolvent under the balance sheet test where he "transferred 'all the property 
held in [his] name' and as 'the transfer consisted of all or substantially all of [debtor's] 
18
 The trial court rejected the testimony of Reott's expert CPA, who testified that Mission 
was insolvent under three different standard analyses for insolvency. (R. 8293:656-679.) 
19
 Wasatch urged a higher standard for insolvency for "start-up" companies such as 
Mission, arguing that Mission was not insolvent because it was only a "start-up" and 
naturally undercapitalized and just needed more time (R. 7519-7520; 7524; 8293:680-
682, 689, 691, 801-803, 827). The trial court agreed. (R. 8098; 8113; 8294:903.) 
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assets/ any moderate debt or liability would result in [debtor's] insolvency." Id. f 25. 
The UFTA also provides that "[a] debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they 
become due is presumed to be insolvent." UCA § 25-6-3(2). "Where failure to pay debts 
as they are due creates a presumption, such presumption may be logically rebutted by 
proof that the debtor is not insolvent." Balsamo v. Gruppo Ceramiche Ricchetti, S.P.A., 
862 So.2d 812 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003). The balance sheet test may rebut the presumption, 
id,, but the burden of proof shifts to the party asserting solvency to rebut the 
presumption.20 
(1) Mission is presumed to be insolvent in June 2000. 
In the present case, the trial court found that "[a]lmost from the start of its existence 
and as of May 1, 2000 through June 21, 2000, Mission was not able to pay its debts as 
they became due for lack of capital and revenue." (R. 8101.) Thus, the trial court 
concluded, and Wasatch conceded (R. 8293:827), that "the evidence would support the 
presumption [of insolvency] found in UCA §25-6-3(2)[.]" (R. 8121.) The burden thus 
shifted to Wasatch to rebut the presumption and prove that Mission was solvent, i.e. the 
sum of Mission's debts was not greater than all its assets at a fair valuation.21 
(2) Wasatch did not rebut the presumption of Mission's insolvency. 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that the "presumption is rebutted by the 
No Utah court has determined whether rebuttal of the presumption must be by 
preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence, but it is not necessary to 
do so here because Wasatch has failed to rebut the presumption and prove Mission's 
solvency even under the minimum preponderance of the evidence standard. 
21
 The trial court expressly recognized Mission's financial troubles. (R. 8293:680 ("It's 
pretty clear Mission was in financial trouble during this period of time.")) 
484R-S^8^.m^7/RF000-nni 1 7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
undisputed testimony that the 'fair value5 of all of the assets of Mission exceeded the sum 
of its debts as of May and June 2000." (R. 8121.) There was no testimony, and Wasatch 
did not prove., that the sum of Mission's debts was not greater than the value of all of its 
assets. As in Tolle, "any moderate debt or liability would result in [Mission's] 
insolvency/' 2006 UT App. 78, ^ f 25, and that is precisely what happened. On September 
18, 2000, less than three months after the June 2000 transfer, Reott recovered only 
$27,236.37 from Mission's bank accounts to partially satisfy his $204,000 Colorado 
Judgment. (R. 8115.) The trial court found that Sutton resigned effective October 1, 
2000, and "[n]o later than March 1, 2001, Mission ceased to function by reason of Reott's 
collection efforts." (R. 8117 (emphasis added).) Not only was Mission insolvent but it 
entirely "ceased to function" for the sole reason that Mission could not meet even the 
debt it owed to Reott. This finding by the trial court should have precluded it from 
finding that Wasatch proved that Mission was somehow solvent. 
Instead, the trial court found that following the June 2000 transfer, Mission retained 
the following assets: "a. The Lavinia 1-32 well (valued by Reott and Sutton at an amount 
in excess of the total of all outstanding Mission liabilities), b. Cash in the bank of at least 
$27,236.27. c, Amounts held by the State of Utah as a bond of $19,943.15. d. The Gusher 
leases (the precise value of which was not addressed at trial but which Sutton testified 
had value and the Lease Acquisition Memorandum identified as having value)." (R. 
8113.) The trial court found that "[t]he sole evidence before the Court was that the fair 
22
 The trial court also included Mission's right under the June Letter Agreement to 
participate in a drilling deal as an asset, but that deal never materialized and Wasatch 
never presented any evidence of its value, if any. 
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value of Mission's assets as of June 21, 2000, exceeded its debts, notwithstanding 
Mission's inability as a start-up company to pay its debts as they became due." (Id.) 
To rebut the presumption of insolvency, Wasatch had the burden to prove that the 
value of these remaining assets in June 2000 exceeded Mission's liabilities. By the end 
of 1999, Mission's liabilities ($1,145,432) exceeded its assets ($719,654) by $434,778, 
and by the end of 2000 Mission's liabilities ($1,163,881) exceeded its assets ($582,599) 
by $581,282. (R. 8293:661-663.) The cash on hand and bond totaled $47,179.42, but 
Wasatch failed to establish the "fair value" of the Lavinia Well and the Gusher leases. 
First, there was no evidence at trial as to any value, "fair" or not, of the Gusher leases, 
and this the trial court expressly found: "[T]he precise value of [the Gusher leases] was 
not addressed at trial." 24 (R. 8113.) Merely finding that there was evidence that the 
Gusher leases "had value" does not satisfy Wasatch's burden to establish the quantum of 
that value, which was necessary for Wasatch to prove that the quantum of Mission's 
assets exceeded its debts. See Levin v. Furniture Indus. Of Florida, Inc., 823 So. 2d 132 
(Fl. Ct. App. 2002) (the presumption of insolvency was not rebutted because "[t]he 
[debtors], who had the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of insolvency, put 
on no evidence as to the value of the judgment while it was on appeal"). 
With respect to the Lavinia Well, the evidence presented at trial does not support the 
trial court's finding that the Well's "fair value" exceeded the sum of all of Mission's 
There was no evidence at trial that the Gusher leases and Lavinia Well were not 
included in the "Oil and Gas Properties" assets category on Mission's balance sheets. 
Counsel for Wasatch admitted at trial that there was no evidence of the value of the 
Gusher leases. (827:8-9 ("Plus the Gusher interests, which nobody bothered to tell us 
what they were worth . . . .") . ) 
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debts. (R. 8113.) This Court "may reverse a factual finding of the trial court only if it 
determines that the finding is clearly erroneous, . . . that is, if the trial court's ruling 
contradicts the great weight of evidence or if a court reviewing the evidence is left with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." England v. Horbach, 944 
P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1997). Pursuant to Reott's duty to marshal, all of the evidence 
presented at trial that could have supported the trial court's finding is: 
- Heggie Wilson gave general testimony about how to value a lease and what he did 
for Wasatch when making an offer for the leases transferred in May and June 
2000. However, he did not opine on the value of the Lavinia Well. (R. 8292:336-
348, 356-363, 367-368, 376-377.) 
- Sutton testified (by deposition) regarding the Lavinia Well: "I believe then and I 
still believe today, that that well has value, significantly more than Ed Reott's 
judgment ever entailed Value number 1 of that 40 acres was the well and the 
hydrocarbons on it. Which I felt had more than significant value than the amount 
of debt, lien, and judgments against the company." (R. 6495-6499.) 
- Sutton also testified that in February, 2000, Mission (through an independent 
consultant) valued all of its Peters Pointe leases at $210,000 to $560,000, but he 
did not identify what acreage and leases were included in this valuation, or 
whether it included the Lavinia Well. (R. 6862, p. 187, to 6863, p. 198.) 
- Sutton also testified that as of March 6, 2000, Mission owned 8,000 acres in Peters 
Pointe which had a value of $40/acre, but he did not indicate whether this 
valuation included the Lavinia Well and its 40-acres. (R. 6864, pp. 209-210.) 
- Ed Reott estimated that, as of June 2000, the value of the Lavinia Well and 
surrounding 640 acres without any depth limitation "could be anywhere from $2.5 
million to $5 million" based on "topography, the access, the ability to—to drill, no 
[NEPA], and the pipeline there." (R. 8292:552-553.) 
This evidence does not support the finding that the value of the Lavinia Well and the 
surrounding 40 acres to a depth of 3,398 feet exceeded Mission's $1.1 million in 
liabilities. Reott's valuation of $2.5 to $5 million was not for the Lavinia Well retained 
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by Mission but encompassed the entire 640-acre tract of Section 32 with an attributable 
spacing of 640 acres and no depth limitation. (R. 8291:149; 8292:552-553.) He never 
opined on the value of the Lavinia Well and 40-acre tract to a depth of 3,398 feet (id.), 
which the trial court and Wasatch's counsel acknowledged (R. 8293:791-792). 
Furthermore, Wasatch did not establish or present any evidence that Reott's $2.5 to 
$5 million valuation, or that Sutton's valuation in excess of the "amount of debt, lien, and 
judgments against the company," was a "fair value" as would be required to prove 
Mission's solvency under the balance sheet test. Rather, the sole evidence at trial 
established that the "fair value" of the Lavinia well in June 2000 was no more than 
$20,000. Prior to the June 2000 transaction, Cusick and Sutton discussed including the 
Lavinia Well in the transaction, and he and Sutton "discussed what it would be worth." 
(R. 8293:646-650.) On May 31, 2000, Cusick sent a letter to Sutton requesting to add 
the Lavinia Well to transaction if the liens could be cleared for $20,000, the value 
Wasatch attributed to the well. (Trial Exhibit 112, attached as Addendum I). (R. 
8293:650.) Cusick learned of the liens filed against the Lavinia Well, and it became clear 
to him that Mission "didn't pay for this well." (R. 8291:284-288.) Cusick testified that 
Wasatch "declined to purchase [the Lavinia well] because we didn't want to get 
entangled in any mess there might be . . . on the well." (R. 8293:648.) 
Reott testified that on December 19, 2000, he received a phone call from Cusick in 
which "[Cusick] wanted to purchase for $15,000 the J West lien and the Lavinia well." 
The trial court's reliance on Reott's valuation is akin to attributing to a single 
condominium unit the appraised value of the entire condominium complex. 
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(R. 8292:525.) Reott further testified that "[Cusick] stated that he had acquired most of 
Mission's assets in the area and that he needed this piece to complete his acquisition and 
that the well wasn't worth anything and would cost $40,000 to $200,000 to place back 
into production and that he controlled the pipeline." (Id.) Reott further testified that 
"[Cusick] insisted that I needed to sell it to him for $15,000. And I told him, no, I didn't 
need to. And he said . . . no one else would be interested in it." (R. 8293:526.) 
Huntington Walker, a landman for BBC, testified (by deposition) that in early 2002 
"Wasatch had said that they didn't think it was a particularly good well." (R. 6900, p. 88; 
6901, p. 90.) He testified that BBC's "own independent geologic and engineering 
analysis that we could get from the public records didn't indicate it was a very good well" 
and that he thought "it hasn't been proved to be commercially productive." (Id.) 
Even BBC's expert witness, James C. Creel, testified (during the damages phase) that 
during the period of 2000 to 2002, the Lavinia Well was "non-commercial": "So back 
here in 2000, it was making about 250 MCF a day. 8 MCF—or 250—MCF a month, 
about 8 MCF or so a day. That's pretty low. It doesn't take much expenditure of time or 
money to make that non-commercial, particularly, I think at that time, gas prices were a 
little under $3." (R. 8295:1326.) He further testified that in 2001-2002 the Lavinia Well 
was still "non-commercial" and "had no value for its reserves" (R. 8295: 1319-1320, 
1324); that "the value in 2002 was zero" and Mission "had no economic value for the 
reserves" (R. 8295:1360-1361), and that "the well is non-economic" because "[i]t cost 
more to operate than you're making in revenue" (id.). Mr. Creel opined that in 2003 the 
"economic value of well" was only $17,844. (R. 8295:1341.) The trial court relied on 
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Mr. Creel's testimony and found that "the commercial value of the Lavinia well in 2002 
was effectively zero; Reott's costs of production in 2002 would have exceeded any 
potential revenue." (R. 8210-8211.)26 
It is indeed perplexing how the trial court could find that the value of the Lavinia 
Well for purposes of damages was "effectively zero" but for purposes of quiet title and 
fraudulent transfer the well had a value in excess of $1.1 million, the sum of all Mission's 
liabilities. "[I]nternally inconsistent findings constitute clear error." John Allan Co, v. 
Craig Allen Co., L.L.C., 540 F.3d 1133, 1139 (10th Cir. 2008). The trial court's reliance 
on Ed Reott's valuation of the Lavinia Well was also clearly erroneous since he valued 
the entire 640 acre section with no depth limitation, not the mere 40-acres around the well 
to a depth of only 3,398 feet. Furthermore, Wasatch did not establish that either Reott's 
or Sutton's valuation was a "fair valuation", e.g. that a buyer was willing to purchase it 
for the value of all Mission's liabilities, which exceeded $1.1 million. The only evidence 
regarding the "fair value" of the Lavinia Well as it was retained by Mission—40-acres to 
a depth of only 3,398 feet—was no more than the $15,000 to $20,000 that Wasatch was 
willing to pay for it. Indeed, that is the definition of fair valuation—the amount a willing 
buyer is willing to pay for it. But ultimately not even Wasatch was willing to purchase 
the Lavinia Well with the "mess" there was on it. 
Because Mission was insolvent when it transferred the June Leases to Wasatch, and 
The maximum value attributed to the Lavinia Well and 40 acres to a depth of 3,398 
feet at any point during the trial, and for any time period, was Mr. Creel's valuation of 
only $99,975 as of July 1, 2008. (R. 8295:1319.) The trial court concurred, finding that 
"the well had a value of $99,000 in 2008." (R. 8211.) 
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Mission received only $3,629.40 in "value" for the Leases—merely 11% of what the trial 
court found was reasonably equivalent value—Mission's transfer of the June Leases to 
Wasatch was fraudulent as a matter of law pursuant to UCA § 25-6-6. Reott therefore 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's conclusion and remand to the trial court to 
implement UFTA's remedies. 
IV. The Trial Court Incorrectly Concluded that Reott Suffered No Damages. 
A. The trial court abused it discretion by considering causation on the 
damages issue for Reott's trespass to chattels claim. 
Prior to the first appeal, the trial court held on summary judgment that BBC was 
liable, as a matter of law, to the Reott Parties for all damages arising from BBC's . 
. . actions: . . . in physically removing the pipeline that connected the meter house 
to the main pipeline, damaging the Lavinia Pipeline, damaging the Oil Tank, 
causing the oil spill and causing the loss of approximately 100 barrels of oil. 
(R. 5386.) Having already ruled on causation and liability, the trial court reserved for 
trial determination of Reott's damages. (Id.) Yet three years later on the first day of trial, 
and in spite of Reott's motion in limine to exclude evidence of causation (R. 6688-6689), 
the trial court vacated its decision on summary judgment and ruled that it would consider 
"causation" as a defense to Reott's claims for damages, and that "Reott had the burden to 
prove that the actions of BBC's crew caused the oil spill" (R. 8212; 8291:39-40). 
While the trial court has some discretion to reconsider its own non-final decisions, see 
Chilton v. Young, 2009 UT App 265, f 4, 220 P.3d 171, the trial court abused its 
27
 UFTA's remedies for Mission's fraudulent transfer of the June Leases include: (i) 
avoidance of the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim; (ii) 
appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of 
the transferee; (iii) levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds; and (iv) any 
other relief the circumstances may require. UCA § 25-6-8 (1988). 
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discretion because there was no "reasonable basis" to overturn its prior decision on 
causation, see Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, ^ 16, 163 P.3d 615 
(reasonable basis required to overturn prior decision). First, there was no intervening 
change in the law regarding causation warranting re-opening that issue for trial. Second, 
there was no new evidence presented regarding causation. See Murdoch v. Springville 
Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, *{ 23, 982 P.2d 65. Third, the trial court's reconsideration 
during trial was untimely and highly prejudicial to Reott. See Tschaggeny, 2007 UT 37, 
Tf 17 (holding that last minute motion to reconsider on eve of trial was properly denied, 
and citing cases). Fourth, to the extent the trial court allowed "causation" evidence 
merely as a "mitigating factor" of Reott's damages (see R. 8291:39-40), the trial court 
erred in this conclusion because the duty to mitigate damages presumes causation exists. 
See, e.g., Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728, 731 (Utah 1984) (defendant did not 
have a causation defense but only a mitigation of damages defense). Reott therefore 
requests that this Court reverse and remand to the trial court to determine, without 
considering causation, the amount of Reott's damages on his trespass to chattels claim. 
B. The trial court applied an incorrect measure of damages on Reott's 
breach of common carrier obligation claim. 
The trial court also incorrectly concluded that "Reott has suffered no damages as a 
result of any breach by Wasatch or BBC of their common carrier obligations" (R. 8211-
8212) because it incorrectly applied a market value test instead of a lost production/lost 
profits test for the three-year disruption to Reott's production from the Lavinia Well. 
"Whether the trial court applied the correct rule for measuring damages is a question of 
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law that we review for correctness." Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, <f 
25, 96 P.3d 893. 
Without identifying or citing any legal authority, the trial court stated its rule for the 
measure of damages as follows: 
Whether Wasatch or BBC owes damages to Reott for breach of common carrier 
duties fundamentally depends on whether there exists a finite amount of 
commercially recoverable gas in the reservoir in which the Lavinia well is drilled. 
. . . [If so,] damages would be dependent on the price of gas during the period 
when Reott could not produce because Wasatch or BBC were not gathering 
Reott's gas, as compared to a later period when Reott was able to produce. 
(R. 8211-8212.) This measure of damages does not follow Utah law and the general rule 
of damages for disruption to business. Relying on the Mineral Leasing Act (30 U.S.C. 
§185(r)(2)(A)), the trial court earlier held on summary judgment that "Wasatch and BBC 
were and are common carriers" and "breached their obligations as common carriers." (R. 
4823.) The measure of damages for violations of the Mineral Leasing Act's provisions 
are as set forth by applicable regulation, see 30 U.S.C.A. §185(x), which regulation 
provides that federal right-of-way holders, such as pipeline operators, "shall be fully 
liable for injuries or damages to third parties . . . in accordance with the law of the 
jurisdiction in which the damage or injury occurred." 43 C.F.R. § 2883.1-4(d). Thus, 
Utah law governs Reott5s damages for breach of common carrier obligations. 
Under Utah law, Wasatch and BBC are liable for all injuries and damage arising out 
of their violation of the statute. See Curtis v. Harmon Elec, 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 
1978) (noting that the violation of a statutory duty "renders defendant liable for all 
damages caused by such failure."). For disruption or interruption of business, such as 
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Reott suffered for more than three years, the general measure of compensatory damages 
is lost profits. See Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728, 731 (Utah 1984) (citation 
omitted) (awarding plaintiff its lost profits for interruption to business caused by 
defendant's negligence); Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983) 
(awarding plaintiff its lost profits for the delay in opening manufacturing plant caused by 
defendant's breach of contract). This rule is consonant with the general rule that the 
proper measure of damages for interruption or disruption of business is lost profits. See 
22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 455 (citing cases and noting that lost profits are recoverable for 
-no 
disruption to business caused by breach of contract or tortious conduct). 
In Acculog, the plaintiffs business equipment was destroyed in a vehicle fire 
proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, resulting in a temporary interruption 
to plaintiffs business and lost business and profits. The Utah Supreme Court held that 
"lost profits may be recovered" as long as "the evidence submitted provides a basis for 
estimating them with reasonable certainty." 692 P.2d at 731. 
This general rule was applied in United Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, 22 F. Supp. 221 
(E.D. 111. 1938), in a fact situation similar to Reott's. In Rice, striking workers conspired 
to obstruct operation of a coal mine by force, violence, threats, and intimidation, resulting 
28
 See, e.g., Weinman v. De Palma, 232 U.S. 571, 575 (1914) (the loss of future profits 
forms a proper element of compensatory damages for interruption of a going business); 
CADCO, Inc. v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 220 S.W.3d 426, 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) 
(same); UST Corp. v. General Road Trucking Corp., 783 A.2d 931 (R.I. 2001) (same); 
Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 464 A.2d 1243 (Pa. 1983) (same); Rhodes v. 
Sigler, 357 N.E.2d 846 (111. Ct. App. 1976) (same); L. H. Bell & Associates, Inc. v. 
Granger, 543 P.2d 428 (Ariz. 1975) (same); ERA Helicopters, Inc. v. Digicon Alaska, 
Inc., 518 P.2d 1057 (Alaska 1974) (same). 
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in wrongful shutdown of the mine for a period of time. The mine sued the workers, 
claiming lost profits for the period of the wrongful shutdown. The trial court held that 
"[a]mong the elements of damages that may be assessed . . . in such case where the 
employer is wrongfully prevented from operating its plant, mine, or business are loss of 
profits, loss of business that cannot be regained, . . . " Id. at 226 (citations omitted). The 
defendants moved for a rehearing on the court's measure of damages, arguing that "the 
profits were not lost but merely postponed for the period of the wrongful shutdown." Id. 
at 229. On rehearing, the court again disagreed, holding that "the net profits lost by the 
plaintiff during the period of the wrongful shutdown caused by defendants' wrong is a 
proper element to be included in an equitable and fair assessment of the damages suffered 
by the plaintiff." The court reasoned: 
When capital investments, including machinery and equipment subject to 
depreciation, are involved, time is valuable and costly just as it is when personal 
services are involved. Earnings upon an investment lost through wrongfully 
enforced idleness can never be recovered through subsequent earnings any more 
than a wasted hour can be recalled for subsequent use. Depreciation of 
machinery and equipment not balanced by contemporary earnings represents a 
present and not a postponed loss. Where there is a large capital investment, as 
here, the fact that the coal remained in the ground is not a controlling factor . . . . 
Whether it can be mined at some future time . . . at a net profit that will fairly 
compensate plaintiff for its then required use of its capital investment and also for 
its losses suffered through its enforced idleness during the period in question, as 
shown by the evidence, takes one into the realm of pure speculation. 
Id. at 230 (emphasis added). 
Disruption of business "represents a present and not a postponed loss" because 
creditors need present payment, not postponed payment; business investors demand 
present returns; and market and business opportunities do not wait until businesses regain 
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viability. Where debts and business opportunities are not postponed, profits cannot be 
postponed. Because Reott suffered present losses for more than three years when the 
Lavinia Well was denied access to the gas gathering pipeline and the equipment sat idle, 
the measure of Reott5 s damages does not depend on whether there was "a finite amount 
of commercially recoverable gas in the reservoir in which the Lavinia well is drilled." 
(R. 8211.) Rather, the measure of damages for disruption of Reott's business is his lost 
profits occasioned (i.e. lost production) from the Lavinia Well. 
C, Reott presented evidence of lost profits with reasonable certainty, 
"[L]ost profits may be recovered when the evidence submitted provides a basis for 
estimating them with reasonable certainty. While the evidence must not be so indefinite 
as to allow the jury to speculate as to their amount, some degree of uncertainty is 
tolerable." Acculog, 692 P.2d at 731. Reott presented evidence of his lost profits with 
reasonable certainty. His expert witness, Don Stinson, Ph.D., P.E., calculated the lost 
production by estimating the amount of gas production during the shut-in period based on 
historical production records for the Lavinia Well, subtracted the volume of gas used on-
site for well operations to determine net gas sold, multiplied the net gas by the estimated 
price of gas (adjusted for the heat content of the gas) over the shut-in period to determine 
gross revenue, then subtracted from the gross revenue the estimated state and county 
taxes, state royalties and overriding royalty payments, lease operating expenses, and 
Wasatch's gas gathering costs. (R. 8294:922-934.) Dr. Stinson's evidence established 
that Reott's lost profits totaled $116,064 for lost production from April 1, 2002 through 
January 31, 2004, the date his expert report had been completed. (R. 8294:933-934.) 
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Because Dr. Stinson's expert report had not been updated after its submission, the 
trial court refused to allow Dr. Stinson to offer damages figures for the period from 
February 1, 2004 through August 1, 2005, even though such figures were based on the 
same method, calculations, and underlying facts and data. (R. 8294:937-942.) The trial 
court's refusal to allow Dr. Stinson's testimony for the February 1, 2004 to August 1, 
2005 period was error inasmuch as there was no surprise or prejudice to Wasatch and 
BBC since Dr. Stinson merely applied the exact same factors and formula to the later 
period. Also, courts routinely allow experts to testify and offer opinions as to matters 
broadly covered by their expert reports but not specifically disclosed. See, e.g., Creative 
Waste Mgrnt., Inc. v. Capitol Environ. Svcs., Inc., 495 F.Supp.2d 353, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (allowing expert's testimony as to damages because expert witness was disclosed 
pursuant to rules of evidence and the expert's testimony was based solely on evidence 
admitted at trial).30 Reott therefore requests that this Court remand to the trial court 
with directions to award Reott the proper amount of damages during the time the Lavinia 
Well was shut-in and not producing. 
CONCLUSION 
Reott requests that this Court quieting title to the Section 32 Leases in Reott, set 
aside the June 2000 transfer as fraudulent and void, and remand to the trial court for a 
proper determination of Reott's damages. 
29
 Reott proffered that the damages from April 1, 2002 through August 1, 2005, totaled 
$281,767 ($165,703 from February 1, 2004 through August 1, 2005). (R. 8294:965.) 
30
 BBC never deposed Dr. Stinson. Reott also identified updated damages figures 
totaling $387,902 in his trial brief, which was filed and served several days before trial. 
(R. 7644-7645.) 
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Respectfully submitted this 1 } day of March, 2010. 
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AMENDED AND RESTATED 
OPERATING AGREEMENT OF 
MISSION ENERGY, LLC 
A COLORADO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
THIS AMENDED AND RESTATED OPERATING AGREEMENT is entered into 
as of this 1 day of April, 1997, among those persons or entities 
listed in Schedule HA", attached hereto and incorporated, herein by 
reference [hereinafter referred to, collectively as "Members" and 
individually as "Member"], who are the initial Members of MISSION 
ENERGY, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company, [hereinafter 
referred to as "LLC") 
In consideration of the mutual covenants and promises set 
forth in this agreement the Members agree as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
GENERAL 
1.1 Formation. The LLC was created pursuant to the Colorado 
Limited Liability Company Act, C.R.S. 7-80-101, et. seq. (the 
"Act.") The LLC was formed on September 16, 1996 upon the filing 
with the Colorado Secretary of State of the LLC's duly executed 
Articles of Organization. The Members thereafter shall, from time 
to time, execute such further documents and take such further 
action as shall be deemed appropriate by the Members or by the 
Manager to comply with the requirements of law for the formation 
and operation of a limited liability company in all other counties, 
states, or other jurisdictions where the LLC may elect to do 
business. 
1.2 Name. The name of the LLC shall be MISSION ENERGY, LLC. 
1•3 Location of the Principal Place of Business; Registered 
Agent and office. The principal place of business and registered 
office of the LLC shall be at 1617 Lincolnwood Drive, Glenwood 
Springs, CO. 81601, or such other address within the State of 
Colorado as from time to time selected by the Managers. The 
registered agent of the LLC shall be William F. Muller. If the 
Managers change the name of the registered agent and/or registered 
office, they shall notify the Members. 
1-4 Records to be Kept at Registered Office. The LLC shall 
continuously maintain at its registered office all of the 
following: 
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(a) A current list of the full name and last known 
business or residence address of each Member and each holder of an 
economic interest in the LLC set forth in alphabetical order, 
together with the contribution and the share in profits and losses 
of each Member and holder of an economic interest. 
(b) A current list of the name and address of each 
Manager, if any. 
(c) A copy of the Articles of Organization and all 
amendments thereto, together with any powers of attorney pursuant 
to which the articles of organization or any amendments thereto 
were executed. 
(d) Copies of the LLC's federal, state and local income 
tax or information returns and reports, if any, for the six most 
recent taxable years. 
(e) A copy of this Operating Agreement and any 
amendments thereto, together with any powers of attorney pursuant 
to which this Operating Agreement and any amendments thereto are 
executed., 
(f) Copies of the LLC's financial statements for the six 
most recent fiscal years. 
(g) The books and records of the LLC as they relate to 
the internal affairs of the LLC for at least the current and the 
four most recent fiscal years. 
(h) In the event that the LLC at any time owns an 
interest in real property, upon the request of an assessor, the LLC 
shall made available, at the LLC's registered office, a true copy 
of the business records relevant to the amount, cost, and value of 
all property that the LLC owns, claims, possesses or controls 
within the county. 
1.5 Term. The term of this LLC shall commence on the date of 
filing of the Articles of Organization with the Colorado Secretary 
of State, and shall continue until any of the following: 
(a) Upon the death, withdrawal, resignation, 
expulsion, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a member, unless the 
business of the LLC is continued by a vote of all of the remaining 
members within 90 days of the happening of that event; 
(b) the entry of a decree of dissolution of the LLC. 
ARTICLE II 
MEMBERS 
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2.1 Nature of Interest. A membership interest in the LLC, 
shall constitute the personal property of the Member or assignee. 
A member or assignee has no interest in the specific LLC property. 
2.2 Admission of Members to LLC. 
2.2.1 The founding Members of the LLC shall have those 
Shares listed beside their names on Schedule A. 
2.2.2 All those persons acquiring Membership interests 
in the LLC's offering of Shares by means of its Private Placement 
Memorandum dated May 1, 1997 shall'be required to pay the LLC the 
cash sum of $5,000 per Share. All such persons shall, upon 
acceptance of their subscriptions, be listed as Members on Schedule 
A. 
2.2.3 Any person or entity other than the persons or 
entities listed in Schedule A shall become a Member upon the 
affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of Shares. In the 
event such person or entity is admitted to Membership in the LLC, 
such Member shall become a party to this Operating Agreement, and 
shall have the same rights, duties, obligations and benefits of 
existing Members. 
2-3 Assignment of a Member's Interest. Except as provided in 
Section 2.4, hereinbelow, a Member may assign his interest in the 
LLC, provided that the Member shall first have received the written 
consent' of the holders of a majority of the Shares to the 
assignment. An assignee who has become a Member has, to the extent 
assigned, the rights and powers, and is subject to the restrictions 
and liabilities, of a Member under this Agreement and under the 
Act. However, an assignee is not obligated for liabilities unknown 
to the assignee at the time the assignee became a Member and that 
could not be ascertained from the Articles of Organization or this 
Agreement. 
2.3.1 Subject to the requirement that the consent of a 
majority of the Shares outstanding be first obtained, a Member may 
assign his Shares in the LLC. An assignment of Shares entitles the 
assignee to receive, to the extent assigned, the distributions and 
the allocations of Net Income, Net Gain or Net Loss, or items 
thereof, or similar items, and Net Cash Flow, to which the assignor 
would be entitled. Upon the assignment of all or a part of an 
assignor's Shares, the assignor shall provide the Manager or Member 
responsible for the books and records of LLC with the name and 
address of the assignee, together with details of the interest 
assigned. Upon receipt of the notice, the LLC shall amend its 
records accordingly. Until the assignee of Shares becomes a 
Member, the assignor continues to be a Member and to have the power 
to exercise any rights and powers of a Member, including the right 
to vote. 
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2.4 No Involuntary Assignments. No person shall accede to 
the rights of any Member hereto except upon the voluntary 
assignment of a Member's rights, and the unanimous written consent 
of said assignment, pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.3, 
hereinabove. In the event any person or entity (herein referred to 
as the "Involuntary Assignee") accedes to the interest of a Member 
as a result of the execution of a judgment, levy, seizure or other 
involuntary means, the Involuntary Assignee shall obtain only an 
economic interest. A court may charge the membership interest of 
the Member with payment of the unsatisfied debt. However, upon 
receipt of any such charging order, the Manager or Member receiving 
such charging order shall notify the other Members, in which event: 
(a) No distribution otherwise required to be made to the 
Member shall be made to the Member or to the Involuntary Assignee; 
and 
(b) The Involuntary Assignee shall offer the interest of 
the Member to the LLC, and the LLC may, but shall be required to, 
acquire the interest held by the Involuntary Assignee. In the 
event that the LLC elects to purchase the interest of the 
Involuntary Assignee, the consideration that the LLC shall pay to 
the Involuntary Assignee for the Member's interest shall be the 
lesser of (i) the fair market value of the Member's interest, 
determined by a qualified appraiser selected by the LLC and the 
Involuntary Assignee, or (ii) the book value of the Member's pro 
rata interest in the assets of the LLC. 
2.5 Death or Incompetency of a Member. If a Member who is 
an individual dies or is adjudged by a court of competent 
jurisdiction to be incompetent to manage the Member's person or 
property, the Member's executor, administrator, guardian, 
conservator or other legal representative may exercise all of the 
Member's rights for the purpose of settling the Member's estate or 
administering the Member's property, including any power the Member 
had under this Agreement to give an assignee the right to become a 
Member. 
ARTICLE III 
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS; CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
3.1 Initial Capital Contributions. Each of the initial 
Members shall make, or have already made, those initial capital 
contributions to the LLC listed beside their names in Schedule A, 
attached hereto. After a. Member has made a contribution to the 
capital of the LLC and has become a Member, said Member shall have 
no right to withdraw his capital contribution. 
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3.2 Additional Capital Contributions. No Member shall be 
required to contribute additional capital to the LLC at any time 
during the term"6f the LLC, and no Member shall suffer any penalty 
for failure to make voluntary contributions to the capital of the 
LLC. The foregoing notwithstanding, in the event that any Member 
makes additional voluntary contributions to the LLC, which 
contributions shall be only for a valid purpose related to the 
LLC's business, then upon the sale of any LLC assets, any Net 
Capital Gain from the sale of LLC assets shall be first allocated 
and distributed to those Members who made voluntary capital 
contributions to the extent of those voluntary contributions, 
before Net Capital Gains are allocated to other Members in 
accordance with their membership interests. A voluntary 
contribution of capital to the LLC shall not otherwise result in an 
increase in the interest of a Member in the LLC owned by the Member 
having made such voluntary contribution, or in an increase in such 
Member's right to allocations and distributions of Partnership Cash 
Flow, or annual income. No Member may at any time make a 
contribution to the LLC other than in cash. 
3.3 Capital Contributions of Additional Members. A person or 
entity other than the initial Members listed in Schedule A shall 
make a capital contribution, and obtain an interest in the LLC as 
a Member, in accordance to that amount agreed to by such additional 
Member and all of the initial Members. 
3.4 Establishment of Capital Accounts. A capital account 
shall be established for each Member. The account shall be 
credited with the amount of each Member's capital contributions, 
including voluntary capital contributions, a) increased by: (i) his 
share of LLC taxable Net Income and Net Gain and (ii) his share of 
LLC income and gain not included in (i), and (b) decreased by LLC 
distributions to him, (ii) his share of LLC tax deductions and tax 
losses, and (iii) his share of expenses not included in (ii). 
3.4.1 Special Allocations. 
(a) Except as provided in Section 3.4.1 (b) hereof, in 
the event any Member unexpectedly receives any adjustments, 
allocations or distributions described in paragraphs (4), (5) and 
(6) of Treasury Regulations Section 1.704-1(b) (2) (ii) (d), items of 
LLC income and gain shall be specially allocated to such Member in 
an amount and manner sufficient to eliminate, to the extent 
required in the Regulations, the Adjusted Capital Account deficit 
of such Member as quickly as possible. This Section 3.4.1(a) is 
intended to constitute a "qualified income offset" provision 
described in Treasury Regulations Section 1.704-1(b) (2) (ii) (d) and 
shall be interpreted consistently therewith. 
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article 
III, if there is a net decrease in the LLC's Minimum Gain during 
any LLC fiscal year, each Member who would otherwise have an 
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Adjusted Capital Account Deficit at the end of such year shall be 
specially allocated items of LLC income and gain for such year 
(and/ if necessary, subseguent years) in an amount and manner 
sufficient to eliminate such adjusted Capital Account Deficit as 
guickly as possible. The items to be so allocated shall be 
determined in accordance with Treasury Regulations.Section 1.704-
1(b) (4)(iv) (e) . This Section 3.4.1(b) is intended to constitute a 
"minimum gain chargeback" provision within the meaning of such 
Section of the Treasury Regulations and shall be interpreted 
consistently therewith. 
3.4.2 The provisions of subsections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 
notwithstanding, the Managers, acting upon the written advice of 
counsel, may refuse to allocate in accordance with a Minimum Gain 
Chargeback and/or Qualified Income Offset if in their discretion an 
alternative allocation would have "substantial economic effect" for 
federal income tax purposes. 
3.4.3 Upon dissolution of the LLC: 
(a) the LLC will be dissolved and its assets shall be 
distributed as follows: 
(1) all of the LLC's debts and liabilities to 
persons other than the Members shall be paid and discharged; 
(2) all of the LLC's debts and liabilities to the 
Members shall be paid and discharged; 
(3) the net assets of the LLC shall be distributed 
to those Members who have positive capital account balances, in 
accordance with the ratio of Members1 total capital account 
balances; 
(b) In no event shall any Member be reguired to restore 
any deficit capital account upon the dissolution of the LLC. 
ARTICLE IV 
LLC ALLOCATIONS . 
4 .1 Allocations According to Members1 Capital Contributions. 
Subject to the provisions of Section 3.2 relating to voluntary 
capital contributions, Members will be allocated Net Income or Loss 
from LLC operations and Net Gain and Loss from the sale or exchange 
of LLC assets, and shall receive distributions of available Net 
Cash Flow, in the same ratio that the number of Shares owned by 
such Member bears to all of the Shares outstanding. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4.1-1 The foregoing notwithstanding, those Members who 
acquired Shares by means of the Offering of Shares described in the 
Private Placement Memorandum shall be entitled, in the aggregate, 
to receive distributions of fifty percent (50%) of all Net Cash 
Flow until such time as such Members have received distributions of 
Net Cash Flow equal to their aggregate capital •contributions. 
Thereafter, Members shall receive a pro rata of all Net Cash Flow. 
4.1.2- For the purposes of this Agreement, "Net Cash 
Flow" shall mean that amount of cash, which the Managers, in their 
sole and absolute discretion, deem available for distribution to 
Members, after deduction for all current and anticipated costs, 
salaries, operating expenses and capital expenditures, including 
amounts the Managers deem necessary for reserve for contingencies. 
4.2 Determination of Share in Event of Transfer. All items 
of Net Income, Net Gain, Net Loss, deduction or credit, and all 
available Net Cash Flow for a calendar year allocable to any Member 
which may have been transferred during the year shall be allocated 
between the transferor and transferee based upon the period of days 
that each was a Member, without regard to the actual results of LLC 
operations during any particular period and without regard to 
whether cash distributions were made to the transferor or 
transferee during any particular period. 
ARTICLE V 
MANAGEMENT 
5.1 Management Rights Vested in Managers. The right to 
operate the LLC shall be vested in the Managers, acting by majority 
vote. At all times during the term of the LLC, there shall be at 
least four Managers. A Manager may or may not be one of the 
Members. The identity of the Manager shall be as disclosed in 
Schedule B, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
The Manager shall have the power and authority to perform the 
following duties: 
(a) all actions reasonable and necessary to carry out 
the LLC's oil and gas operations, including but not limited to 
entering into oil and gas leases, farm-out agreements, sub-leases, 
pooling and unitization agreements, and otherwise dealing with oil 
and gas operators, contractors, lenders and governmental agencies. 
(b) obtain and pay for out of LLC funds the preparation 
of required LLC tax returns; 
(c) maintain accounts in banking institutions or savings 
and loan associations whose deposits are insured by an agency of 
the United States Government or the State of Colorado or purchase 
certificates of deposit, money market fund securities or similar 
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s e c u r i t i e s ; 
(d) i ncu r d e b t o b l i g a t i o n s on beha l f of t h e LLC, pay t h e 
o b l i g a t i o n s of the LLC and c o l l e c t o b l i g a t i o n s owed t o t h e LLC; 
(e) perform normal a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and m i n i s t e r i a l a c t s ; 
(f) f u r n i s h f i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e Members a t such 
t i m e and in such form a s t h e Manage r s s h a l l deem a p p r o p r i a t e ; 
(g) m a i n t a i n r e s e r v e s f o r t h e purpose of p a y i n g p r o p e r t y 
t a x e s , i n s u r a n c e c o s t s , m o r t g a g e i n s t a l l m e n t s , and any and a l l 
o t h e r t y p e s of c o s t s o r e x p e n s e s a s r e g u i r e d o r d e s i r e d by t h e 
Managers ; 
(h) employ g e o l o g i s t s , e n g i n e e r s , a c c o u n t a n t s , l e g a l 
c o u n s e l , managing a g e n t s , o r o t h e r e x p e r t s t o p e r f o r m s e r v i c e s f o r 
t h e LLC and compensate them from LLC f u n d s ; 
( i ) bor row money and i n c u r s e c u r e d and u n s e c u r e d 
i n d e b t e d n e s s on b e h a l f of t h e LLC and e x e c u t e on b e h a l f of t h e LLC 
w i t h o u t o b l i g a t i o n on t h i r d p a r t y ' s p a r t fo r i n g u i r y a s t o a c t u a l 
a u t h o r i t y or as t o d i s p o s i t i o n of f u n d s , a l l c o n t r a c t s , l e a s e s , 
n o t e s , mor tgages , d e e d s , e v i d e n c e s of i n d e b t e d n e s s or s e c u r i t y 
a g r e e m e n t s ; 
( j) p u r c h a s e , t r a d e , l e a s e , l i q u i d a t e and s e l l t h e 
p r o p e r t i e s of the LLC upon such t e r m s , c o n d i t i o n s a n d p r i c e s a s t h e 
Managers deem a c c e p t a b l e ; 
(k) e n t e r i n t o any and a l l o t h e r a g r e e m e n t s on b e h a l f of 
t h e LLC, wi th any o t h e r p e r s o n o r e n t i t y fo r any p u r p o s e ; 
(1) make t h o s e a c c o u n t i n g d e c i s i o n s t h e Manage r s deem i n 
t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e LLC. 
5 .2 Form of Execu t i on , of Documents. Any document o r 
i n s t r u m e n t , of any and e v e r y n a t u r e , i n c l u d i n g w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n , 
any ag reemen t , c o n t r a c t , d e e d , p r o m i s s o r y n o t e , m o r t g a g e o r deed of 
t r u s t , s e c u r i t y a g r e e m e n t , f i n a n c i n g s t a t e m e n t , p l e d g e , a s s i g n m e n t , 
b i l l of s a l e and c e r t i f i c a t e , w h i c h i s i n t ended t o b i n d t h e LLC o r 
convey o r encumber t i t l e t o i t s r e a l o r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y s h a l l be 
v a l i d and b ind ing f o r a l l p u r p o s e s i f execu ted by any two of t h e 
Managers . 
5 .3 Managers; E l e c t i o n and R e s i g n a t i o n . A Manager s h a l l be 
e l e c t e d upon the c o n s e n t of t h e h o l d e r s of a m a j o r i t y of t h e 
S h a r e s . A Manager may r e s i g n a t any t i m e , i n w h i c h e v e n t t h e 
e l e c t i o n s h a l l be f i l l e d by t h e h o l d e r s of a m a j o r i t y of t h e 
S h a r e s . A Manager may be removed a t any t i m e , w i t h o r w i t h o u t 
c a u s e , upon t h e unanimous c o n s e n t of a l l of t h e Members . At t h e 
o p t i o n of t h e Managers, t h e Manage r s may adopt t h e t i t l e s of and 
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hold himself out as being the "President,,f "Executive Manager," or 
any similar office of the LLC. 
5.3.1 Except as provided in Section 6.7, hereinbelow, no 
Manager shall be entitled to compensation for acting as Manager, 
except as agreed upon by the LLC and the Manager in writing. A 
Manager shall be entitled to reimbursement for his actual expenses 
incurred in carrying out his duties as Manager. 
5.4 Indemnification, The LLC shall indemnify and defend any 
Member or Manager against any and all judgments, claims, suits, 
liabilities, expenses, costs and damages arising out of or incident 
to a person's status or actions as, Manager or Member, other than 
those arising out of the intentional conduct or fraud of said 
Member or Manager. The foregoing indemnification shall not extend 
to any suit brought by the LLC against any Manager or Member. 
5.5 No Regular Meetings. There shall be no required periodic 
or annual meetings of the Managers or the Members, and no inference 
of any kind shall be drawn from the failure of the Managers or 
Members of the LLC to conduct a meeting. 
5.6 Reports to Members. The Managers shall prepare and shall 
make available to each Member on or before March 15th of each year,-
the federal income tax information return of the LLC for the 
preceding fiscal year, showing the distributive share of each item 
of income, gain or loss, deduction or credit which a Member is 
required to take into account separately on his individual federal 
income tax return. The Managers shall also furnish to any Member, 
at the Member's expense, such other reports on the LLC's operations 
and conditions as he may reasonably request. 
(b) In addition to the foregoing, the Manager shall 
cause information reports to be mailed to all the Members at 
reasonable intervals during each year. 
5.7 Overriding Royalty Pool. The Managers may elect to award 
overriding royalty interests in oil and gas leases in which the LLC 
owns an interest to LLC employees and Managers. In no event will 
the combination of landowners' royalties and overriding royalties 
with respect to any lease exceed 20%, nor will the Managers award 
more than 4% aggregate overriding royalties in any lease. 
ARTICLE VI 
• MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
6.1 Mandatory Arbitration. Any party may submit any 
controversy, claim or matter of difference ("Controversy") to 
arbitration ("Arbitration") by filing a written demand pursuant to 
the provisions of this Article VI. If a party has submitted the 
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Controversy to Arbitration and the responding party has a claim 
which would be considered a compulsory cross-complaint under 
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure the responding party shall assert 
the compulsory counterclaim in the Arbitration proceeding or it 
shall be deemed waived. In no event may a party submit a claim or 
counterclaim for punitive or exemplary damages for arbitration. 
6.2 Scope. Without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, the following shall be considered Controversies for this 
purpose: 
(a) All questions relating to the breach of any 
obligation or condition of this agreement; 
(b) All guestions relating to any representations, 
negotiations and other proceedings leading to the execution of this 
agreement; 
(c) Failure of any party to deny or reject a claim or 
demand of any other party; and 
(d) All questions as to whether a right to arbitrate 
exists. 
6-3 Place. If a Controversy is submitted to Arbitration the 
proceedings shall be conducted in the State of Colorado according 
to the rules and practices of the American Arbitration Association 
from time to time in force, except that: (i) if such rules and 
practices shall conflict with the Colorado Pules of Civil Procedure 
or any other provisions of Colorado law then in force, such 
Colorado rules and laws shall govern; and (ii) all parties shall be 
entitled to discovery concerning the Controversy to the same extent 
as permitted by the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure then in 
effect. 
6.4 Time Limits. Arbitration of any Controversy shall be 
initiated by delivery to the other party of a written demand that 
Arbitration commence. Such demand must be made within a reasonable 
period of time after the Controversy arises, but in no event shall 
the Controversy by submitted to Arbitration if the date of delivery 
of the demand for Arbitration is not within the time limit of the 
Colorado or Federal Statute of Limitations which would be 
applicable if the Controversy were asserted in litigation. 
Arbitration may proceed in the absence of any party if demand for 
the proceedings has been given to such party. 
6.5 Awards. Any Arbitration award shall be final and 
binding on all parties to an extent and in the manner provided by 
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. All awards may be filed 
with the clerk of one or more courts, state or federal, having 
jurisdiction over the party against whom such an award is rendered 
or his property, as a. basis of judgment and of the issuance of 
10 
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execution for its collection. No party shall be considered in 
default under this agreement during the pendency of Arbitration 
proceedings relating to such default. 
6.6 Attorneys Fees; Costs. If Arbitration is brought for 
the enforcement of this agreement, or because of an alleged 
dispute, breach, default or misrepresentation in connection with 
any of the provisions of this agreement, the successful or 
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's 
fees and other costs incurred in that action or proceeding, in 
addition to any other relief to which it may be entitled. In no 
event shall an arbitrator have the authority to award or consider 
punitive or exemplary damages. 
ARTICLE VII 
NOTICES 
7.1 Method for Notices. All notices provided for in this 
agreement shall be sent by certified or regular mail addressed as 
set forth below the Member's signature on the Subscription 
Agreement (except that any Member may from time to time give notice 
changing his address for that purpose). Notice shall be effective 
when deposited in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid. 
7.2 Computation of Time. In computing any period of time 
under this agreement, the day of the act, event or default from 
which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be 
included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included 
unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which event 
the period shall run until the end of the next day which is not a 
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. 
ARTICLE VIII 
AMENDMENTS 
This Operating Agreement may be amended only upon the prior 
written consent of the holders of a majority of the Shares. 
ARTICLE IX 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
6.1 Integration. This agreement embodies the entire 
agreement and understanding among the Members and supersedes all 
prior agreements and understandings, if any, among them. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8.2 Applicable Law, This agreement and the rlghrs of the 
Members shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the lavs 
of the State of Colorado. 
8.3 Counterparts, This agreement may be executed in 
counterparts and all counterparts 50 executed shall constitute one 
agree««ant binding on all the parties hereto, notwithstanding that 
all the parties are not signatory to the originail or the sane 
counterpart, except that no counterpart shall be authentic unless 
signed by a Kember. 
8.4 Separability, In case any one or more of tihe provisions 
contained in this agreement or any application thereof shall be 
held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, the 
validity, legality and enforceability cf the remaining provisions 
any other application thereof shall not in any way bo effected or 
impaired. 
8.5 Binding Effect, Except as herein otherwise provided to 
the contrary, this agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the Members and their respective heirs, representatives, 
successors and assigns. 
8.6 Headnotes. Headnotes are used merely for reference 
purposes and do not affect the content of any Article or section. 
8.7 ftepder. Whenever the context of this instrument so 
requires words useti in the masculine gender include the feminine 
and neuter; th* singular includes the plural and the plural and 
singular* 
IK VITK2S8 WHEREOF, the undersigned, being all of the Members 
of MISSION ENERGY, LLC, a Colorado Limited Liability Company, have 
executed and acknowledged this Agreement as of the day and year 
first above written. 
INTERMARXET TRADING COMPANY, LLC 
By: Xy^l^ ( - JvJl^ 
Manager 
.tUJL. 
William F. Muller 
,dU^ ijLj^SL 
Charles 3, Willard 
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8.2 Applicable Law. This agreement and the rights of the 
Members shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws 
of the State of Colorado. 
8.3 Counterparts, This agreement may be executed in 
counterparts and all counterparts so executed shall5 constitute one 
agreement binding on all the parties hereto, notwithstanding that 
all the parties are not signatory to the original or the same 
counterpart, except that no counterpart shall be authentic unless 
signed by a Member. 
8.4 Separability, In case any one or more of the provisions 
contained in this agreement or any application thereof shall be 
held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, the 
validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions 
any other application thereof shall not in any way be affected or 
impaired. 
8.5 Binding Effect. Except as herein otherwise provided to 
the contrary, this agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the Members and their respective heirs, representatives, 
successors and assigns. 
8.6 Headnotes. Headnotes are used merely for reference 
purposes and do not affect the content of any Article or section. 
8.7 Gender. Whenever the context of this instrument so 
requires words used in the masculine gender include the feminine 
and neuter; the singular includes the plural and the plural and 
singular. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being all of the Members 
of MISSION ENERGY, LLC, a Colorado. Limited Liability Company, have 
executed and acknowledged this Agreement as of the day and year 
first above written. 
INTERMARKET TRADING COMPANY, LLC 
By: 
Manager 
Q-&J- UJL 
William F. Muller 
Charles B. Willard 
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SCHEDULE A 
C a p i t a l 
Member No*, o f S h a r e s Qpntrillation 
I n t e r m a r k e t T r a d i n g 480 $4 8 0 0 . 0 0 
Company, LLC 
M u l l e r O i l Company LLC 160 $ i 6 0 0 . 0 0 
C h a r l e s B. W i l l a r d 160 $ 1 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 
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SCHEDULE B 
Initial Managers 
Name Title 
Fred G. Jager Chief Executive Manager and 
Chairman 
William F. Muller Chief Operating Manager and 
President 
Charles B. Willard Chief Production Manager and 
Executive Vice President 
Justin C. Sutton Chief Marketing Manager and 
Executive Vice President 
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Wasatch 
Oil&Gas 
Wednesday, June 21,2000 
J.C. Sutton fai+ fM; H6-+U- ^ 7 ? ? ) 
Mission Energy ^ 
531 Encinitas Blvd Suite 200 
Encinitas, CA 92024 
Dear J.C: 
As we have discussed, and as referenced in our Letter of Intent dated May 24,2000, this letter 
shall serve as a letter agreement between Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation ("Wasatch") and 
Mission Energy, LLC ("Mission"). Inasmuch as Mission desires to transfer their ownership in 
the Leases ("Leases") described on the attached "Exhibit A," and the operations of the Jacks 
Canyon Unit ("JCtT) to Wasatch, and Wasatch desires to take assignment of the Leases and to 
operate the JCU, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Mission will assign to Wasatch all record title and working interest to all the Leases except 
for the wcllbore rights and attributable spacing unit relating to the Lavinia #1-32 well. 
2. Mission will have a right to participate in a <ctrade" relating to a drilling deal that Wasatch 
may be successful in putting together on the Leases, but only on the Leases listed on Exhibit 
A. Mission's participation will be proportionally similar to whatever Wasatch is able to 
retain in a trade with a. third party. For example, if Wasatch is able to sell a drilling deal in 
which Wasatch is carried for 25% of the drilling of a well, then Mission will have the option 
to receive 25% of the carry that Wasatch receives. For this example Mission's carry would 
be25%of25%or6.25%. 
3. The terms of any trade obtained by Wasatch will be offered to Mission, If Mission elects to 
accept the terms then an operaiing agreement will be executed. If Mission elects not to 
accept the terms of the trade then Wasatch can proceed without Mission. Consequently, if 
Mission elects not to participate in any trade then Mission will have been deemed to 
relinquish any and all interest in the Leases. If Mission elects to participate in a trade then 
assignments will be made after an operating agreement is executed and after a well is 
completed on a particular lease. 
4. Wasatch will work in good faith to meet the JCU obligations as defined by the BLM. 
However, due to the time constraints and requirements that at this point aie not fully known, 
Wasatch makes no guarantee that these obligations will be met. 
5. Mission will fully indemnify Wasatch for any obligation relating to the Lavinia tf 1 -32 welL 
Wasatch accepts no financial obligation relating to this well. Mission will continue to have 
responsibility for financial obligations of the Lavinia #1-32 well, including lease bonding, 
6. Mission will assign JCU operations to Wasatck 
7. Mission will worie in good faith transfer to Wasatch any pending APD's on the Leases. 
8. Any cost incurred by Wasatch to get the Leases in good standing, effective the (ktc ofMs 
letter, will be reimbursed to Wasatch by Mission within 10 days notice jL£ct^d f &UY»OJ / 
fJ^JkJi^ ycr ;^~<r * / 
PO Box €99 * Farmington, UT 84025*0699 • Tel (801) 451-9200 * Fax (801) 451*9204 
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9. The letter can be executed by facsimile. 
10. Wasatch will reimburse Mission for paying the rentals on the Mowing leases in the 
following amounts: ML - 43798, $678.40; UTU- 62890, $640.00; UTU - 66801, $716.00; 
UTU - 60470, $ 1 ,595.00. The total amount of $3,629.40 being paid upon execution of this 
document and delivery to Wasatch of the assignments. 
Sincerely, 
6 ^ 
Todd Cusick 
President 
AGREED AND ACCEPTED THIS DAY OF JUNE, 2000, FOR MISSION ENERGY, 
LLC.BY: 
(j^AC- Ju% 
Judfa C. Suttoa 
Title * 
•m 
-&-
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EXHIBIT A 
fer.y* Canvon Drift I .eases 
UTU-6S486 
UTU-69463 
UTU-60470 
UTU- 62890 
UTU-66801 
ML -43798 
ML - 43541 (Record Title: N/2NE/4, W/2, S/2SE/4, NE/SE/4; Operating Rights: NW/4SE/4, 
Section 36, below depth of 3,398 feet) 
Burris/Horse Bench Area Leases 
UTU-62645 
UTU-65782 
UTU -65783 
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C&SZii. I, 
Proposed and prepared by: 
LAWRENCE E. STEVENS (3103) 
GARY E. DOCTORMAN (0895) 
DIANNA M. GIBSON (7533) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Edward A. Reott, Goal, LLC, and 
Regoal, Inc. 
| — 
I MAY 2 4 2006 
I L 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH OIL & GAS, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD A. REOTT, an individual, KEY 
ENERGY SERVICES, INC., a Maryland 
corporation dba Key Energy Services, Inc. Four 
Corners Division, J-WEST OILFIELD 
SERVICE, INC., a Utah corporation, MISSION 
ENERGY, LLC, a Colorado limited liability 
company, and ALL OTHER UNKNOWN 
PERSONS OR PARTIES CLAIMING ANY 
RIGHT, TITLE, LIEN OR INTEREST IN THE 
PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE 
COMPLAINT HEREIN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WASATCH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT RE: REDEMPTION, 
AND, 
THE REOTT PARTIES' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON QUIET 
TITLE, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 
TRESPASS, CONVERSION AND 
TRESPASS TO CHATTELS 
Case No. 010700991 
Judge Bf ycc K* 
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GOAL, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, as the real party in interest to the 
rights of Edward Reott, Key Energy Services 
Lien and J-West Oilfield Lien, and REGOAL, 
INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, 
Counterclaim, Third Party and 
Cross claim Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
WASATCH OIL & GAS, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, MISSION L.L.C., a 
Colorado limited liability company, 
WASATCH OIL & GAS PRODUCTION 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
WASATCH GAS GATHERING, a Utah 
limited liability company, BILL BARRETT 
CORPORATION, a Maryland corporation, and 
all other persons unknown claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in or a lien upon the real 
property described herein adverse to the 
complainant's ownership or clouding his title 
thereto, 
Third Party, Counterclaim and 
Cross claim Defendants. 
On April 15, 2004, Plaintiff Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC ("Wasatch") filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. On April 30,2004, the Reott Parties filed a Memorandum in Opposition in 
addition to its own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Quiet Title, Fraudulent 
Conveyance, Trespass, Conversion and Trespass to Chattels. Wasatch and Bill Barrett 
Corporation ("BBC") each filed opposing memoranda. After full consideration of the briefs 
830982.2 
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submitted by all parties, consideration of supplemental submissions, oral arguments held on 
January 24, 2005 and March 18, 2005, and post-hearing briefing submitted by all parties, the 
Court—pursuant to Rules 52(a), 54(b), 56(c), and 56(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-
enters the following ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT on 
Wasatch's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Redemption, and, the Reott Parties' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Quiet Title, Fraudulent Conveyance, Trespass, Conversion and Trespass 
to Chattels. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Wasatch's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Redemption Issues is 
granted with respect to all properties formerly owned by Mission Energy ("Mission") in Sections 
27, 33 and 34 of Township 12 South, Range 16 East, Carbon County, including the BLM 
Mineral Leases U-08107, SL-069551 and SL-071595 (the "BLM Leases"). Wasatch may 
redeem by payment to Regoal, Inc., through the Carbon County Sheriff of $1.06, plus any other 
costs under Rule 69, within thirty (30) days of the entry of this final Judgment. If Wasatch 
redeems, title to the BLM Lease and all real property fixtures, including all equipment, pipelines 
and any existing APDs is quieted in BBC, Wasatch's successor in interest, and the sheriff is 
directed to issue a corrected Sheriffs Deed to BBC for all such properties. Wasatch's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Redemption Issues is denied with respect to its attempt to 
redeem any former Mission property in Section 32. 
2. The Reott Parties' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Quiet Title and 
Fraudulent Conveyance against the Wasatch Entities and BBC is granted with respect to all 
830982.2 
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properties formerly owned by Mission Energy ("Mission") in Section 32 of Township 12 South, 
Range 16 East, Carbon County, including the SITLA Leases in Section 32—ML43541, 
ML43541-A and ML43798 ("SITLA Leases")—and all real property fixtures, including all 
equipment, pipelines and any existing APDs (the SITLA Leases, fixtures and other personal 
property collectively referred to as "Section 32 Property"). Title to the Section 32 Property is 
quieted in the Reott Parties as of February 9, 2002, and neither the Wasatch Entities nor BBC 
have any record, legal or equitable interest in or title to such property. As such, the sheriff is 
directed to issue a corrected Sheriffs Deed to the Reott Parties for the Section 32 Property, and 
the Reott Parties are granted immediate possession and all the rights and benefits in and to the 
Section 32 Property. 
3, Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because this is a multi-
claim action involving multiple parties, the Court directs an entry of final Judgment quieting title 
in the Reott Parties to the Section 32 Leases, ML43541, ML43541-A and ML43798, and all real 
property fixtures, including all equipment, pipelines and any existing APDs in Section 32. The 
Court finds no just reason to delay entry of final judgment. BBC and the Wasatch Entities are 
not the successors-in-interest to Mission with respect to the Section 32 Property, and therefore 
cannot redeem the former Mission property sold. The Court finds that the Reott Parties have 
had title to the Section 32 Property since receiving the Sheriffs Deed on February 9, 2002. 
4. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because this is a multi-
claim action involving multiple parties, the Court directs an entry of final Judgment quieting title 
in BBC to the BLM Leases and all real property fixtures, including all equipment, pipelines and 
830982.2 
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any existing APDs in Sections 27, 33 and 34. The Court finds no just reason to delay entry of 
final judgment. BBC and the Wasatch Entities are successors-in-interest to Mission, and 
therefore may redeem the former Mission property sold in Sections 27, 33 and 34, under the 
procedure prescribed above. 
5. Summary Judgment is granted to the Reott Parties on their claims against 
BBC for trespass, trespass to chattels and conversion. As such, BBC is liable, as a matter of law, 
to the Reott Parties for all damages arising from BBC's willful, Icnowing and intentional entry 
upon the Section 32 Leases and the Lavinia Well Site, and its actions: (a) in drilling two new 
wells on Section 32, and in converting any and all oil and gas from the Section 32 leases since 
February 9, 2002, and (b) in physically removing the pipeline that connected the meter house to 
the main pipeline, damaging the Lavinia Pipeline, damaging the Oil Tank, causing the oil spill 
and causing the loss of approximately 100 barrels of oil. 
6. Judgment as a matter of law shall therefore be entered in favor of the Reott 
Parties and against BBC declaring BBC liable for all damages related to, and arising from, the 
Reott Parties' claims of trespass, conversion and trespass to chattels. Damages will be 
determined at trial 
DATED this ^ 7 day o f / % ^ 2006. 
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BY THE COURT 
' . s r fgSSS^ 
^ t e OF. £&&*. 
Jud^e Bfofce K. Bryner 
Seventh Judicial District Court, (Bar 
5
 ' i K T 
Approved as to form: 
^gr J'Mf. 
%sm0>0 
Eric C. Olson 
Matthew K. Richards 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Wasatch entities 
Carolyn Mcintosh 
David E. Brody 
PATTON & BOGGS, LLP 
Attorneys for BBC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3> day of ffpw 2006, I caused to be mailed, 
first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON WASATCH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT RE: REDEMPTION, AND, THE REOTT PARTIES' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON QUIET TITLE, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 
TRESPASS, CONVERSION AND TRESPASS TO CHATTELS., to: 
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Eric C. Olson 
Matthew K. Richards 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. BOX 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Attorneys for Wasatch 
Carolyn Mcintosh 
David E. Brody 
PATTON & BOGGS, LLP 
1600 Lincoln Street, Suite 1900 
Denver, Colorado 80264 
Nick Sampinos 
190 North Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 
Attorneys for BBC 
M ... 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010700991 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail GARY E DOCTORMAN 
ATTORNEY DEF 
201 S MAIN ST STE 1800 
POB 45898 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
84145-0898 
Mail ERIC C OLSON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
POB 45120 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84145-0120 
Mail NICK J SAMPINOS 
ATTORNEY 
190 N CARBON AVE 
PRICE UT 84501 
Mail CAROLYN MCINTOSH 
ATTY 
1600 Lincoln Street, Suite 
190 
Denver CO 802 64 
Mail DAVID E BRODY 
ATTY 
1600 Lincoln Street Suite 
1900 
Denver CO 802 64 
Mail MATTHEW K RICHARDS 
ATTY 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
PO Box 45120 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
Mail LAWRENCE E STEVENS 
ATTY 
201 S Main Street, Suite 
1800 
PO Box 45898 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
Mail DIANNA M GIBSON 
ATTY 
201 S Main Street, Suite 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C., a 
Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Edward A. Reott, et al. , 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Goal, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and Regoal, 
Inc., a Pennsylvania 
corporation, 
Counterclaim, Third-party, 
and Crossclaim Plaintiffs; 
and Appellees, 
v. 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C., et 
al., 
Counterclaim, Third-party, 
and Crossclaim Defendants; 
and Appellants. 
Seventh District, Price Department, 010700991 
The Honorable Bryce K. Bryner 
The Honorable George M. Harmond Jr. 
Attorneys: Eric C. Olson and Matthew K. Richards, Salt Lake 
City, Nick Sampinos, Price, and Carolyn L. Mcintosh, 
Denver, Colorado, for Appellant 
Gary E. Doctorman, Lawrence E. Stevens, and Dianna M. 
Gibson, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Thorne. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20060562-CA 
F I L E D 
( J u n e 2 1 , 2007) 
12007 UT App 223J 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
1l Plaintiff Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C. (Wasatch) appeals the 
trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to Defendant 
Edward A. Reott (Reott).1 On appeal, Wasatch argues the trial 
court erred in concluding (1) that Reott had standing to 
challenge whether Wasatch was a lawful successor in interest, 
entitled to exercise redemption rights, and (2) that Wasatch was 
not a valid successor in interest because it had no legal or 
equitable title to the disputed property. We reverse the trial 
court's grant of partial summary judgment and remand for further 
proceedings. 
BACKGROUND2 
\2 From approximately 1997 to 2000, Mission Energy, L.L.C. 
(Mission) was a Colorado limited liability company engaged in oil 
and gas business on federal and state land in Carbon and Duchesne 
Counties, Utah. Mission was governed by the Mission Operating 
Agreement (the MOA). According to the MOA, "[t]he right to 
operate the LLC shall be vested in the [m]anagers, acting by 
majority vote . . . [and a]t all times during the term of the 
LLC, there shall be at least four [m]anagers." The MOA requires 
that the identity of Mission's managers be disclosed in a 
schedule attached to the MOA. At the time of the MOA's execution 
in April 1997, the schedule attached to the MOA listed four 
managers: Fred G. Jager, William F. Muller, Charles B. Willard, 
and Justin C. Sutton. From 1997 to 2000, Sutton purportedly 
acted as Mission's sole manager. Sutton officially resigned as 
manager on October 1, 2000, and Jager acted as manager following 
Sutton's resignation. 
%2 In 1997, Mission was the record title owner of two mineral 
leasehold interests (ML 43541 & ML 43798), issued by the Utah 
1. For ease of reference, the term "Wasatch" includes Wasatch 
Oil & Gas Production Corp. and Wasatch Gas Gathering, L.L.C. 
Similarly, the term "Reott" also collectively includes Reott's 
companies, Goal, L.L.C. and Regoal, Inc. 
2. "[W]hen an appellate court reviews a district court's grant 
of summary judgment, 'the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.'" Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10,^8, 152 P.3d 
312 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fericks v. Lucy Ann 
Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85,1(2, 100 P.3d 1200). 
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School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA), in 
Section 32, Township 12 South, Range 16 East (Section 32). These 
two leases collectively covered the entire 640 acres of Section 
32. In 1997, Mission was also the owner of the Lavinia State #1-
32 well (the Well), located on forty acres wholly within Section 
32 with a specified depth of 3398 feet.3 
1[4 In February 1997, the Estate of Lavinia Reott made a bridge 
loan to Mission in the amount of $160,000.4 Mission promised to 
repay the loan within three months. Mission did not repay the 
loan, and in May 1998, Reott filed suit against Mission in 
federal court to recover the unpaid loan. In December 1999, 
Reott obtained a judgment against Mission in the amount of 
$204,000, plus costs and post-judgment interest. 
%5 From February 1998 through May 2000, eleven mechanics' liens 
were recorded against Mission's Section 32 interests due to 
Mission's failure to pay for goods and services provided. Two 
companies, J-West Oilfield Services, Inc. (J-West) and Key Energy 
Services, Inc. (Key Energy), filed lawsuits against Mission to 
foreclose on their mechanics' liens and, ultimately, obtained 
judgments and orders of foreclosure against Mission. 
%6 On June 21, 2000, Mission and Wasatch executed a letter 
agreement (the Agreement) that provided for, among other things, 
the transfer of Mission's mineral lease rights (ML 43541 & ML 
43798) in Section 32 to Wasatch.5 The Agreement assigned Wasatch 
all record title and working interest to the Section 32 leases, 
"except for the wellbore rights and attributable spacing unit 
relating to . . . the [Well]." Thus, under the Agreement, 
Mission retained the Well, including the Well's corresponding 
mineral lease rights. In return, Wasatch agreed to assume the 
obligation to maintain the leases it received, reimburse Mission 
for monies Mission had paid in rental payments on certain leases, 
and provide Mission with "a right to participate in a 'trade' 
relating to a drilling deal that Wasatch may be successful in 
putting together on the [1]eases." The Agreement was never 
recorded, and Wasatch did not end up putting together the 
drilling deal. 
3. References to the Well include the forty acres on which it is 
located. 
4. Lavinia Reott was Reott's mother. 
5. The Agreement also provided for the transfer of Federal 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) leases not at issue here. 
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%1 On June 23, 2000, Sutton executed three mineral lease 
assignment forms (the Assignments) purporting to transfer all of 
Mission's Section 32 leasehold rights. Specifically, the 
Assignments, signed by Sutton on the line designated for "Lessee-
Assignor,1'' assign the assignor's/lessee's rights to ML 43541 and 
ML 43798 to Wasatch. The Assignments do not expressly identify 
Sutton as the manager of Mission or as a person authorized to 
execute the Assignments on Mission's behalf. On the back of the 
Assignments, Wasatch agrees to "hereby accept [] the assignment 
from Mission." 
H8 The MOA gives managers the authority to "execute on behalf 
of [Mission] without obligation on third party's part for inquiry 
as to actual authority or as to disposition of funds, all 
contracts, leases, notes, mortgages, deeds, evidences of 
indebtedness or security agreements" and to "enter into any and 
all other agreements on behalf of [Mission], with any other 
person or entity for any purpose." The MOA states, however, that 
[a]ny document or instrument, of any and 
every nature, including without limitation, 
any agreement, contract, deed, promissory 
note, mortgage or deed of trust, security 
agreement, financing statement, pledge, 
assignment, bill of sale and certificate, 
which is intended to bind [Mission] or convey 
or encumber title to its real or personal 
property shall be valid and binding for all 
purposes if executed by any two of the 
[m]anagers. 
i|9 Following the Assignments, Mission retained only the Well. 
Although Wasatch admits it knew about Mission's debts to Key 
Energy and J-West prior to the issuance of the Assignments, 
Wasatch thought the J-West and Key Energy mechanics' liens only 
attached to the Well. 
1)10 The Assignments were not recorded with the Carbon County 
Recorder. On July 5, 2000, SITLA approved the Assignments. On 
August 22, 2000, Mission sent a letter to Wasatch stating: 
I was informed that you, or your offices had 
been contacted by several individuals, 
specifically . . . Reott, regarding potential 
filings of judgment against Mission. . . . 
There are several creditors with outstanding 
issues. . . . I must request that you advise 
your offices to refer any similar[] creditor, 
or legal calls directly to my attention. 
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Further[,] given the confidentiality of the 
agreements entered into between our 
companies, I would request that no verbal, or 
written information be sent to anyone without 
prior permission from Mission . . . .6 
Wasatch claims that this letter ratifies the Assignments, signed 
by Sutton, and that "[t]he letter evidences that Mission was not 
a stranger to the deal and that Sutton did not act ultra vires or 
on his own behalf but as Mission's manager, when [he] effected 
the transfers to Wasatch." (Emphasis omitted.) On August 22, 
2000, Sutton also wrote Reott, stating, among other things, that: 
[T]he managers of Mission . . . are doing 
everything possible to protect the assets of 
the company. We are working with several 
companies to develop a drilling program in 
hopes of receiving revenues to pay off 
creditors of the company. In that regard, 
many of those creditors who are owed monies 
for operations and permitting that have not 
been paid are working with Mission to try and 
make the company successful. 
fll On October 27, 2000, Reott domesticated the Colorado 
judgment against Mission in Utah state court. In 2001, Reott 
purchased J-West's and Key Energy's judgment interests and liens 
against Mission. Subsequently, on May 16, 2001, Reott sought 
enforcement of all judgments against Mission's Section 32 
interests. 
fl2 A sheriff's sale was held on August 9, 2001. No other 
bidders appeared at the sale and Reott obtained a certificate of 
sale for Mission's Section 32 interests for a credit bid of 
$1.00.7 In December 2001, Wasatch, after learning of the sale, 
filed a redemption notice, tendered a check in the amount of 
$1.06, and brought suit to quiet title to certain lease rights on 
Section 32 (Section 32 Leasehold Interests).8 In response, Reott 
rejected the tender and filed a notice that "Wasatch Is Not a 
6. "I" assumably refers to Sutton, although the letter in the 
record on appeal provides no signature to confirm this. 
7. Along with Mission's interest in other sections not relevant 
here. 
8. Wasatch's suit also sought to quiet title to BLM leases not 
at issue here. 
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Proper Party to Redeem or That The Amount of Redemption Is 
Insufficient." On January 10, 2002, the Carbon County Sheriff's 
Office sent a letter to Wasatch, certifying receipt of the 
redemption notice and stating that the sheriff's office was 
unable to locate Mission, Reott, Key Energy, or J-West in Carbon 
County. The sheriff returned Wasatch's tendered check. On 
January 18, 2002, Wasatch filed a second redemption notice and 
tender of redemption amount.9 On February 9, 2002, the sheriff 
issued the deed to Reott, and Reott subsequently recorded it. 
Reott later filed a lis pendens against the disputed property. 
On April 30, 2002, Wasatch sold a number of leases to Bill 
Barrett Corp. (BBC), including its Section 32 Leasehold 
Interests. BBC recorded its Section 32 Leasehold Interests. 
Reott added BBC as a defendant in late 2002. 
Kl3 On April 15, 2004, Wasatch moved for partial summary 
judgment, arguing that it was entitled to and had properly 
exercised a valid right of redemption. Reott submitted a 
memorandum in opposition to Wasatch's motion and filed his own 
motion for partial summary judgment against Wasatch and BBC as to 
issues of quiet title, fraudulent conveyance, trespass, 
conversion, and trespass to chattels. Reott claimed that Wasatch 
could not exercise a right of redemption because (1) Wasatch did 
not have legal title on grounds that the Assignments failed to 
identify Sutton as an agent for Mission and Wasatch did not pay 
sufficient consideration and (2) Wasatch did not have "equitable 
title on the basis of fraudulent conveyance." Reott also argued 
that if Wasatch was not a lawful successor in interest to 
Mission, BBC was liable for trespass, conversion, and trespass of 
chattels as to the Section 32 Leasehold Interests. Wasatch and 
BBC each filed opposing memoranda to Reott's motion. 
i[l4 The parties argued their motions for partial summary 
judgment in early 2005. On December 16, 2005, the trial court 
denied Wasatch's motion with respect to redemption rights in the 
Section 3 2 Leasehold Interests10 and granted Reott's motion. The 
trial court concluded that there were no disputed material facts, 
and Reott was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with regard 
to issues of quiet title and fraudulent conveyance. 
9. Wasatch filed both notices within the six-month period 
required under former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69 (j), the 
governing rule effective at the time. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j) 
(repealed 2004). 
10. The trial court granted Wasatch's motion with respect to the 
federal ELM leases that, as previously noted, are not at issue on 
appeal. 
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Specifically, the trial court determined that (1) Reott had 
standing to challenge Wasatch's purported redemption rights and 
(2) Wasatch was not a successor in interest, entitled to 
redemption, because the Assignments did not transfer legal title 
to the Section 32 Leasehold Interests to Wasatch due to "the 
failure to identify Sutton on the assignment forms as a person 
authorized to execute the [A]ssignments on behalf of Mission," 
and the Agreement did not convey equitable title to Wasatch 
because Mission fraudulently transferred its Section 32 Leasehold 
Interests to Wasatch. In making its decision, the trial court 
ruled that "Reott1s lien interests in the [s]herifffs [sjale 
properties are extinguished because the sale on a judgment 
exhausts it as to the property sold." 
[^15 The trial court therefore quieted title to the Section 32 
Leasehold Interests in Reott as of February 9, 2002, ruling that 
"neither . . . [Wasatch] or BBC have any record, legal [,] or 
equitable interest in or title to such property." The trial 
court also granted Reott's motion against BBC as to issues of 
trespass, trespass to chattels, and conversion. 
i(l6 Wasatch appeals the trial court's grant of Reott' s motion 
for partial summary judgment. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
i|l7 On appeal, Wasatch claims the trial court erred in granting 
Reott's motion for partial summary judgment, quieting title to 
the Section 32 Leasehold Interests in Reott. "A court 
appropriately grants summary judgment 'only when there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Benjamin v. Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37,Kl2, 140 P.3d 1210 (quoting Swan Creek 
Vill. Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne , 2006 UT 22,1(16, 134 P.3d 1122); 
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, "[w]e review the district 
court's grant of partial summary judgment 'for correctness, 
granting no deference to the district court.'" Id. (quoting Swan 
Creek, 2006 UT 22 at ^16) . 
ANALYSIS 
1(18 Wasatch argues the trial court improperly granted Reott's 
motion for partial summary judgment. Specifically, Wasatch 
claims the trial court erred in determining (1) that Reott had 
standing to challenge whether Wasatch was a lawful successor in 
interest to the Section 32 Leasehold Interests and (2) that 
Wasatch was not a lawful successor in interest to Mission, 
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entitled to redemption rights, because it had no legal or 
equitable title in the Section 32 Leasehold Interests. 
I. Standing 
fl9 Wasatch first claims that the trial court improperly granted 
Reottfs motion for partial summary judgment because Reott did not 
have standing to challenge Wasatchfs right to redeem its alleged 
Section 32 Leasehold Interests.. In Utah, a party has standing if 
he or she suffers "'some distinct and palpable injury that gives 
rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute.1" D.A.R. 
v. State, 2006 UT App 114,^7, 133 P.3d 445 (quoting Berg v. 
State, 2004 UT App 337,1(8, 100 P.3d 261) . lx 
[^2 0 The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern the exercise of 
redemption rights. In 2000, at which time Wasatch attempted to 
exercise its purported redemption rights, the governing provision 
was former rule 69 (j).12 Under rule 69 (j), 
11. Whether a complainant has suffered a "distinct and palpable 
injury," giving "rise to a personal stake in the . . . dispute," 
is one means of satisfying Utah!s three-tier standing inquiry. 
D.A.R. v. State, 2006 UT App 114,%1, 133 P.3d 445 (citing State 
v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1379 (Utah 1996)). That is, "'[i]f the 
complainant cannot [show that he will suffer a distinct and 
palpable injury], then [the court] will move to the second step 
of determining whether anyone else would have a more direct 
interest in the issues who can more adequately litigate the 
issues.1" Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Mace, 921 
P.2d at 1379). And, "if the complainant cannot meet the first or 
second steps of [the] inquiry, then the court will 'move to the 
third step, which is to decide if the issues raised by the 
[complainant] are of sufficient public importance in and of 
themselves to grant . . . standing.1" Id. (second and third 
alterations in original) (quoting Mace, 921 P.2d at 1379). Here, 
Reott and Wasatch focus solely on whether Reott suffered a 
distinct and palpable injury. 
12. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69 (j) was repealed in 2004 and. 
replaced by current rule 69C. Rule 69C(b) provides that 
[r]eal property subject to redemption may be 
redeemed by the defendant or by a creditor 
having a lien on the property junior to that 
on which the property was sold or by their 
successors in interest. If the defendant 
redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated 
and the defendant is restored to the 
(continued...) 
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[r]eal property sold subject to redemption, 
or any part sold separately, may be redeemed 
by the following persons or their successors 
in interest: (A) the judgment debtor; (B) a 
creditor having a lien by judgment, mortgage, 
or other lien on the property sold, or on 
some share or part thereof, subsequent to 
that on which the property was sold. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69 (j) (1) (repealed 2004) . 
1(21 The parties do not dispute that Reott relinquished his 
judgment creditor status respecting the Section 32 Leasehold 
Interests when he purchased those interests, and Utah case law 
appears to acknowledge such relinquishment. For example, in 
Brockbank v. Brockbank, 2001 UT App 251, 32 P.3d 990, this court 
held that a judgment creditor who foreclosed and subsequently 
purchased liened property owned the purchased property, "subject 
only to the exercise of the right of redemption," and that this 
right of redemption was not available to the foreclosing creditor 
turned purchaser, i.e., "she could not execute on it." Id. at 
Kl2. The court explained that " [t]o allow a foreclosing creditor 
to control the right of redemption is inconsistent with the 
purpose of that right--to provide a check on bids that are well 
below market value." Id.; see also id. at n.3 (citing cases for 
the proposition that liens are not revived by redemption and 
that "'[t]he principle purpose of the redemption statute, and the 
only purpose which it serves in a superior way, is the 
encouragement of adequate bidding at the sale[, and ojbviously 
this purpose is defeated by holding that liens are revived, or 
that a deficiency decree will effectively charge the land'" 
(citations omitted)). See also Currier v. Elliot, 39 N.E. 554, 
557-58 (Ind. 1895) ("'A purchaser at an execution sale stands in 
no sort of legal privity of contract with the creditor upon whose 
claim the judgment was obtained. It does not alter the case that 
the purchaser and the creditor are the same person. In respect 
to the property purchased they can [n]ot be the same. The 
creditors ceased to be creditors [respecting the property] when 
12. (...continued) 
defendant's estate. If the property is 
redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor 
having a right of redemption may redeem. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(b). Although rule 69C(b) and former rule 
69(j) are substantively similar, the parties and the lower court 
refer to and rely on rule 69 (j), the rule in place at the time 
Wasatch attempted to redeem. For purposes of our analysis, we do 
the same. 
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the sale occurred. Thenceforwcird their interest in the property 
was as purchasers at an execution sale, not as creditors.'" 
(citation omitted)). 
i|22 Thus, as a purchaser, " [Reott] owned the [Section 32 
Leasehold Interests] , subject only to the exercise of the right 
of redemption" by Mission, or its alleged successor in interest, 
Wasatch. Brockbank, 2001 UT App 251 at i|l2. Wasatch argues that 
because Reott's ownership of the Section 32 Leasehold Interests 
was subject only to Wasatch's exercise of its redemption rights, 
Reott would suffer no injury if Wasatch redeemed because Reott 
would be reimbursed his credit bid plus cost. The fact that 
Reottfs reimbursement would only be $1.06 of his $238,000 lien 
is, Wasatch claims, no fault but his own. That is, because "the 
high bid ait the sheriff's sale sets the redemption amount, which 
is the only amount guaranteed to the creditor for the [redemption 
period;] . . . this is the risk a creditor takes when bidding 
less than market value." Id. at 1fl4. Because "[t]he amount bid 
. . . is within the creditor's control," id. , Wasatch contends 
that any injury to Reott is self-inflicted and results from 
Reott's own choice to set a nominal bid amount, not from 
Wasatch's exercise of its redemption rights. 
i[23 Although we agree with Wasatch that Reott "is bound by [his] 
choices" and "should not now be heard to complain" about his 
decision to set the redemption value at $1.00, Tech-Fluid Servs., 
Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1335 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), we conclude that Wasatch mischaracterizes Reott's 
alleged injury. "Utah case law has long recognized substantive 
rights vesting in those who purchase property at sheriff [s'] 
sales." American Interstate Mortgage Corp. v. Edwards , 2002 UT 
App 16,125, 41 P.3d 1142; see also Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 
535 (Utah 1991); Layton v. Lavton, 105 Utah 1, 140 P.2d 759, 762 
(1943) ("'A sale by the sheriff gives the purchaser, under a 
certificate, an inchoate right to the land, if not an interest in 
the land itself; and it is such a right as will ripen into a 
title unless the property be redeemed from him.'" (citation 
omitted)). Thus, because Reott's ownership interest is subject 
only to Wasatch's redemption rights, if Wasatch, as Reott 
alleges, is not legally entitled to such redemption rights, Reott 
will be unlawfully usurped of his ownership rights. In other 
words, it is this unlawful usurpation, and not the nominal 
redemption amount, that Reott claims gives rise to injury 
sufficient to give him standing to challenge Wasatch's redemption 
rights. Just as a "purchaser at a sheriff's sale [has the 
substantive right] to receive the proper redemption amount in 
accordance with [the rules] or to have the title perfected," 
Huston, 818 P.2d at 535, we think a purchaser likewise has the 
right to ensure that redemption is only exercised by those 
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entitled to it under the rules. See Reynolds v. Davis, 252 P. 
386, 387 (Mont. 1926) (holding that sheriff sale purchaser was 
"the actual owner of the property, subject only to the right of 
redemption" and " [a]s owner he was entitled to protect his 
interest and to contest the right of [the redemptioner] to 
redeem"); Leland v. Heiberg, 194 N.W. 93, 94 (Minn. 1923) ("The 
purchaser at a foreclosure sale has the right to acquire absolute 
title unless redemption is made by one entitled to redeem, and 
hence he may question a judgment creditor's right to redeem by 
attacking the judgment."); Robertson v. Moline, Milburn & 
Stoddard Co., 55 N.W. 495, 496 (Iowa 1893) ("When the appellant 
purchased [property] at [a] sale on execution, he took it subject 
only to redemption from the sale by the persons and in the manner 
authorized by statute. If those entitled to redeem failed to do 
so within the time and in the manner provided, the [property] 
became his absolutely. He might surely question the right of one 
not authorized to redeem to do so, and ask that an attempted 
redemption be set aside as a cloud upon his title."); see also 
United States Fed. Credit Union v. Avidigm Capital Group, Inc. , 
No. 06-4448, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20652, at *6 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 
2 007) (noting that purchaser could have contested right of 
redemption). As one court has noted, "[i]f the law [were] 
otherwise, anybody and everybody might redeem, without the 
purchaser being able to question their right to do so." Hughes 
v. Olson, 77 N.W. 42, 42 (Minn. 1898) ("[A] purchaser at a 
mortgage sale . . . has the right to acquire absolute title to 
the land, unless it is redeemed within the time allowed by law by 
one who has a right under the statute to redeem; and he cannot be 
deprived of this right by one who is not a lawful 
redemptioner."). 
124 Furthermore, we point out that in Brockbank, this court 
noted that the judgment creditor turned purchaser could not 
object to an assignee's right of redemption because the purchaser 
"waived her objections when she accepted the [redemption] 
tender." 2001 UT App 251 at |^16. Here, the parties do not 
dispute, and the record is clear that, unlike the purchaser in 
Brockbank, see id. , Reott did not accept the redemption amount 
tendered by Wasatch. 
[^25 In sum, we conclude that as a sheriff's sale purchaser, 
Reott had standing to question whether Wasatch was a lawful 
successor in interest, entitled to exercise redemption rights. 
Given this conclusion, we next address Wasatch's claim that the 
trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Wasatch 
was not a lawful successor in interest because it did not have 
legal or equitable title to the Section 32 Leasehold Interests. 
II. Legal Title 
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i[26 We first consider whether the trial court erred in deciding 
that Wasatch was not a lawful successor in interest because it 
lacked legal title to the Section 32 Leasehold Interests. The 
trial court concluded that Wasatch did not have legal title 
because the Assignments failed to identify Sutton as a person 
authorized to execute assignments on Mission's behalf. 
f27 We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the 
Assignments1 failure to identify Sutton as an agent precluded 
legal title from passing as a matter of law. "It is well 
established in the law that a principal is liable for the acts of 
his agent within the scope of the agent's authority, irrespective 
of whether the principal is disclosed or undisclosed." Garland 
v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992). "The fact that an 
agent acts in his own name without disclosing [the] principal 
does not preclude liability on the part of the principal . . . ." 
Id. This is true even when an agent signs a written agreement 
for the transfer of real property without disclosing his or her 
agency status. See id. at 108, 110-11 (holding that buyers who 
entered into an earnest money agreement for the sale of land from 
sellers, who failed to disclose their agency status, "could look 
to [the principal corporation] for a deed when [the agent 
sellers] failed to provide one" and explaining that parol 
evidence is admissible to establish agency); see also id. at 110 
(citing Nalbandian v. Hanson Rest. & Lounge, Inc. , 338 N.E.2d 335 
(Mass. 1975) (granting specific performance against a corporation 
for sale of real estate even though the corporation president had 
signed the sale agreement without indicating he was acting on 
behalf of the corporation that owned the property)). Thus, we 
hold the trial court erred in concluding that the Assignments1 
failure to identify Sutton as an agent of Mission barred legal 
title from passing as a matter of law. 
f2 8 But we point out that in Utah, 
No estate or interest in real property . . . 
shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered[,] or declared otherwise than by 
act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering[,] or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1998). The requirement that an agent 
signing on behalf of another party is authorized in writing to do 
so "[n]aturally . . . appli[es] to agents of corporations." 
Mathis v.. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 952, 956 (1953). 
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Although courts "have adopted an exception [to this written 
authorization requirement for corporate agents] when the person 
who acts under an oral authorization is either a general agent or 
executive officer of the corporation." Id. 
1|2 9 It is undisputed that the MOA gives Mission managers, such 
as Sutton, the authority to "execute on behalf of [Mission] 
without obligation on a third party's part for inquiry as to 
actual authority or as to disposition of funds, all contracts, 
leases, notes, mortgages, deeds, evidences of indebtedness or 
security agreements" and to "enter into any and all other 
agreements on behalf of [Mission] , with any other person or 
entity for any purpose." But it is also undisputed that the MOA 
requires that 
[a]ny document or instrument, of any and 
every nature, including without limitation, 
any agreement, contract, deed, promissory 
note, mortgage, deed of trust, security 
agreement, financing statement, pledge, 
assignment, bill of sale and certificate, 
which is intended to bind [Mission] or convey 
or encumber title to its real or personal 
property shall be valid and binding for all 
purposes if executed by any two of the 
[mlanagers. 
Thus, although the MOA gives Sutton the general power to act on 
behalf of and under the authorization of Mission in the 
assignment of its property, the MOA limits this power in that it 
explicitly requires two Mission managers to execute instruments 
conveying Mission's title to real property, such as the 
Assignments. The parties agree that Sutton was the only manager 
who executed the Assignments. Therefore, we conclude that 
Sutton, acting alone, did not have the requisite written 
authority to assign the Section 32 Leasehold Interests. 
13 0 What is not clear from the record on appeal, however, is 
whether Sutton had oral authorization from Mission to assign the 
Section 32 Leasehold Interests. See Mathis, 261 P.2d at 956 
(noting that general agents or executive officers of corporations 
need only show oral authorization to satisfy the statute of 
frauds' agent authorization requirement). Nor is it clear 
whether Mission later ratified the Assignments. See Bradshaw v. 
McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982) (explaining that a principal 
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may subsequently ratify unauthorized agent acts) . 13 We therefore 
reverse the trial court's grant: of summary judgment as to the 
issue of legal title and remand to the trial court to determine 
whether Mission gave Sutton oral authorization to execute the 
Assignments or whether Mission subsequently ratified the 
Assignments; and, if so, the effect thereof. 
III. Equitable Title 
1(31 We likewise reverse and remand the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment on the issue of equitable title. The trial 
court determined that Wasatch did not have equitable title to the 
Section 3 2 Leasehold Interests because Mission fraudulently 
transferred those interests. Wasatch contends that the trial 
court erred in concluding fraudulent transfer occurred as a 
matter of law because, although the facts supporting the various 
badges of fraud are not disputed, the parties heavily contest the 
inferences one could draw from those facts, and, in weighing 
those inferences, the trial court essentially engaged in improper 
fact finding. We agree. 
[^32 Under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) , the transfer 
of an asset "is fraudulent . . . if the debtor made the transfer 
. . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
creditor of the debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(1) (a) (1998) . 
In deciding whether fraudulent intent exists, it is appropriate 
to infer its existence from "certain indicia of fraud," among 
other factors, set forth in the UFTA, see id. § 25-6-5(2)(a)-(k). 
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird , 781 P. 2d 452, 462 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) . These indicia, have been described as so called 
"badges of fraud." Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 
1252, 1261 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quotations omitted). 
f33 The badges1 "'value as evidence,'" however, "'is relative 
not absolute,'" and they are considered "facts which 'throw 
suspicion on a transaction and which call for an explanation.'" 
Id. at 1262 (quoting Territorial Sav., 781 P.2d at 462). In 
other words, "They are not usually conclusive proof; they are 
open to explanation. They may be almost conclusive, or they may 
13. Under Utah law, "[a] principal may impliedly or expressly 
ratify an agreement made by an unauthorized agent." Bradshaw v. 
McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982) . "However, a ratification 
requires the principal to have knowledge of all material facts 
and an intent to ratify." Id. "[T]he same kind of authorization 
that is required to clothe an agent initially with authority to 
contract must be given by the principal to constitute a 
ratification of an unauthorized act." Id. at 79. 
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furnish merely a reasonable inference of fraud, according to the 
weight to which they may be entitled from their intrinsic 
character and the special circumstances attending the case." 
Territorial Sav., 781 P.2d at 462 (quotations and citations 
omitted). Importantly, "[t]he existence of fraudulent intent is 
a factual question," which "necessarily involves weighing the 
evidence presented and assessing the credibility of witnesses--
tasks largely within the province of the fact-finder." Selvage, 
910 P.2d at 1262. 
1(34 Here, the trial court adopted, with little explanation, 
Reott's eleven asserted badges of fraud as conclusive evidence of 
fraudulent intent. While we agree with the parties that many of 
the underlying facts are undisputed, it was improper on summary 
judgment for the trial court to weigh these facts and adopt 
Reott's legal conclusion that these facts necessarily infer 
fraudulent intent. 
i}35 For example, the trial court adopted Reott' s alleged badge 
of fraud that "Sutton and [Wasatch] carved up [one of the leases] 
with the intent of evading the liens and judgments." While 
Wasatch does not dispute that it carved up the lease, Wasatch 
strongly contests Reott's asserted inference that such carving 
was done with the intent to evade liens and judgments. In fact, 
Wasatch asserts that it assumed the liens and judgments only 
applied to the Well. The trial court's decision to adopt Reott's 
legal conclusion as to the significance of the carving was wholly 
improper. On summary judgment, "[t]he trial court must not weigh 
evidence or assess credibility," Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 
v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 
1984), and where "there are other equally plausible inferences to 
be drawn from the evidence . . . summary judgment should not have 
been granted," Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR, L.L.C. , 
2006 UT App 353,1(18, 144 P. 3d 261. Moreover, on summary 
judgment, the trial court was required to construe "[d]oubts, 
uncertainties, or inferences concerning issues of fact . . . in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment," 
which in this case was Wasatch, not Reott. Mountain States, 681 
P.2d at 1261. 
1(36 We therefore reverse the trial court's determination of 
fraudulent intent and remand for "the fact-finder [to] consider" 
whether the undisputed facts support an inference of fraudulent 
intent. Selvage, 910 P.2d at 1261 (explaining that the badges of 
fraud are "factors which the fact-finder may consider, among 
others, to determine if actual intent [to defraud] existed" 
(quotations omitted)). 
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CONCLUSION 
i|37 In sum, we conclude that as sheriff's sale purchaser of the 
Section 32 Leasehold Interests, Reott had standing, generally 
speaking, to challenge whether Wasatch was a lawful successor in 
interest capable of exercising a right of redemption. 
Nonetheless, we determine the trial court erred in deciding as a 
matter of law that Wasatch lacked legal or equitable title, 
precluding lawful successor in interest status, to the Section 32 
Leasehold Interests. We therefore reverse the trial court's 
grant of partial summary judgment quieting title in Reott and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 14 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
H38 WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
14. Although BBC does not expressly appeal the trial court 
rulings regarding trespass, conversion, and trespass to chattels, 
these rulings were based on the trial court's determination that 
Reott had title to the Section 32 Leasehold Interests. 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH OIL & GAS, L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
EDWARD A. REOTT, et. al. 
Defendants 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
re: QUIET TITLE AND 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER 
CLAIMS 
Civil No. 010700991 
Judge George ML Harmond 
and related actions. 
The trial of this action to the Court commenced on October 27, 2008 and continued through 
October 31, 2008. The plaintiff Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C. and related companies ("Wasatch") were 
represented by Eric Olson and Matthew Richards. The defendant Edward A. Reott and related 
companies ("Reott") were represented by Craig Smith, Scott Crook and Bryan Bryner. The third-party 
defendant Bill Barrett Corporation ("BBC") was represented by Carolyn Mcintosh, Donna Vetrano 
Pryor and Nick Sampinos. 
At the direction of this Court, evidence relating to the issues of quiet title and fraudulent 
transfer was presented during the first three days of trial. In this regard, Wasatch called as witnesses 
Edward Reott, Todd Cusick, Heggie Wilson, Brian Watts and, by deposition, Justin Sutton. Reott 
called as witnesses Edward Reott, Todd Cusick, Roger Smith (expert), Donald Stinson (expert) and, by 
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deposition, Justin Sutton. Wasatch called Mr. Cusick in rebuttal. 
_~ The following documents were admitted into evidence .during the first three days of trial: 
Exhibits 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 through 19, 28 through 30, 101A and B, 102, 107 tlirough 111, 113 
through 118 (including 114A through D and 115 A and B), 120,123, 124, 126, 128 through 130, 320, 
340, 342, 343, 345, 359A, 359B, 362, 380, 381, 383, 385, 394, 400, 407 tlirough 409, 411, 422, 425 
through 431, 438, 442, 444 (Exhibits 2 tlirough 5 thereto only), 492, 557, 562, 569, 575, 639, 652, 728, 
and 730. 
The Court, having heard the testimony presented at trial, having reviewed the deposition 
testimony received as evidence, having also reviewed the exhibits received at trial, having read into the 
record its Ruling on the quiet title and fraudulent transfer issues on October 30, 2008, and being 
otherwise sufficiently advised, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
re: Quiet Title and Fraudulent Conveyance claims: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. As of December 1996, Mission Energy, LLC ("Mission") was a start-up company in the 
oil and gas industry, organized with the stated purpose to acquire mineral leases and then market those 
leases to third parties as part of a drilling program. 
2. For all time periods relevant to this action, Mission conducted its business pursuant to an 
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement dated April 1, 1997 (the "Operating Agreement"). 
3. The Operating Agreement identified three members/owners of Mission, with 
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Intennarket Trading Company, LLC ("Intennarket") owning the majority interest in Mission at 480 
shares out of a total of 800 shares. 
4. The Operating Agreement identified as "initial managers" of Mission four individuals: 
Justin Sutton ("Sutton"), Charles Wiliard ("Willard"), William Muller ("Muller"), and Fred Jager 
("Jager"). 
5. Sutton was the sole manager of Intennarket. 
6. Jager did not sign the Operating Agreement and there was no evidence at trial that, 
although he purported to act for Mission as "chairman" once in 1997 and once in 2001, he knew he was 
a manager of Mission. 
7. The Operating Agreement at paragraph 5.1 (i) and (j) provided: 
The Manager shall have the power and authority to perform the following duties: 
(i) Borrow money and incur secured and unsecured indebtedness on 
behalf of the LLC and execute on behalf of the LLC without obligation 
on third party's part for inquiry as to actual authority or as to disposition 
of funds, all contracts, leases, notes, mortgages, deeds, evidences of 
indebtedness or security agreements; 
(ii) Purchase, trade, lease, liquidate and sell the properties of the LLC 
upon such terms, conditions and prices as the Managers deem 
acceptable.... 
8. The Operating Agreement at paragraph 5.2 further provided that "[a]ny ... assignment..., 
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which is intended to bind the LLC or convey .., title to its real... property shall be valid and binding for 
- --alLpuiposesif executed by any two_ of the .ManagOTS.^  
9. Reott or related entities twice provided funds to Mission: 
a. On behalf of his mother and through Belle Oil & Gas, Reott invested 
$ 150,000 in Mission's Utah Lease Acquisition Program I pursuant to a signed 
Subscription Agreement. 
b. At the direction of his mother, Reott made an unsecured loan of $160,000 to 
Mission. 
10. With respect to the investment identified in finding 9(a) above, Reott executed the 
Subscription Agreement and the Lease Acquisition Memorandum on behalf of Belle Oil & Gas Inc. as 
president and Sutton alone executed both documents on behalf of Mission without any statement 
indicating his authority. (Exhibits 2 and 102) 
11. The Subscription Agreement warned that "THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT 
MISSION MAY BE UNABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY MARKET THE LEASES ACQUIRED 
UNDER THIS PROGRAM OR EVEN MAINTAIN SUCH LEASES. EITHER EVENT MAY LEAD 
TO THE LOSS OF SUCH LEASES...." 
12. Mission represented in a memorandum to Reott dated February 24, 1997, that it would 
issue a promissory note to evidence the loan identified in Finding No. 9(b) above but it failed to do so. 
(Exhibit 28) 
13. The memorandum identified in Finding No. 12 above was signed by Jager, 
without noting his authority next to his signature but with the indication at the top of the 
memorandum that he was "chairman." 
4 
n n o 1 OH 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14. Consistent with the disclosures in its offering memorandum, Mission was 
undercapitalized from the beginning as a start-up company in the oil and gas industry. 
15 Mission's stated object, pursuant to the documents the Court has reviewed, was to 
acquire mineral leases and then to market the leases for a drilling program. 
16. Because it was undercapitalized, Mission would be expending cash to acquire those 
leases but cash flow for development would be problematic and, thus, Mission needed a better 
capitalized partner to realize the potential value of leases acquired. 
17. Pursuant to its lease acquisition program, Mission acquired interests in leases located in 
the Peter's Point Unit, the Stone Cabin/Prickly Pear area (later a unit), the Jack Canyon Unit, the Burris 
area, the Gusher area and other locations in the vicinity of Nine Mile Canyon. 
18. Mission also obtained approval from SITLA to drill or rework a well called the 
"Lavinia 1-32" well, located on Township 12 South, Range 16, Section 32 ("Section 32). 
19. Pursuant to the application to drill the Lavinia 1-32 well filed by Mission on September 
10, 1997 and approved by the State of Utah on September 25,1997, the spacing for or area assigned to 
the Lavinia 1-32 well was 40 acres. (Exhibit 385) 
20. Almost from the start of its existence and as of May 1, 2000 through June 21, 2000, 
Mission was not able to pay its debts as they became due for lack of capital and revenue. 
21. In May 1998, Willard and Muller terminated their relationship with Mission by selling 
their membership interests and ceasing to be managers. 
22. Mission did not appoint any managers to replace Muller and Willard. 
23. In May 1998, Sutton became the manager of Mission and from that date through 
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October 21, 2000, when he resigned, Sutton acted as sole manager of Mission. 
_ 24, . Sutton advised Reott no later than August 21, 1998, that he (Sutton) had taken over the 
operations of Mission as of May 1, 1998. (Exhibit 6) . 
25. Wasatch acquired certain lease interests in the Peter's Point Unit from McCullis 
Resources Co., Inc. ("McCullis") together with, among other things, the gas gathering pipeline 
servicing the Nine Mile Canyon area, including the Lavinia 1-32 well. 
26. Immediately upon acquiring the McCullis interests, Wasatch commenced a process to 
vacate the existing spacing order, No. 157-1, covering the Peter's Point Unit and properties in the Nine 
Mile Canyon area including Section 32 and the Lavinia 1-32 well. 
27. Under Spacing Order No. 157-1, the default spacing for wells on lands owned by the 
State of Utah, set at 40 acres per well, had been replaced by spacing set at 640 acres per well. 
28. In furtherance of its efforts to vacate Spacing Order No. 157-1, Wasatch retained the 
services of expert legal counsel, a certified landman, a geologist and a petroleum engineer to gather 
data to present to the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (the "Board"). (Exhibit 19) 
29. As an interest holder in the area, Reott's company Belle Oil & Gas, Inc. was given 
notice of Wasatch's effort before the Board to vacate Spacing Order No. 157-1 and raised no objection. 
(Exhibit 19) 
30. Mission held minority interests in certain of the Peter's Point mineral leases subject to 
Wasatch's acquisition from McCullis. 
31. As the result of disputes between Mission and McCullis predating Wasatch's acquisition 
as well as Wasatch's involvement in funding certain McCullis' operations, both Mission and Wasatch 
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were parties to litigation involving the McCullis/Mission property interests. 
32, hi June 1999, Wasatch and Mission settled the litigation by entering into a settlement 
that, by order of this Court and agreement of the parties, is not at issue in this action but does represent 
part of the course of dealings between Mission and Wasatch. 
33. Mission failed to repay the loan by Reott referenced in finding 9(b) above. 
34. On December 20, 1999, the United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado awarded Reott a judgment in the amount of $204,000 against Mission based on 
Mission's default in paying the loan (the "Reott Judgment"). (Exhibit 408) 
35. Thereafter, and before May 1, 2000, Reott sought to enforce the Reott Judgment by 
garnishing funds in Mission bank accounts in the amount of $27,236.27. 
36. On May 1, 2000, pursuant to a letter agreement, Mission transferred eight mineral 
leases- two State of Utah or SITLA leases and six federal or BLM leases consisting of six non-
contiguous parcels - to Wasatch for a payment of $27,443.30. (Exhibit 108) 
37. The leases sold on May 1, 2000, did not have any existing wells or oil and gas 
production. 
38. Within a few months prior to the May 1, 2000, transaction, Wasatch had bid 
successfully at auction for two federal and two state leases contiguous to the property covered by the 
May 1, 2000, letter agreement. 
39. The amount Wasatch initially offered for the May 1, 2000, lease purchase was based on 
the average price paid for the four leases it acquired at government bid sales just previous to the May 1, 
2002, sale. 
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40. The ultimate price paid for the May 1, 2000, purchase resulted from negotiations 
between Wasatch and Mission.._ 
41. Wasatch was familiar with the area in which the leases were located, including access 
and topography, because it had operated wells and a pipeline in that area for nearly a year previously, 
42. Todd Cusick and Heggie Wilson of Wasatch worked together to formulate an initial 
offer for the eight leases by looking at each lease and assessing factors such as access to roads and 
pipelines and topography for drilling. 
43. Thus, the offers made by Wasatch were based on its hands-on experience in the area. 
44. Wasatch's initial offer for the leases sold pursuant to the May 1, 2000, letter agreement 
was the result of calculating the net acres available (four of the BLM leases were only 50% interests) 
and multiplying that number by the price per acre derived from government bid sale prices paid by 
Wasatch for four leases contiguous to property included in the transaction as discussed in Findings 
Nos. 38 and 39 above. 
45. As a consequence of this calculation, Wasatch made an initial offer to Mission of 
$24,610.83 for the eight leases. (Exhibit 129) 
46. Because some of the parcels covered by the leases were quite remote and subject to 
very challenging terrain, Wasatch's calculations and offer took into account, on a property by property 
basis, any limiting conditions, including rough ten-ain, remoteness and access, and whether or not the 
lease was suspended. 
47. Wasatch set forth its calculation and the factors bearing on any limitations in the 
document received into evidence as Exhibit 129. 
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48. This offer represented the amount that a willing buyer was prepared to pay a 
willing seller for the leases.,. 
49. Dr. Donald Stinson's expert testimony as to a much higher value for the leases included 
in both the May 1, 2000, transaction and the later June 21, 2000, transaction relied heavily on the trend 
of prices of minerals in determining a value for the subject leases. 
50. Dr. Stinson did review some lease sales in the area, but he did not record those sales. He 
did not rely on sales from state or federal auctions, despite the fact (as he aclaiowledged) that such 
sales are competitively bid, and are publicly available. 
51. While Dr. Stinson testified that he did review some BLM auction sales, he did not 
review any SITLA auction sales. 
52. The one lease sale specifically identified by Dr. Stinson - a 50 acre sale in Section 36 -
took place in November 2000, well after the last of the sales from Mission to Wasatch. 
53. Dr. Stinson testified that knowledge of specific conditions of each lease as outlined 
above in Findings Nos. 41 through 43 is important, but it was not clear if, and to what degree, Dr. 
Stinson relied on such information in arriving at his opinion of value. 
54. Dr. Stinson assumed that, where applications for permits to drill were on file, it was 
Mission that had done the necessary archaeological, cultural and environmental research; however, the 
evidence established that Wasatch had either performed the work or paid for this work to be done. 
55. Wasatch, not Mission, also had to make the investment and incur the costs to make the 
leases viable. 
56. Dr. Stinson did not consider each lease separately as to the percentage of ownership, 
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access to pipeline of each lease, topography of each lease and access to existing roads. 
__.._ 57 Di._Stinsgn_did not make a calculation of estimated gas reserves under each property 
covered by the leases but rather merely assigned a probability as to the chance that, if one were to drill, 
a particular property subject to lease would produce gas. 
58. Dr. Stinson did not know how many operators were in the area at the time, which the 
Court finds would be a factor in the price Mission could obtain for the leases. 
59. The Court was unable to track how Dr. Stinson came to his conclusions of value in any 
kind of mathematical model. 
60. The values offered by Wasatch, which were developed by extensive field work in the 
area and detailed knowledge of the leases themselves and the conditions of the field in general, were 
more indicative of reasonably equivalent value at the time of the sale than the values offered by Dr. 
Stinson. 
61. Dr. Stinson's analysis and opinion were more applicable to proposed pricing were one 
to market the property for sale, but not necessarily to determine whether the actual sales prices were 
reasonable under the conditions that prevailed in May and June 2000. 
62. The Court gives greater weight to the calculations of Wasatch and rejects the 
calculations of Dr. Stinson as a measure of reasonably equivalent value. 
63. With respect to the May 1, 2000, transaction, Mission countered Wasatch's initial offer 
with an offer to sell the eight leases at an even $5.00 per net acre. 
64. Wasatch accepted that counteroffer and calculated the final purchase price as set forth 
in Exhibit 130 at trial. 
10 
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65. Wasatch provided this calculation to Mission as part of the May 1, 2000, letter 
-agreement received in evidence at trial as Exhibit 109. 
66. Following the transfer of the eight leases pursuant to the May 1, 2000, letter 
agreement, Mission and Wasatch discussed a second sale of leases to Wasatch. 
67. This second proposed sale involved interests in ten mineral leases, including seven 
leases in the Jack Canyon Unit and three in the Burris area, and unit operator status in the Jack Canyon 
Unit 
68. None of the ten mineral leases had any existing wells or oil or gas production. 
69. The total acreage was split fairly evenly between the Jack Canyon Unit and the Burris 
area; however, two of the Burris leases - UTU-65782 and UTU-65783 - were only 50% interests. 
70. Two leases - ML-43798 and ML-43541 - covered Section 32 and were SITLA leases. 
71. At the time in June 2000, Section 32 was encumbered by various liens including one 
filed by J-West Oilfield Service Inc. and one filed by Key Energy for work performed on the Lavinia 1-
32 well and related pipeline. 
72. With respect to the Section 32 leases, Wasatch and Mission ultimately agreed that 
Mission would transfer its interest outright in 600 acres, reserving for itself only the Lavinia 1-32 well 
and the surrounding 40 acres to a depth of 3,398 feet below the surface of the earth (the depth to which 
the well had been completed). 
73. Mission and Wasatch agreed to this division of Section 32 in an attempt to keep 
Wasatch from becoming entangled in the potential legal disputes associated with the liens, based on 
their understanding that the Lavinia 1-32 had a spacing unit and assigned acreage of 40 acres to which 
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the liens attached. 
74. . Neither Mission.norWasatch acted with any intent to defraud creditors and, with 
respect to any liens, such a division and transfer had no effect on the scope of the liens. 
75. Of the five BLM leases located in the Jack Canyon Unit, three had expired for non-
payment of rentals and another one was in suspension. 
76. The Jack Canyon Unit, of which Mission was unit operator, was also expiring. 
77. As with the May 1, 2000, transaction, Wasatch valued the leases subject to the June 
2000 negotiations by considering the status of the leases and any limiting conditions, such as access, 
remoteness, development limitations and rough terrain. 
78. The Bums leases were located at a distance from other Mission holdings, to the 
northwest of the Jack Canyon Unit and adjacent to wilderness study areas, with very difficult access. 
79. The Bums leases were in suspension. 
80. Ultimately, Wasatch proposed to purchase the Jack Canyon and Bums leases for the 
same $5.00 per net acre price paid for the leases purchased on May 1, 2000. 
81. The Court finds that this amount constituted reasonably equivalent value and rejects the 
testimony of Dr. Stinson to the contrary for the reasons set forth in Findings Nos. 49 through 60 above. 
82. Mission countered with a proposal as set forth in Exhibit 9 that Wasatch reimburse 
Mission for past rental payments, obtain reinstatement of any expired leases, maintain the leases as 
lessee and unit operator, and give Mission a specified percentage of any drilling deal Wasatch or 
Mission might negotiate in the future with respect to the leases purchased. 
83. Sutton and Jager believed that, given the financial pressures on Mission including 
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Reott's judgment collection efforts, the promise of a percentage of a future drilling deal had more 
potential value to the company and its shareholders and creditors in the long term than the payment of 
the fixed amount offered for the leases. 
84. The June 21, 2000, letter agreement (the "June 2000 Letter Agreement") sets forth the 
terms on which Mission agreed to sell to Wasatch the ten lease interests including the Section 32 
interests. (Exhibit 9) 
85. At the time of this sale, Sutton was concerned that the Jack Canyon Unit and related 
leases would expire and the assets would become worthless, either to Mission, to Wasatch or to 
creditors. 
86. Sutton believed that Wasatch could put together a drilling deal to benefit not only 
Wasatch, but Mission and its creditors, and that such a deal would prove the best way to permit 
Mission's investors to recoup money from their investment. 
87. Pursuit of a drilling deal comported with the lease acquisition program set forth in the 
original Mission subscription materials. 
88. This Court finds that the consideration set forth in the June 2000 Letter Agreement and 
the amounts subsequently paid by Wasatch to preserve the leases and the Jack Canyon Unit constituted 
reasonably equivalent value for the sale of the leases. 
89. As of the date of the June 2000 Letter Agreement, Wasatch's efforts to obtain a change 
in the spacing order governing Section 32 and the surrounding area, as noted in Findings Nos. 26 
through 29 above, was well underway. 
90. As of June 21, 2000, geologic and engineering data supported the position that 40 acre 
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spacing was appropriate for the Jack Canyon area. 
— - 91 The reservation.of 40 acres for the Lavinia 1 -32 well was consistent with the 
development in the entire Nine Mile Canyon area. 
92. In anticipation of performance under the June 2000 Letter Agreement, Heggie Wilson 
directed Vem Jones to prepare assignments on standard BLM and SITLA forms to document the 
transfer of the ten lease interests from Mission to Wasatch. 
93. The standard BLM form of lease assignment has a line to identify the assignor together 
with a further line for the signature of the assignor. 
94. The standard SITLA form of lease assignment does not have a line for 
identification of the assignor, but only a signature line for the assignor. 
95. Vem Jones prepared lease assignment forms for all ten leases covered by the June 2000 
Letter Agreement. 
96. The forms for the eight BLM leases included typed identification of Mission as assignor 
and Sutton as manager. 
97. The two forms for assignment of the SITLA leases on Section 32 did not include any 
typed identification of Mission as assignor nor did they identify Sutton as manager. 
98. This was an oversight on the part of Mr. Jones and not an indication of the intent of 
Mission or Sutton not to transfer the interests identified in the June 2000 Letter Agreement. 
99. Wasatch sent the BLM and SITLA forms as prepared by Mr. Jones to Sutton for 
signature. 
100. Sutton signed each form on June 23, 2000, and returned the signed forms to 
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Wasatch. (Exhibit 10) 
- - 101. The clear intent _o_f Mission and Wasatch in executing the lease assignment 
documents was to transfer Mission's interest in the leases to Wasatch. 
102. As to both the May and June 2000 transactions, there were extensive negotiations 
relative to the terms of the letter agreements and the consideration to be paid for the lease interests. 
103. There was no evidence that, in so executing the SITLA forms, Sutton signed in haste or 
with any intent to sign for any entity other than Mission. 
104. Each of the eight BLM lease assignment forms prepared by Mr. Jones, executed at the 
same time as the SITLA forms, was signed by Sutton in a manner which identified Mission as the 
assignor and Sutton as Mission's manager. 
105. The two SITLA lease forms signed by Sutton did not identity Mission as assignor nor 
did they include any statement of Sutton's authority. 
106. In signing the SITLA forms as prepared by Mr. Jones, Sutton did not note that he was 
acting for Mission or in what capacity he was acting. 
107. At the time of both the May 2000 and the June 2000 transactions, Sutton was the sole 
manager of Mission. 
108. Sutton discussed both the May and June 2000 transactions with Jager, who did not at 
the time or subsequently express any opposition to the sale of the leases or the tenns of the sale and, at 
all times, manifested support for the actions taken by Sutton. 
109. Pursuant to the terms of paragraph 5.1(i) and (j)of the Operating Agreement, Sutton had 
actual authority, as sole manager of Mission and as the sole manager of Mission member and majority 
15 
DflSlU 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
interest holder Intermarket, to execute the SITLA lease forms on behalf of Mission. 
- - 110. Wasatch filedihe lease assigmTient forai_s as executed by Sutton with the appropriate 
governmental agencies: the BLM lease assigmnents with the BLM and the SITLA lease assigmnents 
with SITLA. 
111. Such lease assignments reside in the files of the particular governmental entity - BLM or 
SITLA - and, therefore, are a matter of public record available for review by anyone who might wish to 
do so in order to ascertain lease ownership or the status of title. 
112. There was no legal requirement that mineral leases with governmental agencies be 
recorded in the County Recorder's Office. 
113. Consistent with the two SITLA lease assignment forms, SITLA approved the 
assignment to Wasatch of all 80 acres of ML-43798 and 520 acres of the 560 acres covered by ML-
43451 together with all depths below 3398 feet in the 40 acres surrounding the Lavinia 1-32 well. 
114. SITLA issued a new lease - ML-43451 A, covering 520 acres- to reflect the transfer of 
the lease interest in that acreage to Wasatch, consistent with Mission's retention of the Lavinia 1-32 
well and surrounding 40 acres to the depth of 3,398 feet under ML-43451. 
115. Pursuant to the June 2000 Letter Agreement, Wasatch reimbursed Mission 
$3,629.40 for rentals paid by Mission on leases purchased by Wasatch. 
116. In addition, with respect to the Section 32 leases, Wasatch paid to SITLA over $4,000 
for assignment of the leases and for rentals between June 21, 2000 and August 9, 2001. 
117. In late June 2000, Wasatch met with the BLM and successfully reinstated the Jack 
Canyon leases that had expired and avoided deunitization of the Jack Canyon Unit. 
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118. Both Mission and Wasatch actively sought other parties to develop and drill on the lease 
property as contemplated in the June 2000 Letter Agreement so that all would benefit, and Wasatch 
made periodic reports in 2000 to Sutton regarding its attempts to commence drilling. (Exhibits 10, 12, 
14 through 17, 29) 
119. Following the transfer of leases pursuant to the June 2000 Letter Agreement, in 
addition to the right to participate in any drilling deal, Mission retained the following assets: 
a. The Lavinia 1-32 well (valued by Reott and Sutton at an amount in excess of 
the total of all outstanding Mission liabilities). 
b. Cash in the bank of at least $27,236.27. 
c. Amounts held by the State of Utah as a bond of $ 19,943.15. 
d. The Gusher leases (the precise value of which was not addressed at trial but 
which Sutton testified had value and the Lease Acquisition Memorandum 
identified as having value). 
120. Mission did not convey to Wasatch by the June 2000 Letter Agreement all of Mission's 
remaining assets identified in Finding No. 119 above. 
121. The sole evidence before the Court was that the fair value of Mission's assets as of 
June 21, 2000, exceeded its debts, notwithstanding Mission's inability as a start-up company to pay 
its debts as they became due. 
122. After the transfer of lease interests pursuant to the June 2000, Letter Agreement, Sutton 
continued to correspond with Reott, including letters dated August 16 and 22, 2000 (Exhibits 11 and 
12) and October 24, 2000 (Exhibit 16). 
123. Mission was not under any affirmative duty to inform creditors of the two sales of lease 
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interests to Wasatch. 
124. While Sutton did not disclose the particulars of the two transactions with Wasatch 
that had taken place in May and June 2000 (a fact that is entirely understandable given the adversarial 
relationship between Reott and Mission), his letters to Reott did accurately disclose that Mission was 
seeking a joint venture with an industry partner to develop a drilling program in which Mission would 
participate that would permit Mission to pay Reott and make Mission viable. 
125. Sutton did not commit fraud in sending these letters. 
126. Reott contacted Wasatch no later than August 22, 2000, regarding potential filing of his 
judgment against Mission properties. 
127. On August 22, 2000, Sutton wrote to Wasatch requesting that Wasatch refer any 
creditor or legal calls directly to Sutton's attention and not provide any written or verbal information 
regarding Wasatch's dealings with Mission to third parties without Mission's prior written permission. 
(Exhibit 118) 
128. The fact that Sutton wanted Wasatch to refer creditor inquiries to him, absent more, 
represents a defensible business decision and is not sufficient to establish fraudulent intent on his part. 
129. There was no evidence at trial that Wasatch ever complied with Sutton's request set forth 
in the August 22, 2000, letter, but rather the testimony was that Wasatch communicated with Mission's 
creditors both before and after the date of Exhibit 118. 
130. By letter dated August 31, 2000 (Exhibit 320), Jager advised Reott that he was "on the 
sidelines" with respect to the affairs of Mission and presented himself merely as a creditor who, like 
Reott, was seeking to recover what he had advanced to Mission. * 
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131. Jager did not sign the August 31, 2000, letter in any representative capacity, nor does 
the document reflect that it was sent on behalf of Mission. 
132. On September 18, 2000, Reott recovered the sum of $27,236.37 from the bank accounts 
of Mission pursuant to his earlier garnishment. 
133. Effective October 1, 2000, Sutton resigned as manager of Mission although he continued 
to correspond with Wasatch and Reott in some capacity thereafter. 
134. On October 27, 2000, Reott filed and docketed his Colorado Judgment in this Court. 
135. In early January 2001, Wasatch provided Reott with copies of the documents 
evidencing the May 1, 2000 and June 21, 2000, letter agreement transactions. 
136. By letter dated January 10, 2001 (Exhibit 120), Reott wrote to Jager acknowledging (a) 
Sutton's resignation as manager, (b) the transfer of leases from Mission to Wasatch pursuant to the May 
1, 2000 and June 21, 2000 letter agreements, and (c) Mission's continuing lease interest in the 40 acres 
surrounding the Lavinia 1-32 well. 
137. On January 17, 2001, Jager wrote in response to Reott's January 10, 2001, letter. 
(Exhibit 29) 
138. The January 17,2001, letter was on Mission letterhead and Jager signed the letter as 
"chairman" of Mission. 
139. In the letter, Jager did not contradict Sutton's authority. 
140. Among other things, Jager confirmed his knowledge of the May 1, 2000 and June 21, 
2000, transactions between Wasatch and Mission and his support of the transactions and the reasoning 
behind them. * 
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141. The January 17, 2001, letter establishes that, to the extent he functioned as a manager 
of Mission or had ownership as a member of Mission, Jager either gave oral authorization to Sutton of 
the May 1, 2000 and June 21, 2000 transactions at the time they took place or, after receiving fall 
knowledge of the transactions, ratified them at a later date (a finding the Court now makes 
notwithstanding the previous determination that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
ratification, which finding the Court hereby vacates). 
142. At no time did Jager or anyone else associated with Mission contradict Sutton's 
authority to enter into the May 1, 2000 and June 21, 2000, transactions with Wasatch on behalf of 
Mission. 
143. In connection with Reott's attempts to collect on his Colorado Judgment, he was able 
to locate both Sutton and Jager and both appeared in May 2001 for depositions. 
144. Still later, in this action, Reott was able to locate and take additional deposition 
testimony from Sutton, which was admitted into evidence at trial. 
145. Mission did not abscond or in any way secrete itself to avoid creditors; rather, the 
evidence shows that Mission remained in touch with Reott, responded to his inquiries and dealt with 
him until such time as Mission ceased operations in early 2001. 
146. By assignments dated January 19, 2001 and April 27, 2001, Reott acquired the 
judgments obtained against Mission and its property by J-West and Key Energy. (Exhibits 380 and 
381.) 
147. On February 21, 2001, Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation transferred its entire 
interest in the various leases it had acquired from Mission to Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC. 
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148. The principals of Wasatch organized Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC on advice from their tax 
accountant, who infomiedihem that, with the buyout of a corporate shareholder in 2000, the owners of 
Wasatch could reduce their tax liability by forming an LLC to take the place of Wasatch Oil & Gas 
Corporation and transferring the assets of the corporation into the LLC. 
149. The February 21, 2001, transfer was a legitimate business transaction and was not 
undertaken to place any asset formerly owned by Mission out of the reach of creditors or for any other 
fraudulent purpose. 
150. As with previous assignments of government mineral leases, these lease 
assignments were a matter of public record. 
151. The February 21, 2001, transfer was not done with fraudulent intent. 
152. No later than March 1, 2001, Mission ceased to function by reason of Reott's collection 
efforts. 
153. Thereafter, there was no one representing Mission with whom Wasatch could deal 
regarding its promise to include Mission in any drilling deal. 
154. Wasatch had never dealt with Jager and there is no evidence that Wasatch knew of 
Jager or that, during the relevant time period, Jager purported to act on behalf of Mission 
155. By order No. 157-3 dated May 29, 2001, the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining 
vacated order No. 157-1. 
156. On August 9, 2001, pursuant to notice and direction from this Court, the Sheriff of 
Carbon County held a sale to sell the leases on Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34 to satisfy the three 
judgments held by Reott. 
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157. Reott received payment on his judgment by reason of the sheriffs sale in the form of his 
own credit bid oi$LOO at the sheriff s sale. 
158. There were no other bidders at the sheriffs sale. 
159. On December 21, 2001 and again on January 18, 2002, Wasatch filed notices to 
exercise a right of redemption with respect to Sections 27, 33, and 34 and those portions of Section 32 
acquired by Wasatch pursuant to the June 2000 Letter Agreement. 
160. The Carbon County sheriff either rejected the notices of redemption or simply 
disregarded them. 
161. On February 9, 2002, the Carbon County sheriff issued a sheriffs deed to Reott for 
Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34. 
162. Effective April 1, 2002, Wasatch sold its interests in Section 32, along with other 
properties, to BBC. 
163. Pursuant to this Court's Ruling dated December 15, 2005 and the Order of Summary 
Judgment entered on May 24, 2006, paragraph 1, Wasatch has redeemed Sections 27, 33 and 34 by 
paying to Reott the sum of $ 1.06 as required by law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Utah Court of Appeals, reversing a partial summary judgment in favor of Reott on 
the quiet title issue and Wasatch's attempted redemption of Section 32, directed this Court to hold a 
trial with respect to the sole potential legal impediments to redemption: (a) lack of actual authority on 
the part of Sutton to act for Mission in transferring the Section 32 lease interests, and (b) fraudulent 
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transfer of the Section 32 interests from Mission to Wasatch. 
.._ 2.._ _ The mandate of the Utah Court of Appeals did not limit the evidence this Court could 
receive and consider with respect to the resolution of these two issues on remand. 
3. This Court's resolution of the fraudulent transfer issue could also potentially impact the 
status of title of the lease interests, apart from Section 32, transfeiTed pursuant to both the May 1, 2000 
Letter Agreement and the June 21, 2000 Letter Agreement. 
4. Wasatch's claim of successor-in-interest status with respect to Mission's interests in 
Section 32 in order to redeem that interest after the August 9, 2001, Sheriffs Sale pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 69(j) (2001), will be deemed valid if Wasatch had either legal title to the 
Section 32 leases or an equitable interest in those leases. 
5. If Sutton had actual authority to execute the lease assignment documents, Wasatch 
held legal title and was a successor in interest. 
6. With respect to the issue of Sutton's actual authority to execute the Section 32 lease 
assignments, Wasatch had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Sutton had 
actual authority from Mission. 
7. This Court had previously entered Partial Summary Judgment in favor of Reott on the 
issue of Mission's ratification of Sutton's authority. The Court now vacates that Partial Summary 
Judgment based on the contents of Jager's letter dated January 17, 2001 (Exhibit 29). 
8. Based on the findings of fact set forth above, this Court concludes that Wasatch has met 
its burden to prove actual authority by a preponderance of the evidence as follows: 
a. Mission was a closely held corporation with only two or three members/ 
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I 
owners at any time. 
b. Intermarket, at all times, held the controlling, majority ownership interest in 
- Mission. - - - _ - _• ._ _ _. .._ _ _ _ 
c. Sutton was the sole manager of Intermarket. 
d. After the departure of Muller and Willard in May 1998, Sutton acted as sole 
manager of Mission until October 2000. 
e. Reott and SITLA both recognized Sutton as authorized to take action on 
behalf of Mission notwithstanding any requirements in the Operating 
Agreement. 
f. While Jager was not involved in the management of Mission from May 1998 
to October 2000, his correspondence and Sutton's testimony establish that 
Jager had knowledge of and was in agreement with the actions taken by 
Sutton with respect to the sale of leases to Wasatch. 
g. No one comiected with Mission ever challenged the actions taken by Sutton. 
9. Both the June 2000 Letter Agreement and the payments made by Wasatch to 
SITLA to preserve the Section 32 lease interests gave Wasatch an equitable interest in the 
Section 32 interests assigned to it by Mission which, absent a valid defense thereto, was a 
sufficient separate ground to support successor-in-interest status for purposes of redemption 
under Rule 69(j). 
10. Reott advances the defense of actual intent to defraud in the transfer of the Section 
32 interests to defeat Wasatch's equitable interest in the Section 32 interests. 
11. Reott has the burden of proving fraud, whether premised on actual intent under common 
law or on statutory grounds, by the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence. 
12. Based on the findings set forth above, this Court concludes that Reott has failed to 
prove actual intent to defraud - either on the part of Mission or on the part of Wasatch - by clear and 
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convincing evidence, as follows (referencing the "badges of fraud" as outlined in Exhibit 728): 
_ a. While the assignment of the Section 32 interests occurred after the recording 
of mechanics liens, foreclosure actions and judgments, this alone does not 
prove fraud because Sutton believed (consistent with the testimony of Reott) 
that the Lavinia 1-32 well, a producing well not transferred to Wasatch, had 
sufficient value to pay off all creditors including Reott. 
b. The division of lease ML-43541 was not intended to defraud creditors but, 
based on Wasatch's understanding of the relevant spacing unit, was intended 
only to avoid entanglement by Wasatch in existing claims against the Lavinia 
1-32 well. 
c. While Mission was not paying its debts as they came due, the presumption 
raised by this fact is rebutted by the undisputed evidence from Sutton and 
Reott demonstrating that, as of May 1, 2000 and June 21, 2000, the fair value 
of the Lavinia 1-32 well alone (not taking into account the value of the Gusher 
interests and cash and bonds in hand) exceeded the total debts of Mission. 
d. Mission did not convey all of its assets to Wasatch. 
e. Mission did not abscond but continued to communicate with Reott at least 
through February 2001 and to participate in depositions in the Reott collection 
action in May 2001 and as late as 2004 in this action. 
f. Although the SITLA mineral lease assignment fonns for the Section 32 
interests were not recorded with Carbon County, they were public records on 
file with the State of Utah, there was no legal requirement that such leases be 
recorded, and there was no intent to conceal the forms. 
g. Sutton did not execute the mineral lease assignment fonns in haste, nor did he 
act without regard for any governing rule of Mission then applicable. 
h. The assignment of the Section 32 lease interests was not concealed from creditors. 
Wasatch provided documentation of the assignment to Reott in January 2001 and 
Jager acknowledged the transaction in February 2001. 
i. The transfer of leases from Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation to Wasatch Oil & Gas, 
L.L.C. was solely for tax and business purposes and was not undertaken to place 
assets out of the reach of Mission creditors. 
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13. Based on the findings set forth above, this Court finds that Reott has failed to 
prov€ by clear and convincing evidence that Mission's sale of mineral leases to Wasatch in May 
and June 2000 was a fraudulent transfer pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-6 
as follows: 
a. As already noted, absent more, the evidence would support the presumption 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-3(2), but that presumption is rebutted by the 
undisputed testimony that the "fair value" of all of the assets of Mission 
exceeded the sum of its debts as of May and June 2000. 
b. The evidence offered through Donald Stinson was not sufficient in content, 
analysis or detail to support the value conclusions to which he testified or a 
finding on clear and convincing evidence that Wasatch did not give 
"reasonably equivalent value" for the lease interests assigned to it by Mission 
in May and June 2000. 
c. The method of valuation utilized by Wasatch, and accepted by Mission, in 
fixing the amounts offered at the time of the transactions - including full 
analysis of properties, reliance on auction prices, reference to status of leases, 
competitors in the market and obligations undertaken - establishes that 
Mission received "reasonably equivalent value" for the leases. 
14. Wasatch is the successor-in-interest to Mission's leasehold interests in Section 32, 
excluding the Lavinia 1-32 well and the surrounding 40 acres to a depth of 3,398 feet. 
15. Wasatch has redeemed Section 32, excluding the Lavinia 1-32 well and the surrounding 
40 acres to a depth of 3,398 feet. 
16. Wasatch and BBC are entitled to entry of judgment quieting title to the Section 32 
interest - ML 43541 A, ML 43798, and ML 43541 below 3,398 feet in depth to the center of the earth-
in BBC. 
17. The sum of $1.06 paid to Reott previously in connection with Wasatch's redemption of 
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Sections 27, 33 and 34 shall constitute sufficient performance under Rule 69(j) of the Utah Rules of 
-CivilProcedure (2001) with jrespect to the redemption of the Section 32 interests listed in Conclusion 
No. 15 above and Wasatch is deemed to have taken all steps precedent to redeeming those interests and 
need take no further steps. 
18. Reott shall remove all lis pendens currently filed against any property of BBC. 
Dated February Z^f , 2009. 
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FILED 
AUG 1 9 2009 
I SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WITHIN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, UTAH 
WASATCH OIL & GAS, L.L.C, a FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Utah limited liability company, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, re: DAMAGES 
v. 
Case No. 010700991 
EDWARD A. REOTT, et. al. 
Defendants. 
The trial of this action to the Court commenced on October 27, 20O8 and continued 
through October 31, 2008. The plaintiff Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C. and related companies 
("Wasatch") were represented by Eric Olson and Matthew Richards. The defendant Edward A. 
Reott and related companies ("Reott") were represented by Craig Smith, Scott Crook and Bryan 
Bryner. The third-party defendant Bill Barrett Corporation ("BBC") was represented by Carolyn 
Mcintosh, Donna Vetrano Pryor and Nick Sampinos. 
At the direction of the Court, evidence of damages relating to Reott's claims against 
Wasatch and BBC for breach of common carrier obligations and against BBC for trespass, 
trespass to chattels and conversion was presented during the final three days of trial. In its Order 
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Granting Partial Summary Judgment dated May 24, 2006 (the "2006 Partial Summary 
Judgment"), the Court had previously granted summary judgment to Reott on the issues of 
liability under those claims. On the issue of damages, Reott called as witnesses Edward Reott, 
Randy Smuin, and Dr. Donald Stinson (expert). BBC called as witnesses Greg Hinds, Fred 
Goodrich, David Posner, and J. Craig Creel (expert). Both Wasatch and BBC called Todd 
Cusick. Reott called Edward Reott in rebuttal. In addition to the documents already in evidence 
at trial as identified in this Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re: Quiet Title and 
Fraudulent Transfer Claims dated February 27, 2009 (the "Quiet Title Findings and 
Conclusions") at page 2 thereof, the following documents were admitted into evidence during the 
last three days of trial: Exhibits 23, 25 (pages 3 and 4 only), 127, 205-210, 219, 220, 234, 244, 
248, 385, 417, 422, 444 (Ex. 2-5 only), 458 (exhibits A and B thereto only), 708, and 728. 
Finally, following the close of evidence on the issue of damages and at the Court's direction, the 
parties filed written closing arguments relating to the Reott parties' claims for damages. 
The Court, having heard the testimony presented at trial, having reviewed the exhibits 
received at trial and the written closing arguments submitted by the parties, having issued its 
written Ruling On Damages dated May 29, 2009, and being otherwise sufficiently advised, 
hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re: Damages: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court incorporates the Quiet Title Findings and Conclusions. 
2. Prior to 2001, when Reott acquired an interest in the Lavinia 1-32 well, Wasatch had 
acquired from McCullis Resources Co., Inc. a gas gathering system that served the Nine Mile 
Canyon area. 
3. The Wasatch-owned system was quite old, parts of it having been installed in the early 
1980s, and included the pipeline that served the Lavinia 1-32 well, from the oriface plate on 
downstream. (The oriface plate was the interface between the Lavinia 1-32 well and the meter 
shack.) 
4. Wasatch had installed the pipeline from the gathering system to the meter shack, as 
well as the meter shack itself 
5. Wasatch also maintained the meter shack, replaced the charts measuring the gas from 
the Lavinia 1-32 well that passed into the gas gathering system, and maintained the pen 
recorders. 
6. Fred Goodrich, who was first employed by Wasatch and later by BBC as maintenance 
supervisor, had the responsibility for that maintenance, including changing the recording data 
sheets and ensuring the batteries were changed so the meter functioned properly. 
7. During the time that Mission Energy, LLC ("Mission") owned the Lavinia 1-32 well, 
Wasatch's president, Todd Cusick, informed employees of a contractor, J-West Oilfield Service 
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Inc., that the pipeline from the meter shack to the main gas gathering line belonged to Wasatch. 
8. On June 1,1999, Wasatch had entered into a gas gathering agreement with Mission 
that required Wasatch to maintain the equipment necessary to meter the gas collected from the 
Lavinia 1-32 well, which included the line and meter shack. 
9. Mission defaulted on obligations owed to a number of creditors. 
10. On August 9, 2001, the Carbon County Sheriff held a foreclosure sale and sold at 
auction Mission's interests in the mineral leases covering Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34 of Township 
12 South, Range 8 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian, which included the Lavinia 1-32 well. 
11. Mission never owned the pipeline nor an interest in the pipeline that ran through 
Sections 27, 32., 33 and 34, and which served the Lavinia 1-32 well. Wasatch owned and 
maintained the pipeline, meter shack and meter that served the Lavinia 1-32 well. 
12. Wasatch did not receive notice of the sheriffs sale. 
13. Reott bid $ 1.00 as a credit bid, and being the only bidder at the sale, received the 
leases and property. 
14. Within a day or so, Mr. Reott telephoned Todd Cusick to request access to the 
Wasatch pipeline for purposes of transporting and selling natural gas produced from the Lavinia 
1-32 well. 
15. As Mr. Cusick did not believe that the sale had occurred, he did not respond to Mr. 
Reott's request for access. 
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: \iier additional telephone calls to Mr. Cusick, Mr. Reott on August 27, 2001, sent 
Wasatch a letter asking that they respond to his request to access the pipeline. 
1
 Mi ' ,iMtt ilnl no* 'fspnii'i In Mi Rcoll nillu'i Wasatch rttlemplni 1o redeem the 
leases and property located in Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34 (.wen: a portion of a lease in Section 
32 and the Lavima 1-32 well) and, when this attempt proved unsuccessful, 'W'asatcl i initiated this 
ai Don lo quid lillt 
18. On February 9, 2002, the Carbon County Sheriff issued to Reott a deed for the 
property in spite of objections lodged b> Wasatch 
19. The Lavima 1-32 well was shut in at the time of the sheriffs sale; nonetheless, due to 
M: Reott's efforts, the well was operational within approximately one week Iroiu inc date of the 
-hcnil- sab. 
20. On or about August 6, 2002, Reott became aware that BBC had purchased from 
Wasatch, and was operating, the pipeline u> w niui IIJC La*.;..;,: ; *. .\ ui was connected. 
21 It I a letter to BBC dated A/i igiist 6, 2002, Marcy Underdahl, as president of Regoal, 
Inc., explained the background of the Lavima 1-32 well and requested access to the pipeline to 
n . , : ; K O i i l K U<; p - . i n . • . • • . ; • ' • ' * , " 
22. As a result of that letter, the parties began to negotiate a gas gathering agreement, 
primarily through their attorneys, 
23. BBC 1 purchased the gas gathering system froi n Wa satch effective on '\ pi il 1 2002, 
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and assumed operation of the system on that same date. The purchase agreement was signed on 
April 15, 2002. 
24. The finding in the 2006 Partial Summary Judgment or findings and conclusions in 
support thereof that June 25, 2002 was the effective date of BBC's assumption of operational 
control of the pipeline is hereby vacated based on the evidence at trial. 
25. When BBC took over the system, the Lavinia well was connected to the gathering 
system. 
26. BBC determined that the gas gathering system, particularly the pipeline servicing the 
area where the Lavinia well was located, was inadequate: it was comprised of old, leaky piping 
and was inadequately sized for the field, it consisted primarily of 2" pipe, which was too small to 
move much gas, and the line pressures would increase with increased gas production volume. 
27. In fact, due to the pressures produced by wells drilled in the Prickly Pear field, 
between 300 to 400 psi, the Lavinia well, which produced only 40 psi, would be unable to move 
gas into the gathering system without a compressor. 
28. In October 2003, BBC began replacing the 2" and 4" gathering system pipe in 
Sections 32 and 33 with a 10" steel collection pipe. 
29. On or about October 30, 2003, the gas gathering pipeline from the BBC lateral 
connected to the Lavinia well was damaged by a BBC crew in the process of installing the larger 
lateral line to serve the Lavinia well and two other wells in Section 32. 
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30. The crew pulled on the line with a piece of equipment, not realizing the line was 
connected to the meter shack of the Lavinia well. 
3 .. -hHM-raih- >• ih '-. ; • *. .»i 01 ihe line was accidental on BBC's part, as the 
crew was unaware that the line was connected to the meter shack of the Lavinia well. 
32. 'I he pull on the pipe moved the inetei shad; mtu .J live, bioke tin; lint i/oiniKvluij the 
meter shack to the lateral and broke the line from the meter shack to the storage tank. 
33. Mr Reott discovered the damage on or about November 1,2003. 
•i ^i; ; '-. •.-:•..*•. to the I Itah Di\ isioii of Oil Gas and Mining, who 
notified Fred Goodrich of BBC, who in turn sent Jeff Adley, BBC's construction foreman, to the 
Lavinia well to observe the damage. 
•••
1
-i-,N .m:i \% "--on ;,,:• y *i ,.* well on or about November 6, 2003. 
36. Mi \dle\ observed the temperature of the oil h, the tank on that date was 138 
degrees I ahreiiiieit. 
3 /. Mr. Goodrich inspected the damages himself on November 7, 2003. 
38. A BBC crew promptly repaired the line and meter shack, and completed the work by 
N o v e : • • i i - • • • •• 
39 Mi, Goodrich returned to the site personally to inspect the repairs on that date, and 
observed the flow from the well was bypassing the separator and co-producing oil and gas 
directly into tl le fil >erglass storage tank, resulting in strong vibrations shaking the oil inlet pipe 
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i 
connected to the fiberglass tank. 
40. Storage tanks normally are metal, not fiberglass. 
41. There was no oil leaking at the time Mr. Goodrich visited the site on November 10, 
2003. 
42. Mr. Reott returned to the well on November 28, 2003 to inspect the repairs and 
turned on the heater for the storage tank. 
43. On or about December 1, 2003, Mr. Reott returned to the well and found that oil had 
leaked out of the storage tank and into the container berm surrounding the tank. 
44. Mr. Reott pulled away the metal skin and insulation from the outside of the tank 
where the oil line fed into the lower portion of the tank and found the coupling had come loose. 
He tightened the coupling and this stopped the leak from occurring again. 
45. Mr. Reott estimated the loss at 100 barrels of oil. 
46. He rented a backhoe and truck to haul away the oil and clean up the residue. 
47. BBC did not reconnect the Lavinia lateral to the main line. 
48. The court is unable to determine the actual cost of the reconnection of the lateral line 
to the main gathering line because Reott's testimony at trial was only as to the cost of 
reconfiguring the entire setup of the meter shack, pipeline, and other lines around the Lavinia 
well, rather than simply the cost associated with reconnecting to the BBC gathering line. 
49. Reott was unable even to identify the quantity of pipe necessary to make the 
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connection to the gathering line. 
50. BBC and Reott continued to negotiate a gas gathering agreement even w ink Ui: 
matter was pending. 
51. On • •!• aoout May 27, 2004, BBC provided to Reott two proposed agreements, though 
each contained a clause permitting interruption of the gas gathering from the La\ inia well tc the 
gathering system at BBC's discretion. 
52. The parties finally reached an accommodation, and they signed a gas gathering 
auieem .\;' 
53. Reott began production under this agreement later in that same year. 
54. This Court previously held on summary judgment that \\ usaich and riB<" were 
con mioi I carriei s and that each had breached its corn mon carrier responsibilities by failing to 
provide a reasonable gas gathering agreement to Reott, and consequently were liable for damages 
during the period from April 1, 2002 through July 7, 2005 as maybe proved at trial. 
55. At trial, Reott's expert, Dr. Stinson, testified, without explaining the basis for that 
opinion, that the supply of commercially recoverable gas in the Lavinia 1-32 well is "for all 
practical pi irposes5 infinite." 
56. In contrast, Mr. Creel, expert for BBC and Wasatch, testified that the supply of 
commercially recoverable gas is not infinite. 
57 riie gas in aresei voir is fn lite. othei wise gas wells would i lever be capped but would. 
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produce infinitely. 
58. The Lavinia well is located in a tight sandstone formation, the Wasatch Formation. 
59. A reservoir in a tight sandstone formation recovers during a period when a well is 
shut in and thereafter enjoys a higher pressure at the well bore, and consequent increase in 
production after that interval, but production eventually declines. 
60. Both Dr. Stinson and Mr. Creel testified that production would settle out into a 
hyperbolic curve after sustained pumping. 
61. This is borne out by the production records of the Lavinia well, which show that after 
each shut-in period, the production of the Lavinia well spiked to a level higher than that at the 
time the well was shut in, then settled into a period of lower production. 
62. Based on the production records, the shut in period beginning in April 2002 did not 
damage the Lavinia well 
63. The price of gas in January, February and March, 2002 never rose above $2.19; in 
contrast, during the time the Lavinia well was connected to the BBC system, April 2005 through 
April 2006, the price of gas did not drop below $5.32. 
64. The increase in gas prices during the time the well was shut in resulted in higher 
profits for Reott than could have been realized had he been given access prior to 2005. 
65. Primarily due to low gas prices at the time, the commercial value of the Lavinia well 
in 2002 was effectively zero; Reott's costs of production in 2002 would have exceeded any 
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potential revenue. 
66. In contrast, based on projected co-production of oil and gas over the life of the well, 
projected price of oil and gas, projected costs of production, taxes and transportation of the 
product, discounted to a present value, the well had a value of $99,000.00 in 2008. 
67. Dr. Stinson's testimony concerning lost profits covered only the period from April 
2002 through March 2004; however, because the Court has adopted Mr. Creel's theory relative to 
damages, it would not matter if the Court had heard testimony from Dr. Stinson for the period 
through 2006, because the higher prices commanded by producers during that later period mean 
Reott suffered no damages, and actually received a higher price for the gas he placed in the 
system as a result of the delay in obtaining a gas gathering agreement. 
68. There was no testimony relative to any time value of money Reott would have 
received for the sale of gas between April 2002 and July 2005. 
69. Reott suffered no damages as a result of any breach by Wasatch or BBC of their 
common carrier obligations. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Common Carrier Damages 
1. Whether Wasatch or BBC owes damages to Reott for breach of common carrier duties 
fundamentally depends on whether there exists a finite amount of commercially recoverable gas 
in the reservoir in which the Lavinia well is drilled. 
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2. If the amount of commercially recoverable gas is finite, damages would be dependent 
on the price of gas during the period when Reott could not produce because Wasatch or BBC 
were not gathering Reott's gas, as compared to a later period when Reott was able to produce. 
3. If the amount of commercially recoverable gas is infinite, Reott would never be able 
to make up the gas not produced during that period and would have suffered damages whatever 
the price of gas if that price exceeded the cost of production. 
4. Based on the findings of fact set forth above, including the specific finding that the 
amount of gas in the reservoir drained by the Lavinia well is finite, Reott has suffered no 
damages as a result of any breach by Wasatch or BBC of their common carrier obligations. 
5. Wasatch's obligations as a common carrier ceased upon its sale of the gas gathering 
system to BBC effective April 1,2002. 
Trespass to Chattels 
6. Reott seeks damages from BBC based on the damages to the meter shack, pipeline and 
oil tank due to BBC's removal of the lateral line connecting the Lavinia to the BBC gathering line 
in October 2003. 
7. As to Reott's claim of damages related to the oil spill, Reott had the burden to prove 
that the actions of BBC's crew caused the oil spill. 
8. On summary judgment, the court found that the oil production line had been bent as a 
result of BBC's actions; however, the evidence at trial showed the oil production line had not 
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been bent. 
9. Further, there is a logical alternate explanation for causation. 
10. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court vacates its ruling set forth in the 
2006 Summary Judgment as to causation of the oil leak. 
11. As a matter of law, the evidence at trial did not establish that BBC caused the oil leak 
or that it is liable for any damages arising from the oil leak. 
12. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the oil spill resulted from a loose 
connection at the oil inlet coupling between the oil pipe and tank; consequently, BBC is not 
responsible for any damages caused by the leak. 
13. BBC promptly repaired the damage to the meter shack and gas line caused by its 
removal and upgrade of the lateral line, at no cost to Reott, and so Reott is not entitled to 
damages therefor. 
14. As to the cost of reconnecting the well to the lateral gathering line, BBC had the duty 
to reconnect the well to the lateral gathering line and BBC would be liable for the cost of 
reconnecting had Reott established the cost at trial. 
15. Because there was no evidence of the cost of reconnection to the gathering line, BBC 
is not liable to Reott for any damages due to the removal of the lateral line. 
16. BBC is not liable for damages due to removal of the lateral line. 
17. Reott is not entitled to an award of damages against Wasatch. 
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i 
18. Reott is not entitled to an award of damages against BBC. 
DATED this 17 day of August, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
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Mbsicm Energy, LLC 
531 Eiidiiitas Boulevard, Suite 200 
EuciuiitasjCA 92024 
January 17,2001 
Mr. Edward Roett, President 
Belle Oil & Gas, Ine, 
93 South Fifth Avenue 
Clarion, PA 16214 
Good morning, Kd: 
I am in receipt of your January 10,2001 letter, which frankly greatly disturbs me. Allow me 
please to present you with the facts as 1 understand them concerning a certain 'Utah lease 
transaction, in an effort to correct your apparent misunderstanding of the situation* 
I am informed Ibal Mission Energy did sell approximately 2,500 acres that were held in a block 
as Stone Cabin. These properties were located in various sections of Carbon County. During the 
development of Peters Points, it was determined that these leases would most likely not have any 
development potential for the company. They were held in an enviioninentally protected area, 
were difficult to access, end despite Mission Energy's efforts there had not been any interest by 
potential partners in Ibis region. 
As the leases began to expire, Mission Energy was approached by Wasatch Energy with a 
proposal to purchase the remaining leases in the Stone Cabin area. No reasons were given 
regarding their interest in this area. However, it was stated,, and we now believe that there was 
no anticipated drilling on those locations, J.C. Sutton has spoken with Wasatch Energy, and 
confirmed that tbey have not drilled any locations in this area. We are convinced that with 
current BUM positions in that area, the leases will expire before any drilling can commence. 
With this background, and the language of the Utah Lease Acquisition program, 1 can only 
indicate my opinion that no monies are due at this time to Belle Oil & Gas for the sale of the 
Stone Cabin acreage block. There may, however, be a liability for the Jacks Canyon Unit 
acreage in the future. Please tmdeisiand, in this instance* Mission Energy conveyed their 
ownership to Wasatch Energy in return for future consideration as a carried interest for any wells 
drilled within the unit by Wasatch Energy. There were no drill sites conveyed, ouly acreage, 
with the commitment for future compensation. 
Ed, may I point out to yon that the reason this transaction with Watsatch occurred at all was 
because Mission Energy had substantial ongoing legal expenses and garnishment of its accounts, 
all as a result of your activities against the company. Whether by design or by coincidence, io 
my opinion, your continuing harassment of Mission Energy, its assets, other creditors, as well as 
current and potential partners continues to cause extreme financial and reputation damage. 1 ask 
you again to please cease this counter productive activity. 
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Mr. Routt 
IJelle Oil & Gas. Inc. 
January 17, 2001 
Page Two 
Over Lhe pat several years, J,C. and 1 have repeatedly requested to meet with you to create a 
mutually beneficial arrangement which would resolve both your financial concerns, as well as 
those of other creditors. Personally 1 have invested over $200,000 in Mission Energy, been 
involved with the project for five years as an outside investor, and have never taken one penny 
out of the company other than a token interest payment three or four years ago. Intermarket 
Trading Company has over $165,000 into Mission 'Energy, and other vendors and investor 
partners have claims as well. 
I understand you have been attempting to buy up creditor liens. If your goal is to foreclose on 
Lhese lions, thai will be an illogical strategy. Instead we should be working together to boost tbe 
company, and benefit together from drilling programs, subsequent lease sales, etc. Your 
negative efforts arc destroying these opportunities tor everyone associated with this company. 
Accordingly, I politely invite you to become part of Mission Energy's .solution, and to stop being 
such a destructive force. By being an adversary, you may win a battle here or there, hut you will 
definitely cause the company to die in die process, which no doubt will have its own 
repercussions and consequences. 
I leave you with two thoughts. First, I am told and I now believe that we do not owe Belle Oil & 
Gas any funds at this time as a result of the Wasatch transaction- Second, Ed, please consider 
being part of the solution, because your constant negative activities are materially contributing to 
the destruction of Mission Energy for everyone, including yourself. 
Sincerely, ___^  
MISSIQf^NliRGY, LLC 
Ua* 
<§3^red G. Jager, Chairman 
ce: JX. Sutton 
i 
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y/\\Wasatch 
Z_\Oil&Gas 
Wednesday May 31, 2000 
I.C SuUon fviafex: 760-436-5777) 
Mission Energy 
531 EncinitasBlvd Suite 200 
Encinitas, CA 92024 
DcarJ.C: 
We suggest that we modify our letter agreement dated May 24,2000, between Wasatch and 
Mission regarding the transfer of the Jack Canyon Unit to Wasatch." We suggest that we include 
the Lavinia #1-32 hi the transfer. This inclusion is contingent upon Mission obtaining 
agreements to clear all of the liens for less than $2O;00Q.OG, We suggest that you contact the 
companies that are owed money on the Lavinia #1-32 and see if this can be done. So far we 
have identified Key Energy and J-Wcst Please let us know who else may be owed money on 
this well. 
As I said earlier today, we will be meeting with the State Lands Administration on June 6*. This 
meeting will help us determine if we elect to go forward with this transaction. We arc hopeful 
lhal we can get them to reinstate the leases that have expired. If we are successful with the State 
Lands Administration then we will try to accomplish \he same with the fll -M as three of the live 
federal leases have been cancelled. 
Sincerely, 
Todd Cnsick 
President 
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Westlaw,. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 25-5-1 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 25. Fraud 
*H Chapter 5. Statute of Frauds 
-+ § 25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power 
over or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, sur-
rendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed 
by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
CREDIT(S) 
Codifications R.S. 1898, §§ 1974, 2461; C.L. 1907, §§ 1974, 24612; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; R.S. 1933, § 
33-5-1; C. 1943,33-5-1. 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Westlaw, 
U.C.A. 1953 § 25-6-2 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 25. Fraud 
*H§ Chapter 6. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Refs & Annos) 
.+ § 25-6-2. Definitions 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, con-
trolled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or 
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person 
who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substan-
tially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of 
the debtor's assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien; 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a credit-
or holding a claim against only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, 
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim. 
(7) "Insider" includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative ofthe debtor or of a general partner of the debtor; -
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(a)(ii); 
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control; or 
(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager; 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation: 
(i) a director ofthe debtor; 
(ii) an officer ofthe debtor; 
(iii) a person in control of the debtor; 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(b)(iv); 
(vi) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor; 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership: 
(i) a general partner in the debtor; 
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor; 
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(c)(iii); 
(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vi) a person in control of the debtor; 
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company: 
(i) a member or manager of the debtor; 
(ii) another limited liability company in which the debtor is a member or manager; 
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(d)(iii); 
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member, manager, or person in control of the debtor; 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and 
(f) a managing agent of the debtor. 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an 
obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable 
process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, organization, 
government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial 
entity. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership. 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a spouse, related by consanguinity within the 
third degree as determined by the common law, or a spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive relation-
ship within the third degree. 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of 
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, 
and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. 
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by leg-
al or equitable process or proceedings. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1988, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1992, c. 168, § 1. 
Codifications C. 1953, § 25A-1-2. 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab L 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM L 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Westlaw. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 25-6-3 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 25. Fraud 
*{§ Chapter 6. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Refs & Annos) 
- t § 25-6-3. Insolvency 
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valu- ation. 
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent. 
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the ag-
gregate, at a fair valuation, of all of the partnership's assets and the sum of the excess of the value of each gener-
al partner's nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership debts. 
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under 
this chapter. 
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is secured by a valid lien on property of 
the debtor not included as an asset. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 25. Fraud 
* ! Chapter 6. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Refs & Annos) 
-t § 25-6-4. Value-Transfer 
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is trans-
ferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied. However, value does not include an unperformed promise 
made other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support to the debtor or another per-
son. 
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5 (l)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the per-
son acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale 
or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the debtor upon default under 
a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement. 
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor and the transferee is intended by 
them to be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 25. Fraud 
*H Chapter 6. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 25-6-6. Fraudulent transfer—Claim arising before transfer 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the 
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the transfer or obligation; and 
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. 
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if 
the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider 
had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 
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